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UP AGAINST THE WALL OF SEPARATION:
THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY
Bruce Ledewitz'
INTRODUCTION
Can religious democracy be a question for the United States? Are we not
beyond such sectarianism? Are we not pluralistic and fundamentally secular in our
laws? We are not Iraq, with its conflicting Shiite and Sunni communities. Nor are
we the State of Israel, which grants benefits and preferences based upon the Jewish
religion of most of its citizens. Surely in the United States, religious democracy is
not a question.
Two recent events, however, suggest that religion now has a dominant place in
American political life. The first event was the re-election of President George W.
Bush in the November 2004 presidential election, along with somewhat enlarged
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress. The second event was the March
2005 spectacle surrounding the death of Theresa Marie Schiavo. In both events,
religion, including political organizing and influence by people who identify them-
selves as religious, played the key role.
Religion's newfound presence is not confined to politics. There was a time that
mainstream television would not feature this society's majority religion, Christian-
ity.1 In 2005, however, ABC broadcast a respectful and serious examination of the
resurrection of Jesus, 2 and NBC aired a show - Revelations - that seemed to
imitate aspects of the well-known Left Behind book series3 by suggesting that the
current age may be the biblically predicted end-times.4 A year earlier, ABC broad-
cast several hours examining the roots of early Christianity.5 Aside from these
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This article was prepared with
the support of the Duquesne University School of Law Summer Writing Program.
' See Darrell L. Bock, Jesus andPaul." Looking ataJournalisticApproach to Christianity's
Beginnings, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 6, 2004, available at http://www.christianitytoday
.com/ct/2004/114/21.0.html ("The fact that network television would give three hours to such
a topic shows how our times have changed.").
2 See The Resurrection: SearchingforAnswers, May 20,2005, http://abcnews.go.com/
2020story?id=772399&page= 1.
3 See J6natas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View From Europe, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 451,465 n.60 (2005) (listing books in the series); see also Scott Collins,
NBC to air show on End of Days, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at El.
4 SeegenerallyNetworks get religion infaith-basedshows, P1TTSBURGH POST-GAzETrE,
Apr. 11, 2005, at C8 (discussing new religious shows).
5 See Gretchen Passantino, What Does Peter Jennings Tell Us about Jesus, Paul, and
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planned events, the three broadcast networks and really all of the media covered in
great depth the death of Pope John Paul II and the election of Pope Benedict XVI.
For two weeks, the Catholic Church dominated the airwaves. Liberals are viewing
this religious surge with alarm.6
Other observers will say that this rumor of religion is a media creation7 and that
political matters have not changed all that much. There is some truth in such
denials. Religion has always played a large part in American political life. The
2004 Presidential election was hardly a complete break with the past. Conversely,
the religiosity of the American people can easily be overstated, as the generally
negative public reaction to the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo Act'
suggested. America is not a theocracy.9 Nevertheless, religion is a political force
Christianity, Answers in Action (2004), available at http://answers.org/peteijennings and_
jesus.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (critiquing the alleged liberal and secular bias of the
documentary).
6 Representative of the mood on the left were several articles in Harper's Magazine's
May 2005 issue. See generally Gordon Bigelow, Let There Be Markets: The evangelical
roots of economics, HARPER'S MAG., May 2005, at 33; Jeff Sharlet, Soldiers of Christ: I.,
Inside America's most powerful megachurch, HARPER'S MAG., May 2005, at 41; Chris
Hedges, Soldiers of Christ: 11., Feeling the hate with the National Religious Broadcasters,
HARPER'S MAG., May 2005, at 55. Hedges's story ended with a warning from his ethics
professor at Harvard Divinity School: "[He] told us that when we were his age, and he was
then close to eighty, we would all be fighting the 'Christian fascists'.... Homosexuals and
lesbians ... would be the first 'deviants' singled out by the Christian right. We would be the
next." Id. at 61.
This was the view expressed by Mark Danner in The N. Y Review of Books:
[A]n army of self-interested commentators, self-appointed spiritual
leaders, and television pundits hot for a simple storyline had seized on
the answers to a clumsily posed exit poll question.., and used those
answers to transform the results of the 2004 election into a rousing
statement of Americans' disgust with abortion, promiscuity, R-rated
movies, gay marriage, late-night television, and other "Hollywood-
type" moral laxity.
Mark Danner, HowBush Really Won, N.Y. REV. BoOKS, Jan. 13,2005; see also Dick Meyer,
The Moral Values' Myth, PrTTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 12, 2004, at J1. In Meyer's
view, "one dodgy question in an exit poll wrongly became the story of how Bush won." Id.
' Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 15-16. A poll conducted in late March showed that
75 percent of those polled disapproved of federal intervention into the issue of continued
nutrition and hydration for Terri Schiavo. See Daniel Eisenberg, Lessons of the Schiavo
Battle, TIME, Apr. 4, 2005, at 22.
9 The Republican Party was criticized over the Schiavo intervention by Republican
Representative Christopher Shays of Connecticut on just this point: "'This Republican Party
of Lincoln has become a party of theocracy."' Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. Right Is Splintered
on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A14.
The role of religion in American political life has changed since the mid-twentieth
Century, but America has been more theocratic in the past. For example, today, ajustice on
the Supreme Court would not readily purport to speak for God, as Justice Bradley did in his
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today in a way that it has not been during the past fifty years. Religion has made a
cultural breakthrough that would have been hard to predict during the mid-twentieth
century.' 0
America is now a religious democracy. As a provisional definition, by the term
"religious democracy," I mean simplythat a substantial number of voters in America
now vote the way they do for what they consider to be religious reasons and that as
a result of their voting, government policy is changed." In other words, George
Bush might just as well have said out loud during the 2004 campaign, "Vote for me
because I am a Christian, and I will carry out policies that you and I believe are
consistent with the Christian faith."' 2 Now that he has been elected in that way,
President Bush tries to carry out those promised policies. As Senator Rick Santorum
says, "Elections have consequences."" This is the political system we now have
and, it appears, will have for the foreseeable future.
The questions that this article begins to address are the consequences of this
event. How does a religious democracy function? How, if at all, does it differ from
any other kind of democracy? Can there even be such a thing as religious democracy?
What is the role of the secular voter in a religious democracy? For that matter, what
is a secular voter?
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the current political/religious
landscape to indicate why America might be thought to have entered new terrain.
Part II asks whether America has ever had something that could be called secular
democracy, or even whether such a thing is possible.. Part III asks the converse
concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, in which the Court upheld a statute denying women the
right to practice law. 83 U.S. 130 (1873). Justice Bradley wrote, "The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
10 One has only to look at what mainstream media now cover. See, e.g., David Van
Biema et al., The 25 Most Influential Evangelicals in America, TIME, Feb. 7, 2005.
" Richard John Neuhaus described religion in the public sphere similarly some years
ago: "Religion is merely the public opinion of those citizens who are religious." Richard
John Neuhaus, A New Order ofReligious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 620,621 (1992).
12 See generally David D. Kirkpatrick, Battle Cry of Faithful Pits Believers Against
Unbelievers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at 24. According to Kirkpatrick, it would be more
accurate to portray the overall message as "Vote for me because I believe in God." An
attempt was made to reach Christians and Jews but, given the war in Iraq, probably not
Muslims. Nevertheless, the Republican effort to reach Orthodox Jews was only a very small
piece of their religious strategy.
In the third televised debate during the primaries in 2000, candidate George Bush
responded, "Christ," when asked what political philosopher had most influenced him. See
Davison M. Douglas, Religion in the Public Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 647,647 n. 1
(2001) (citation omitted). The response was not insincere vote mongering, but it was a sign
to the faithful.
'3 Terence Samuel & Dan Gilgoff, At the Brink, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 30,
2005, at 32, 33.
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question - whether something that could be called religious democracy is possible.
Finally, Part IV proposes a new direction for religion in American political life -
progressive religion that is biblical but not exactly Jewish or Christian. Religious
democracy has become divisive because of a mischaracterized secularism that dom-
inates the Democratic Party. This so-called secularism creates a false, unified direc-
tion in religious democracy. It also needlessly creates division between religious and
non-religious voters.
This article, by indirection, also asks who ultimately controls the interpretation
of the Constitution. Larry Kramer has argued persuasively that popular constitution-
alism used to be a prevalent model in the United States.14 Dean Kramer suggests
that this period is over and that we are now bound by a theory ofjudicial supremacy. 5
But what if he is wrong? What if we are living through a real "constitutional
moment," as Bruce Ackerman has termed fundamental changes in constitutional
understanding? 6 What if this moment is one in which the American people have
reclaimed the right to decide what their fundamental political arrangements will
be? 7 What if they have decided that these political arrangements will be religious,
thus horrifying the liberal and secular law professors who, ironically, have champ-
ioned their right to modify constitutional understanding? What if the people are
abolishing the secular assumptions of American law, secular assumptions that most
lawyers, conservatives as well as liberals, hold? I think something like this is just
what is going on in America today. I am not sure where it will lead.
I. RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE AFTER THE 2004 ELECTION
Right after the 2004 Presidential election, Thomas L. Friedman, a liberal New
York Times columnist, described the election in dramatic fashion. He had been on
his way to vote when a "Constitutional Convention broke out.' 8
"4 LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REViEw 207 (2004); see also Shannon D. Gilreath, The Technicolor Constitution:
Popular Constitutionalism, Ethical Norms, and Legal Pedagogy, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 23
(2003) (discussing the theme of popular constitutionalism).
"5 This is a development he opposes. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 249-53. Dean Kramer
believes that to reverse this supremacy would require extraordinary measures, such as
impeaching justices. In fact, a giant reversal may be occurring now without any such drama.
16 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993) (discussing his theory
of "constitutional moments").
'" This kind of popular constitutionalism is an end run around the Court's insistence that
only it can interpret the Constitution. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting
the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 1 (2003). Even if the Court no longer defers to Congress, through changes in personnel
and in the general political and cultural climate, constitutional interpretation changes in the
direction the public wishes.
"S Thomas L. Friedman, Two Nations Under God, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A25.
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What was there about the 2004 Presidential election that felt so different? There
were objective markers in the election's aftermath that suggested an important role
played by religion in the voting. An exit poll reported that 22 percent of the voters
ranked moral values as their top voting issue, and of those voters, 80 percent voted
for President Bush. 9 If accurate, that would mean that almost 18 percent of the
voters overall voted for President Bush on this basis. This would seem an important
role for religion, which many people associate with moral values.
The Presidential election also reflected institutional religious preferences by the
voters. In a dramatic divide, given such a close election, weekly churchgoers - 41
percent of the 2004 Presidential voters - voted for President Bush, 61 percent to 39
percent.20 78 percent of white evangelical voters - 23 percent of the electorate -
and 52 percent of Catholic voters - 27 percent of the electorate - voted for
President Bush.2' In other words, though the nation was politically closely divided
in the 2004 Presidential election, those who could be termed religious voters22 were
not nearly so divided. They supported President Bush.23
There were other issues on various state ballots in 2004 that also sounded
religious and moral themes. Adding to the perception of the election as a kind of
moral/religious referendum, eleven states adopted proposals banning gay marriage.24
Every state where the issue was on the ballot adopted an anti-gay state constitutional
amendment.25
Even before the voting began, there was a feeling in America that the election
might be decided along a national religious divide. Before the election, David Domke
1" CNN.com Election 2004, CNN.com [hereinafter Election 2004], at http://www.cnn.
com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
This information was widely reported. See, e.g., Editorial, Election Results: Whose Morality?,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 7, 2004. ("Exit polls indicate that for 22 percent of
voters in Tuesday's election, moral values ranked as the top issue - above Iraq, the economy,
taxes or terrorism. And among those voters, nearly 80 percent said they voted to re-elect
President Bush.").
20 Election 2004, supra note 19.
21 Id.
22 1 use the term "religious voters" to denote those voters who voted for President Bush
on religious grounds, and other voters who share this political orientation. Of course, the
term "religious voter" is tendentious. It assumes that these voters are religious, whereas
other, and opposing, voters are not. There were probably many voters who voted for Senator
Kerry for what they would say were religious reasons, but I am not including them in the
term. My only defense is that I am using terms in the popular sense, for the purpose of
identification and analysis.
23 The converse, ofcourse, was also true. Kerry led the group of"occasional" churchgoers,
53 percent to 47 percent and dominated in the group who "never" go to church, 62 percent
to 36 percent. Election 2004, supra note 19.
24 Id.
25 See Same-sex marriage bans winning on state ballots, CNN.com, Nov. 3,2004, athttp://
www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/1 1/02/ballot.samesex.marriage.
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criticized President Bush for promoting his identification as more pious than his
political opponents.26 And the weekend before the election, both candidates went
to the churches.27
The political importance of religion in the 2004 election lay not in the mere
existence of these voting patterns, for patterns like them had existed before. The
change lay in the intention of the Bush campaign to win the Presidential election by
using these religious patterns - an apparently successful strategy. It was widely
reported that Karl Rove, President Bush's main election strategist, considered the
goal of turning out four million more evangelical voters in 2004 than in the 2000
Presidential election to be a key to winning for President Bush.28
A changed national political mood after the voting reinforced the impression of
a new role for religion in American political life. Religious groups on the political
right were emboldened. 29 Ed Vitagliano, for example, asked in the American Family
Association Journal, "Will the Church see the results of the 2004 election as a
vindication of power politics, or as a window of opportunity to impact a morally
degenerating culture with the gospel?"3 And, in the aftermath of the election, evan-
gelical groups in Ohio began planning a sort of takeover of the Ohio Republican
Party.
31
Liberals, on the other hand, engaged in a kind of secular retreat after the
election. The most powerful such post-election symbol was the announcement by
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton that she has "always been a praying person. 32
26 See Michael McGough, Op-Ed, Mission Critical, PrITSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Oct.
24, 2004, at B 1 (interviewing David Domke and noting that "David Domke says Bush is
unique in offering himself as God's prophet for America.").
27 John Kerry went to two churches on the Sunday before the election. "In remarks at
Shiloh Baptist Church in Dayton, Kerry quoted the Bible to frame the election in spiritual
terms. 'It's ultimately a choice about whether we're going to keep faith with the faith that we
profess,' he said." Jill Lawrence, Senator makes pitch in N.H. buttressed by Red Sox brass,
USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2004, at 4A.
28 "Mr. Rove thought four million evangelical Christians - probable Bush supporters
- stayed at home in the 2000 election. If they had cast ballots, he reckoned, the president
might have carried an extra state, or at least won the popular vote that would have given his
first term more legitimacy." Rachel Clarke, Drawing up blueprints for Bush victory, BBC
NEWS, Nov. 6, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/3987237.stm.
29 See Neela Banerjee, Conservative Christians Target States, PITSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 2004, at A6 ("Energized by electoral victories last month that they say
reflect wide support for more traditional social values, conservative Christian advocates
across the country are pushing ahead state and local initiatives on thorny issues, including
same-sex marriage, public education and abortion.").
30 Ed Vitagliano, Now What?, AM. FAM. ASS'NJ., Feb. 2005, available at http://www.afa
journal.org/2005/februaryl2.05nowwhat.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2005).
31 See James Dao, Movement in the Pews Tries to Jolt Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005,
at 14.
32 Michael Jonas, Sen. Clinton Urges Use of Faith-Based Initiatives, BOSTON GLOBE,
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It may very well be that Senator Clinton has always been such a person, but it does
not seem likely that she would made this announcement except for the results of the
2004 election. Other liberal icons were also in retreat.33
There were denials that the election turned on religious lines. Among those who
denied that much, if anything, had changed politically were columnists David Brooks
34
and Charles Krauthammer. 35 But this minority view may result from discomfort by
Jewish neo-conservatives at being part of a political coalition driven by a conser-
vative Christian agenda.
One surprising piece of evidence for the conclusion that religion now dominates
politics is the reaction to the new interest by some evangelical Christians in the issue
of global warming. In April 2005, The New York Times Magazine reported growing
concern in the Evangeiical movement about global warming and growing support
for taking action against it.36 This interest has clear theological resonance grounded
in respect for God's creation.
The political aspect of this new environmental concern is that if the Evangelical
movement were to put its political weight behind any sort of legislative initiative to
stem global warming, such an initiative would enjoy great success. There is a great
deal of political support in general behind efforts to deal with global warming. A
change in stance by part of the religious right would doubtless create a majority in
Congress supporting legislative action.
The most persuasive demonstration of the political power of religious voters was
the large congressional majority that supported the Terri Schiavo legislation.37
President Bush rather publicly returned to Washington from vacation to sign the
Schiavo bill.38
Jan. 20, 2005, at B I.
33 See, e.g., BurtNeubome, Courting Trouble, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 2005, atA16. Neubome
sounded ready to abandon public prayer cases altogether: "[S]eriously, as long as all religions
are treated equally, do you really view such exercises in religious symbolism as a threat to
our way of life?" Id. at A18.
4 See David Brooks, The Values-Vote Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A19.
3 See Charles Krauthammer, Moral Values' Myth, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2004, at A25.
36 See Deborah Solomon, Earthly Evangelist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,2005, § 6 (Magazine),
at 17 (interviewing Richard Cizak); see also Laurie Goodstein, Evangelical Leaders Swing
Influence Behind Effort to Combat Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16.
17 The vote in the House was 203 to 58. Anita Kumar, David Karp, & Chris Tisch,
Congress Votes: Keep Schiavo Alive, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 1A. In the
Senate, Democrats literally disappeared. The bill passed without objection on a voice vote
with only three Senators, all Republican, present. See Larry Lipman, Democrats A WOLfor
Senate's Vote, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 23, 2005, at 6A. This remarkable piece of
intimidation illustrates the political power of religious voters.
38 President Bush "ordered his staff to awaken him so he could sign the bill." Kumar,
supra note 37.
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Certainly the politicians who voted for the bill had reasons for doing so in
addition to gaining the support of religious voters. Some of them presumably
agreed that Schiavo was not in a vegetative state and/or that her husband could not
be trusted to protect her interests.
But the federal legislation was remarkable and its passage surprising. The bill
reversed the usual assumptions of American federalism by allowing a federal judge
in a civil context39 to revisit issues already decided by a judge in state court.4" Even
more surprising, after it became clear that a majority of the American people
opposed the federal intervention, the Republican congressional leadership continued
to urge federal judicial intervention.4 All in all, the Schiavo episode, especially the
absence of organized opposition to the bill, suggests enormous influence, maybe
dominance, by religious voters.
The political consequences of this power will depend on what religious voters
want. Certainly such voters want to elect persons who, like themselves, are religious.
This explains the strong support for President Bush, a self-identified born-again
Christian. This political support should not be thought of as necessarily Christian.
An orthodox Jew like Senator Joseph Lieberman might have done very well with
these voters in 2004.
Nor should it be thought that political support for candidates like President Bush
is only a matter of religious identification. That was the interpretation put forward,
for example, by the magazine, The New Yorker, which wrote about the 2004 election
result as if religious voters did not quite know what they were doing:
[The 80% of evangelical voters who supported President Bush
did so] against their own material (and, some might imagine,
spiritual) well-being. The moral values that stirred them seem
not to encompass botched wars or economic injustices or environ-
mental depredations; rather, moral values are about sexual beha-
vior and its various manifestations and outcomes, about family
structures, and about a particularly demonstrative brand of reli-
gious piety. What was important to these voters, it appears, was
not Bush's public record but what they conceived to be his private
soul. He is a good Christian, so his policy failures are forgivable.42
'9 This is compared with federal habeas corpus, which applies to state prisoners and thus
a criminal context. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) ("The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to
a prisoner unless... (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution .... ").
40 Id. § 2254(a) (noting that a federal judge "shall entertain on application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court").
41 Popular opposition to federal intervention was plain by the Sunday that Congress acted.
See Andrew Kohut, A political victory that wasn 't: The Schiavo Case, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Mar. 24, 2005, at 7 (referring to ABC poll taken on March 20, 2005).
42 Hendrik Hertzberg, Blues, NEW YORKER, Nov. 15, 2004, at 33.
[Vol. 14:555
UP AGAINST THE WALL OF SEPARATION
What this analysis mistakes is that among some of these religious voters, ending
the Estate Tax and anti-government and anti-tax and anti-welfare rhetoric are not
inconsistent with religious values. So these matters were not policy failures to be
overcome or disfavored policies to be overlooked, but were additional reasons to
support President Bush. These voters thought President Bush had a pretty good
public record.
Another issue that arises in large part because of the concerns of religious voters
is the role of judges in American life. As Burt Neuborne has written, "The 2004
election saw the Democrats' 50-year practice of successfully advancing Enlighten-
ment values through the courts instead of through the political process come home
to roost."'43 After the election, National Public Radio did a story about the continuing
culture war in America. The point that repeatedly emerged in the story was the
hostility of religious voters to "judges" and the way judges are running the country,
making decisions at odds with the wishes of the majority of the American people."
More recently, in a story by Russell Shorto in The New York Times Magazine about
anti-gay marriage organizers in Maryland, the same point was made by Laura Clark,
a typical apolitical parent turned anti-gay activist: "She believed that what happened
in Massachusetts could happen in Maryland. 'My first reaction was frustration,' she
said, 'knowing that this is a legislative issue and the court in Massachusetts had
overstepped their bounds. "4
The filibuster fight in the United States Senate in the spring of 2005 stemmed
in large part from the concern of religious voters over the judiciary. The end of the
judicial filibuster would allow President Bush to select candidates for the federal
judiciary who would change the way judges act - at the very least, overruling Roe
v. Wade" and preventing judicial endorsement of gay marriage. The religious hos-
tility to the judiciary explains why the Family Research Council program supporting
an end to filibusters in judicial nominations described Democrats conducting these
filibusters as "against people of faith. 4 7 It also explains the strong reaction to the
federal judicial decisions that, in effect, dismissed the Schiavo case.48 Senate Majority
Leader Tom DeLay practically threatened the federal judges involved.49
4' Neuborne, supra note 33, at A17.
" See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Analysis: Frustration ofAmericans Who Want Laws and
Other Aspects of Public Life to Reflect Their Particular Values (NPR radio broadcast Dec.
23, 2004) (transcript on file with author).
4' Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem With Gay Marriage? It's the Gay Part,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
46 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41 See Bruce Ledewitz, The End ofAmerican Democracy?, PrIrTSBURGH POST-GAzETrE,
Apr. 24, 2005, at J 1 (quoting Senator Bill Frist).
48 Comm. on Gov't Reform of the U.S. House of Reps. v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1622
(2005).
41 "[T]he time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior."
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Religious voters are also, no doubt, committed to seeing more religious
symbolism in public life and more religious instruction in public schools. This
means more symbolic religious expression cases and more issues around prayer in
the public schools. The Supreme Court's decision in Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow,5" essentially ducking the case in a supreme example of Alexander
Bickel's "passive virtues,"'" may have reflected the dilemma that upholding the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance was inevitable in the current political
climate, but that there was no doctrinal way to do so without substantially reducing
the reach of the Establishment Clause. On the last day of the 2004 term, the Court
divided 5-4 in two Ten Commandments cases, upholding a display in Texas5 2 and
striking down courthouse displays in Kentucky53 - as close as the Court can get to
splitting the difference.
On other issues, the influence of religious voters has not been as focused. There
has been support for the rights of Christians in Africa 4 and abstinence-only sex
education programs in schools.55 But the major focus of religious voters thus far has
been the courts and the issues the courts have influenced.
Of course I am writing about what religious voters support as religious issues.
Presumably they also support President Bush on issues that are not seen primarily as
religious - such as the war in Iraq, although that issue does have religious fallout.56
Does the new influence of religious voters mean that agnostics and atheists
cannot be considered viable candidates for national and, in many places, statewide
offices? Of course it means that. That much should have been clear when Howard
Dean's candidacy for president unraveled in part because he was considered too
Mike Allen, DeLay Wants Panel to Review Role of Courts, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A9.
10 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (dismissing the case for lack of standing).
5' ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) (discussing the Court's "passive virtues," through which
the Court refuses to hear a case out of a concern for its political legitimacy).
52 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2856-57 (2005).
"3 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005).
14 See, e.g., Islam Review, http://www.islamreview.com/articles/catholicchurchandislam.
shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
" See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N. OF AM., INC., ABSTINENCEONLY 'SEX' EDUCATION,
at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/teensexualhealth/
fact-abstinence-education.xml (last visited Oct. 13,2005) ("Abstinence-only education is one
of the religious right's greatest challenges to the nation's sexual health."). Of course, the
report is critical of this concern by religious voters, but it does demonstrate that religious
support for such education has been politically significant.
56 Unfortunately, religious voters also support the President's non-religious policies with
which they might not agree. Religious voters cannot possibly be pleased with the federal
budget deficits that are weakening America's economic foundation. In our political system,
however, you have to join a "side."
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unreliable in religious matters." It is not at all certain that an Abraham Lincoln,
who did not belong to any denomination, 8 could be a serious contender for the
Presidential nomination today, certainly not for the Republican nomination.
But isn't that reality totally at odds with the Establishment Clause? Does not
the fact that atheists and agnostics cannot win national, or even state-wide, elections
"send[] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community"?59 Does it not establish a de facto religious test for federal
office in violation of the Constitution?" Yes, but that is precisely the point. The
unreviewable actions of religious voters have created religious democracy in America.
It might be objected that, for years, voters voted in racial patterns that gave the
lie to the national commitment against racism, but this failure did not undermine the
constitutional meaning of equal protection. Why should the voters' patterns now
change the constitutional understanding of religion and political life?
The difference between race and religion is that racial pattern voting was and
remains a dirty and discredited reality. Even politicians who use racist appeals deny
they are doing so. Certainly no one suggests that racist voting is normative. Religious
voters, on the other hand, vote in the light and claim to represent a new and better
understanding of democracy and the Constitution.
How is American politics changed by all this? It seems to me that the
transformation to religious democracy is more fundamental than a particular election
result: What was repudiated in the 2004 election was secular leadership itself."
This is a cultural as much as a political matter. The political left is associated with
disdain for ordinary people, including disdain for matters religious, and this is what
"7 "[F]aith avowals are all but requisite on the campaign trail-with hell to pay for
anyone who demonstrates biblical illiteracy, as did former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean
when he described Job as his favorite book of the New Testament and was promptly
pronounced a heathen." Carol Eisenberg, Reawakening Pop culture says Americans more
religious, but stats tell different story, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), May 1, 2004, at 1 C.
58 See Andrew Delbanco, Lincoln and Modernity, in KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF IN
AMERICA: ENLIGHTENMENT TRADITIONS AND MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 247,267 n.38
(William M. Shea & Peter A. Huff eds., 1995) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF IN
AMERICA] (quoting Lincoln, Delbanco writes that "it was every where [sic] contended that
no christian ought to go for me, because I belonged to no church.. . .") Delbanco says of
Lincoln that he was "[n]ever a churchgoer." Id. at 267.
" Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Quali-
fication to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
61 This is very much how religious conservatives saw the election. Bob Jones III, for
example, read to the student body at Bob Jones University these words from his letter of
congratulations to President Bush on the occasion of his re-election: "You owe the liberals
nothing. They despise you because they despise your Christ." Peter Carlson, Taking the Bob
Out of Bob Jones University, WASH. POST, May 5, 2005, at C 1.
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lost in the 2004 election.62 Popular resentment of secular leadership now seems to
have blossomed into a narrow, but dependable, Republican Party national governing
majority. Of course, there will be electoral setbacks to the Republican coalition,
and, presumably, poor performance in economics and foreign policy will cost votes
in future elections. Nevertheless, religious voting that favors the Republican Party
is now a settled feature of American political life, giving the Republicans a constant
electoral edge.
The significance and dramatic nature of this political change is hard to overstate.
In the course of a few decades, America has gone from Richard John Neuhaus's
"naked public square," hostile to religion,63 through Stephen Carter's description of
the public square as "formally open," with religion treated as a hobby,65 to the
practical exclusion from the public square of arguments grounded on non-belief -
on atheism or agnosticism. This latest exclusion from the public square admittedly
has the democratic advantage that the reason atheists do not get a hearing is simply
that most Americans disagree with them on religious matters. But it is still exclusion,
in a sense, of the secular. Political and constitutional analysis should acknowledge
today's changed political reality and not repeat arguments about exclusion of religion
that no longer apply."
62 See Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Liberals?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 12,2005.
For more than thirty-five years, American politics has followed a
populist pattern as predictable as a Punch and Judy show as conducive
to enlightened statesmanship as the cycles of a noisy washing machine.
The antagonists of this familiar melodrama are instantly recognizable:
the average American, humble, long-suffering, working hard and
paying his taxes; and the liberal elite, the know-it-alls ofManhattan and
Malibu, sipping their lattes as they lord over the peasantry with their
fancy college degrees and their friends in the judiciary.
Id. Later in the article, Frank quotes Republican Senator Sam Brownback, who, at the 2004
Republican convention, spoke at a private meeting of evangelical Christians, a meeting that
received a great deal of publicity despite being billed as media free:
[H]e took on the tone of affronted middle-American victimhood,
complaining to a roomful of Christian conservatives that "the press
beats up on you like there's something wrong with faith, family and
freedom" and exhorting them to "win this culture war." For the con-
servative rank and file, this election was to be the culture-war Arma-
geddon, and they were battling for the Lord.
Id. (footnote omitted).
63 See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
64 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 54 (1993).
65 Id. at 51.
66 Political rhetoric has not caught up with this change. See infra text accompanying note
69 (quoting Senator Rick Santorum).
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Does this political change mean that fundamental constitutional arrangements
concerning religion also will change? If the Constitution prohibits the establishment
of religion, why does it matter what a majority of the American people think about
it? A mere majority of voters may be able to elect candidates based on religious
affiliation, but they cannot amend the Constitution.67
The image of the Constitution as unchanging may be a reassuring rhetorical
device, but it in no way describes how the Constitution actually has been interpreted.
In practice, the Constitution comes to mean what the people want it to mean.6 8 So
if there has been a revolution of sorts about the role of religion in American political
life, there has been or will soon be a similar revolution in constitutional interpreta-
tion of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Constitution.
It is impossible to say now how much of a change in case law and doctrine there
will turn out to be. It does not appear that the religious voters have really thought
through a model for religion in the public square. They still speak as if the public
square were "naked," in Neuhaus's phrase. For example, in 2005, Senator Rick
Santorum was quoted in a New York Times Magazine feature article, speaking as if
religious voters were still on the outside of political life: "'How is it possible that
there exists so little space in the public square for expressions of faith and the
standards that follow from belief in a transcendent God?"' 6 9 On one level, this
protest makes no sense, since the Republican Party coalition now controls the entire
federal government, in large part because of religious voters. There is, therefore, as
much space for faith in the public square as Senator Santorum says there is, since
he now in effect makes the rules.70 Assuming that Senator Santorum is sincere and
67 "Though 'We the People' established the Constitution and may amend it, the people
themselves are not the arbiters of the Constitution's meaning. The Constitution does not
establish a People's Court or a People's Committee by which the people definitively decide
the Constitution's meaning." Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive
Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1539, 1542 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES, POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL AND JuDIcIAL REvIEw (2004)).
6 See generally Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan's Law and Democracy, 20 J.L. & POL.
373 (2004). Justice Scalia, for example, explains the Court's willingness to accept government
encouragement of religion that appears to violate the neutrality principle by referring to the
Court's "instinct for self-preservation." McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722,
2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, Scalia contends that "the Court... cannot go too
far down the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact and current
practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of the people to accept its
interpretation of the Constitution as definitive .. . ." Id. Though Justice Scalia would not
approve, he, in fact, is describing one kind of popular control of Supreme Court decision-
making.
6 Michael Sokolove, The Believer, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 56,
59.
70 These sorts of statements about discrimination against religion abound, and, given the
political realities, one has to wonder what they are really about. Columnist Burt Prelutsky
wrote in the Los Angeles Times in 2004 that his fellow Jews were pushing an anti-Christian
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that his comment is not just habit, it may be that he and his fellow religious voters
have not decided, even in their own minds, what the public square should look and
sound like. All Americans may share the view that religion should not dominate the
public square, even if a majority of voters feels that the role of religion should be
larger than it lately has been. This is part of the reason why religious democracy in
America is a question.
It is not even clear that the role of religion was ever in eclipse. Certainly
religion plays a more prominent role in public life today than it has at any time since
the Second World War, but was American political life ever actually secular? Bruno
Latour once wrote a book about the meaning of modernity.7' Latour concluded that
we have never been modem."2 By the same token, in asking about the change from
secular democracy to religious democracy, we may conclude that we have never
been secular.
Before addressing the subject of secular democracy, a word must be said about
the theological implications of religious political power. H. Jefferson Powell has
argued that the most appropriate political response for a Christian living in the
democratic West, and in America particularly, is a strong anti-Constantinianism:
"The equation of constitutional with theological ethics repeats the ancient Constan-
tinian error of confusing Caesar with God... ."" Speaking theologically, Professor
Powell would say, there can be no Christian constitutionalism, nor Christian State,
nor even any Christian domestic policy. Probably, in theory, few Christians would
disagree with Professor Powell. What has occurred, however, is that a sizeable
group of religious voters, primarily and almost exclusively Christian, have achieved
an impressive degree ofpolitical/govemmental power in America. They have achieved
this power self-consciously as Christians, that is, as the Church. It is therefore not
possible for the rest of America to think in anti-Constantinian terms. The rest of us,
including myself, outside this new Christian power, must decide whether we are
rivals or allies of this Christian attainment. It is not for the rest of us to decide for
Christians whether their political power is theologically legitimate. It is not for the
rest of us to say whether Christians should have done what they did. Fellow
Christians must debate that issue within the Church. In the political realm, there is
no debate. Events have left anti-Constantinianism behind. The rest ofus must regard
agenda: "'The dirty little secret in America is that anti-Semitism is no longer a problem in
society - it's been replaced by a rampant anti-Christianity."' Julia Duin, Faithless: God
Under Fire in the Public Square, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A1. What can this mean?
A political coalition influenced if not dominated by Christians now controls the federal
government. It is a strange time to claim to observe a national, rampant anti-Christianity.
7' BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans., 1993).
7 See generally id.
7 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CoNsTrruTIoNALISM:
A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 11 (1993).
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the Church - the Church universal and not any one church, of course - as wholly
involved in the exercise of profane political power in America.
. IS SECULAR DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE?
Recently, a friend of mine, upon hearing that I was writing about religious
democracy, asked, "Isn't that an oxymoron?" This question reflects a general
assumption in certain educated American circles that secular democracy is the norm,
at least in America,74 and that religious democracy is the phenomenon that must be
analyzed and justified. As David Dow flatly stated, "[R]eligious ideology, any
religious ideology, is inherently undemocratic. '75 Yet, Richard John Neuhaus argued
that it is secular democracy that is in question.7 ' He explained that in this society,
with its biblical tradition, "[t]he state ... cannot be 'strictly secular' and still be
deemed morally legitimate., 77 So, the assumption that democracy must be secular,
even that democracy can be secular, is itself subject to question and critique.
A. The Dominance of the American Secular Consensus
I don't know when the secular consensus became conventional wisdom, at least
among the coastal elites. But that consensus certainly had formed by the time I
entered law school in 1974. I know this mostly by the absence of the topic of
religion during my law school experience. I cannot remember even a single discussion
of religion in any course during my years at Yale. In fact, I cannot remember any
discussion of religion outside of class. We understood, without really thinking about
it, that in accordance with John Rawls's Theory of Justice,8 the overwhelmingly
14 Thus Rabbi David Novak did not sense any controversy in referring to "a secular
constitutional democracy like ours." David Novak, Religion, Faith, and Elections, in ONE
ELECTORATE UNDER GOD?: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICs 159, 162
(E.J. Dionne Jr., Jean Bethke Elshtain, & Kayla M. Drogosz eds., 2004). It is obvious to
Rabbi Novak, beyond any serious possibility of contradiction, that the Constitution requires
secularism.
'5 David R. Dow, The End of Religion, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 877, 881 (2001) (emphasis
in original) (reviewing RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR
DEMOCRACY (1996)). Cf Lee A. Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 498 (2002) ("The core issue is whether a religious democ-
racy is possible.").
76 NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 175.
77 Id.
78 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-251 (1971). Rawls contends that "gov-
emnment has neither the right nor the duty to do what it or a majority.., wants to do in
questions of morals and religion. Its duty is limited to underwriting the conditions of equal
moral and religious liberty." Id. at 212. While these words do not sound anti-religious, they
banish religion and religious sentiment from the public square completely. See also id. at 554
(contending that to choose God as our one "end" is irrational); id. at 365 (arguing that civil
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dominant political theory at the time, religious arguments were not permitted in
public discourse.
Strangely, all this was happening while the modem political phenomenon of the
religious right was already beginning to emerge. That coming political change did
not matter to us secularists at Yale. Even conservative students were business-
oriented and secular in orientation. Of course, some law students practiced their re-
ligion. But religion had no relationship to law and government. It was a private matter.
This appearance of a secular consensus was either false at the time or did not last
very long.79 Even in law, by the early 1980s, the situation was markedly different.
In 1983, Robert Cover published his famous article, Nomos and Narrative," which
examined the political/legal crises inherent in conflicts of conscience, especially
conflicts of religious conscience. Cover's article led to what Susan Stone called a
"startling increase of citations to Jewish sources" over the following decade. 1 Then
in 1984, Richard John Neuhaus published The Naked Public Square, which directly
challenged the assumptions of the secular consensus.82
This intense engagement of law and government with religion had been building
throughout the 1970s. Robert Cover's book, Justice Accused, published in 1975,83
raised the same sorts of issues concerning the conflicts of conscience in terms of
anti-slavery judges, as Nomos and Narrative did later. Similarly, Neuhaus was
writing in part in reaction to the victory of the religious right associated with the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.m
We are concerned here, however, with the content of the secular consensus,
even if it did not attain lasting political/legal dominance. The two major assump-
tions behind the secular consensus were, politically, that religion and religious doc-
trine could not serve as the ground of public action85 and, historically, that religion
disobedience is not to be justified by religious reasons in the liberal state).
" Religion at Yale apparently occupies a different role today. The May/June 2005 edition
of the Yale Alumni Magazine featured a cover photo of a minister, a priest, a Buddhist, and
a rabbi, highlighting the feature story, Gods & Man at Yale, YALE ALUMNI MAG., May/June
2005, at 32, available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2005 05/religion.html.
80 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos andNarrative,
97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
"I Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: the Turn to the Jewish Legal
Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARv. L. REV. 813, 816 (1993).
82 NEUHAUS, supra note 63.
83 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
84 NEUHAUS, supra note 63.
85 As Kathleen Sullivan put it, religious questions have been "privatized" by the
Constitution, by which she presumably meant the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 211 (1992)
("True, abortion, like religion, is divisive and controversial, but not all divisive and
controversial questions have been privatized by the Constitution; only religious questions
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was a sort of vestigial matter that was destined to pass away.6 The legal manifesta-
tion of the secular consensus was the Wall of Separation of Church and State,
understood as the unconstitutionality of any attempt by government to promote
religion or religious belief.8 7
The secular consensus attempted to ground the legal system in non-religious
sources. On the political left, this effort meant finding a ground for rights in liberal
values.88 For example, David Douglas, exemplifying the secular consensus, res-
ponded as follows to The Naked Public Square: "The Christian, Jew and traditional
Native American cannot be united by religion, but only by America's fierce and
longstanding adherence to the fundamental principles of liberalism - the ideology
of individuals' freedom and inherent worth - and democracy - the philosophy of
self-governance and majority rule. 89
On the political right - the secular consensus was in law as pervasive on the
right as on the left - the non-religious ground was the Constitution, treated as a
historical and linguistic "given," without regard to underlying issues of right and
wrong or truth and falsehood. Thus, in the most obvious example of secular con-
servative thought, there is said to be no constitutional right to abortion because
abortion is not "in" the Constitution, rather than because there could not be a right
to kill a fellow human being.' This positivist mode of constitutional analysis is
associated with Justice Antonin Scalia as well as former federal judge Robert Bork.91
have."); see also id. at 201 (discussing "the establishment of the secular public order" under
the United States Constitution).
86 The latter point is rarely said explicitly, but it is candidly stated in Dow, supra note 75.
Two primary forces will stand in the way of the creation of a single
world, and what is peculiar is that while one of these forces is on the
wane, the other has of late attracted articulate and thoughtful defenders.
These two forces, of course, are nationalism and religion. But the days
for both of these counter-revolutionary forces are numbered.
Id. at 879.
87 See infra text accompanying notes 175-76.
88 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE
ORIGIN OF RIGHTS (2004); Edward B. Foley, Jurisprudence and Theology, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1195 (1998) (grounding rights in reciprocity without reference to God).
89 David S. Douglas, Holding America Together, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325,
338-39 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984)).
90 As Justice Scalia once noted in arguing against recognition of a constitutional right to
die, "the Constitution says nothing about the matter." Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia J., concurring). See also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to "the nonjusticiable
question of when human life begins").
9" See Bruce Ledewitz, Could the Death Penalty Be a Cruel Punishment?, 3 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 121, 122-25 (1993) (providing an analysis of conservative constitutional jurisprudence).
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It yields results that many religious voters desire, such as overruling Roe v. Wade.92
But it is a thoroughly secular mode of analysis. 93 The contingent and temporary
alliance of religious voters with conservative constitutional jurisprudence is thus an
unholy one.
In terms of the Constitution, the secular consensus reads the constitutional
founding as establishing, if not a "Godless Constitution,"'94 at least a Constitution
with a clear distinction between the sacred and the secular spheres of life.95 Public
life falls into the secular sphere, both as wise policy and as constitutional imperative.
The doctrinal operationalizations of the secular consensus in Establishment
Clause cases were the so-called Lemon test96 and the endorsement test.97 The Lemon
test requires, inter alia, that the government have a secular purpose for its actions
rather than a religious purpose,9" so that a government program that sought to
convince schoolchildren to believe in God or putting the phrase "In God We Trust"
on legal tender, to express a national commitment to do God's will, would be
unconstitutional. Under the endorsement test, government may not endorse religion,
but rather, as then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist described in dissent in
92 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93 It is not even a mode of analysis historically faithful to its object - the founding of
the Republic: "For the modem positivist, there is truly no rational way to discuss what the
American founders thought could be discussed rationally - the good life, the call to
happiness, the need for meaning in history and time." David Tracy, Modernity, antimodernity,
and postmodernity in the American setting, in KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF IN AMERICA, supra
note 58, at 328, 329-30.
9 Of course, some scholars do view the founding as one of godlessness. See, e.g., ISAAC
KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1995).
" See Steven H. Shiffin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 9 (2004).
96 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
9' Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Endor-
sement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community." Id. at 688. See generally James M. Lewis &
Michael L. Vild, A Controversial Twist ofLemon: The Endorsement Test as the New Estab-
lishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671 (1990).
98 The secular legislative purpose portion of the Lemon test was the determining factor
in striking down the Ten Commandments displays in McCreary. See McCreary County v.
ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). "Ever since [Lemon] summarized the three familiar
considerations for evaluating Establishment Clause claims, looking to whether government
action has 'a secular legislative purpose' has been a common, albeit seldom dispositive,
element of our cases." Id. at 2732-33 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602).
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Wallace v. Jaffree,99 "the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly
neutral between religion and irreligion."" °
The secular consensus is obviously under attack today from a variety of sources.'O
Nevertheless, some law professors have shown a remarkable ability to regard the
secular consensus as unchallengeable and self-evident. I was very surprised to read,
for example, in the constitutional law casebook that I use in the basic Constitutional
Law course at Duquesne Law School, that "[i]t is generally agreed that the
establishment clause seeks to assure the separation of church and state in a nation
characterized by religious pluralism."'1 2 Even if this description of the purposes of
the Clause were correct, the description of consensus would still be false because
this conclusion is not "generally agreed" to. In addition, the book's description of
the purposes of the Establishment Clause may well be substantively incorrect. For
one thing, at the time of the adoption of the Establishment Clause, the United States
could not have been described as religiously plural in the sense we use the term
today. Rather, the United States at the time was overwhelmingly Protestant. For
another, the purpose of the Clause may not have been separation of church and state
at all. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist had argued that the entire purpose of the
Establishment Clause was "to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and
perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects ' - and many observers agree with
him. In the face of all this, for a textbook to adopt such a bland and confident tone
is not only misleading to students but demonstrates an inability on the part of the
authors to acknowledge and understand the fundamental controversy that exists
today over religion and the Constitution.
Even those voices in American law that argue in favor of a larger role for re-
ligion in the public square do so grudgingly, with an eye on the secular consensus. For
example, Kent Greenawalt has written that "[w]hen issues cannot be settled on
rational secular grounds, it is hard to see why legislators should give weight to non-
religious judgments of value and not to religious ones."' 4 Putting the matter that
way suggests that religious views are a second-class ground of government policy,
99 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down a period of silence statute for prayer in public
schools).
0 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also id. at 113-14 ("Nothing in the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment, properly understood, prohibits any such generalized
'endorsement' of prayer.").
"'1 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1263 (2004).
102 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW 1033 (9th ed. 2001).
103 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing James Madison's under-
standing of the purpose of the Amendment).
"o Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 396
(1985).
20051
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
though not totally prohibited from public debate. Michael J. Perry, in defending a
position taken by Senator Joseph Lieberman in 2000, suggested that although
political reliance on religiously grounded morality is neither
illegitimate in a liberal democracy nor unconstitutional in the
United States .... some religious believers - Christians - have
good reason to be wary about relying on one kind of religiously
grounded morality- biblically grounded morality- in deciding
whether to oppose laws or other public policies that grant official
recognition to same-sex unions."0 5
Professor Perry also has argued that resorting to such religious decision-making does
not violate the Establishment Clause, a position he had previously rejected. 106 Ronald
Thieman, whose book, Religion in Public Life, 10 7 was meant to open up space for
religion in public life, can only bring himself to say that religious voices should be
free to participate in political life insofar as they embrace the values of freedom,
equality, and mutual respect.'0 8 This is not only a test we would never impose on
anyone else, but it is also one that many non-religious political participants would
have a hard time satisfying.
The final component of the secular consensus was the supposed superiority of
reason and rationality over the non-rational, over the emotional, and over matters of
faith and spirituality. This superiority can be affirmed even in the face of the ac-
knowledged burdens of a society purporting to be organized around such rationality.
Thus in 2005, Francis Fukuyama, in the New York Times Book Review section,
criticized Max Weber's famous portrayal of modernity as an iron cage as follows:
"One must wonder whether it was not Weber's nostalgia for spiritual authenticity -
what one might term his Nietzscheanism - that was misplaced, and whether living
in the iron cage of modem rationalism is such a terrible thing after all."109 In other
words, even if we live in an iron cage, it is at least a rational and secular one.
Fukuyama attributes Nazism and Communism to religion because they "were based
on passionate commitments to ultimately irrational beliefs." '110 Considering the weight
105 Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality is not
Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217,222 (2001) [hereinafter
Perry, Political Reliance]. See also Michael J. Perry, Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex
Unions: An Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 449 (2001).
106 See Perry, Political Reliance, supra note 105, at 221 n. 14.
107 RONALD F. THIEMAN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY (1996).
101 Id. at 173.
109 Francis Fukuyama, The Calvinist Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 35
(reviewing MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1905)).
110 Id
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of blaming religion for those calamities, it must follow that, for Fukuyama, anything
would be better than to be subject to religion and religious authority.
B. The Collapse of the American Secular Consensus
The secular consensus is collapsing even as I write these words. It is collapsing
as political reality for the obvious reason that religious voters have attained a great
deal of political power. It is collapsing doctrinally in constitutional law and, theo-
retically, in political thought as well.
The condition of the secular consensus in 2005 may turn out to be similar to the
due process limits of the Lochner Era"'. and limits on Congress's Commerce Power
1 2
on the eve of the revolution of 1936-1937."' Prior to 1936-1937, the Court acted
out of a private property/economic liberty consensus."4 There had been growing
popular dissatisfaction throughout the early twentieth century with these Court-
imposed restrictions on the power of government to regulate the economy." 5 These
restrictions were effectuated through the doctrine of liberty of contract and inter-
pretations of the concept of interstate commerce. The public dissatisfaction began to
come to a head with the election in 1932 of a president who wanted strongly to take
the country in a different economic direction. In the period before the 1936 election,
the Court wavered." 6 Then, in 1936, the president received a strong re-election
"' Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner
Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins ofFundamental Rights Constitutionalism,
92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003).
112 See Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political
Theory and the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
403, 409-12 (2002); see also id. at 425 (noting that in the 1930s, "it was still possible to say
that the Commerce Clause was one of several limited and enumerated federal regulatory
powers").
"' See generally William Lasser, Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of
1937 - Was There a "Switch in Time"?, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2000) (reviewing
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998)). As Lasser notes, laissez-faire jurisprudence disappeared as
a result of the "[t]win pressures of the 1936 election and the President's subsequent 'Court-
packing' plan." Id.
"4 Cf J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 388 (1990) (noting that "the classical vision viewed
economic transactions as involving exercises of individual rights and only local relations.
This vision underlies the Lochner Court's commerce clause decisions as well as its due
process decisions.").
1" See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 65, 65--67, 99-103 (con-
tending that the American people began to reject the laissez-faire jurisprudence).
116 By the 1936 presidential election, the Court had invalidated six New Deal provisions,
some by close votes: The Railway Pension Act in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (5-4 decision); an industrial code under the National
Industrial Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
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endorsement by the voters.'17 Afterward, the Court changed its due process and
Commerce Clause approaches.' 18 Somewhat later, new personnel on the Court
finalized the change." 9
Much the same pattern might be occurring now with regard to the secular
consensus. For the last thirty-five years, there has been popular and theoretical dis-
satisfaction with the notion that our democracy should be, and must be, secular.120
Just as the private property/economic liberty consensus was not a product merely of
judicial decisions,' so too the secular consensus was also a cultural phenomenon.
In both instances, the country as a whole began to move in a different direction. For
a long time, the Court maintained the earlier view, continuing to require government
religious neutrality and secular purposes.'22 With the election of President George
W. Bush in 2000, the Court's decisions began to change.'23 Now that President Bush
has been re-elected, in large part running on the issue of judicial resistance to an
expanded role for religion in public life, we might expect a radical reformulation
(1935); the Farm Mortgage Act in LouisvilleJoint StockLandBankv. Redford, 295 U.S. 555
(1935); the Agricultural Adjustment Act in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3
decision); and the Bituminous Coal Act in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(5-4 decision). During this period, the Court upheld one New Deal measure, the Gold Clause
legislation, in Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (5-4 decision).
." President Roosevelt received 61 percent of the popular vote and 523 out of 531
electoral votes, losing only in Vermont and Maine. See Wikipedia, U.S. Presidential Election,
1936, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._presidentialelection_1936 (last visited Oct. 13,
2005).
1' "In a rapid succession of cases, the Supreme Court altered its interpretation of liberty
of contract, rejected the authority of federal courts to construe state common law, abandoned
nondelegation doctrine, and began to construct a new framework for protecting the individual
rights listed in the first eight amendments." Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the
Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REv. 597, 689 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
"' See generally Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv.
620 (1994); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONsTrruTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000)
(providing a general historical account).
... See generally Smith, supra note 101; see also NEUHAUS, supra note 63.
121 The laissezfaire foundations of the Lochner era were protested at the start in Justice
Holmes's celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain .... The Fourteenth Amendment does
not erect Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics .... [A] Constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of
laissez faire.
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
123 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (expanding government aid
to religion).
[Vol. 14:555
UP AGAINST THE WALL OF SEPARATION
from the Court. Additional personnel changes, which are also coming,124 will finalize
the change.
We will return below to the content of constitutional doctrine concerning religion
and state and the extent to which the above scenario may be playing out. For now we
are interested in the popular and theoretical changes that have set the stage for the end
of the secular consensus.
No one explanation can account for such a significant political event as the
collapse of the secular consensus. No doubt some would say that there has been no
collapse, just a few electoral setbacks. On the other side, it would be said that there
never really was a secular consensus, a position with which I sympathize. Neverthe-
less, certain assumptions used to carry political weight and concomitant confidence,
which they no longer do. We can at least identify these assumptions in a general way
and see that they no longer seem to apply to the American political landscape as they
once did.
The major historical assumption of the secular consensus is that the United States
would become less religious as it became wealthier and better educated.1 25 This trend
can be identified in Europe, so the idea is not fanciful. 26 Nevertheless, by most
measures, the United States has not become less religious since World War H.27
Numbers fluctuate, but there is no noticeable drop in how many people go to church,
believe in God, or say that God is important to them.
28
An attempt can be made to explain away the resistance of religion to the pressures
of modernity in the United States. Perhaps religious commitment is just talk. For ex-
ample, more people say they go to church, but do they? More people get divorced,
29
124 See infra note 215.
125 This is known as the secularization thesis. See Laurence R. lannoccone, Introduction
to the Economics ofReligion, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1465, 1468-72 (1998) (criticizing the
assumptions of the secularization thesis).
26 See God and Foreign Policy: The Religious Divide Between the U.S. and Europe, July
10, 2003, at http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=49.
127 See Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: the Change in Everyday Religious
Practices and its Importance to the Law, 51 BuFF. L. REV. 127, 192 (2003) ("Church mem-
bership is up over the past century, attendance and belief in God have remained stable,
religious contributions have stayed at their 1955 level and the rate of belief and activity has
generally increased with education.").
128 See Religion(2), PollingReport.com, at http://www.pollingreport.com/religion2.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2005). A CNN poll reports that affirmative responses to the question,
"Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days, or not?" was
up slightly from 1939 to 2002, though church membership was down. Id. Belief in God in
a 2000 Newsweek poll was at 94 percent. Id.
129 See Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, Marriage and Divorce Since World War lI:
Analyzing the Role of Technological Progress on the Formation of Households (Economie
d'Avant Garde, Research Report No. 8, 2004), available at http://www.econ.rochester.edu/
Faculty/GreenwoodPapers.manddww.2.pdf(last visited Oct. 13, 2005). See PETERG. FILENE,
HIM/HERISELF: SEX ROLES IN MODERN AMERICA 211,251 (2d ed. 1986); ARLENE SKOLNICK,
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gamble, 3 ' and have premarital sex than prior to World War H as well. 3 ' These are
not behaviors usually associated with religious commitment.
Furthermore, everyone would probably agree that American culture as a whole
is far coarser and more violent than ever before. If we are more religious, where is
the religious effect?
These are reasonable objections, but they go to the kind of religious resurgence
that is occurring, rather than whether there is resurgence. For evidence of resurgence,
we have to take the climate as self-authenticating. Religion is in the air. It has not
gone away or lessened its hold on the consciousness of the American people.
Nor does religious political argumentation engage in the "cut-flower" approach
of covering the roots of religious concerns with purely secular language.' This
point is subtle because there is often no clear delineation between religious concerns
and non-religious concerns in American policy issues. '33 But certainly the invocation
of God in public debate is common. For that matter, even before 2000, President
Clinton invoked God regularly.'34 The Naked Public Square seems to be fully
clothed. 35 Despite all expectations, religion is publicly vibrant.
A related assumption of the secular consensus is that religion is a private matter,
one that primarily concerns an individual's personal relationship with God rather than
influencing the outcome of policy debates. 136 Until the rebirth of evangelical political
involvement, this was the view of many notable religious leaders, as well. Jerry
EMBATTLED PARADISE: THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (1991).
130 See History of Gambling in the United States, at http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/
Chapt2.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
13' Numerous sources have reported that levels of premarital sexual relations in America
increased during the 1960s and remained at pre-war levels in the decades that followed. See,
e.g., ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEwARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA
114-32 (1988); cf SKOLNIK, supra note 129, at 160.
32 See Rachel Mariner, Note, Burdens Hard to Bear: A Theology of Civil Rights, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 657, 669-70 (1992).
'33 U.S. News & World Report's description of the spring 2005 stem cell debate in
Congress illustrates this tendency: "In the debate, both sides talked about valuing human
life." Helen Fields, Reigniting the Stem Cell Debate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 6,
2005, at 22.
'31 See Melissa A. Dalziel, The Tension Between a Godless Constitution and a Culture of
Belief in an Age of Reason, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REv. 861, 872 n.50 (1999) (reviewing ISAAC
KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1997)).
131 Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching about Religion,
Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1159, 1163 (2002) ("[T]oday
at least the public square is substantially clothed with religion.").
236 See Jeffrey Hart, The Evangelical Effect, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 2005,
at JI. ("Jesus teaches little or nothing about politics. His focus is inward, to the purity of the
soul.").
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Falwell, for example, criticized Protestant ministers for their involvement in the civil
rights movement in 1965.137
This attitude toward religion - that it is a private orientation - is certainly not
the dominant understanding of religion in America today. Jim Wallis's book, God's
Politics,138 for example, argues strongly for what would be considered left-wing
public policies on the basis of his understanding of the Christian tradition. Wallis
never even bothers to argue that religion is not merely a private matter.' 39 He takes
it as a given that religion matters in American policy debate today. 4°
It was also significant to the collapse of the secular consensus that important
cultural figures could be seen to be taking religion seriously. The most important
such event in intellectual terms was Jacque Derrida's famed turn to religion.' 4 ' Far
less important internationally, but influential in the insular world of American law,
was the consistent use of religious history, language, and metaphor by admired liberal
law professor Robert Cover'42 and others.
The Supreme Court also contributed to the collapse of the secular consensus.
While the Court has limited the protections of the Free Exercise Clause,'4 3 thus in
some sense weakening religion vis-A-vis government, the Court has also in recent
years been much more accepting of government aid to religious schools,'" indeed
overruling several precedents that had interpreted the Establishment Clause in a way
137 NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 40.
138 JIM WALLIS, GOD'S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE LEFT
DOESN'T GET IT (2005).
"' Wallis calls those on the left who want to restrict religion to the private sphere "secular
fundamentalists." Id. at xviii. This term has been used to describe militant resistance to
religious institutions in general. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious
Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America, 12 J.L. & RELIGION
337 (1995-1996).
140 Id.
14' See, e.g., JOHN D. CAPUTO, THE PRAYERS AND TEARS OF JACQUES DERRIDA: RELIGION
WITHOUT RELIGION (1997); see also Stanley Fish, One University, Under God?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 7, 2005, at C1 ("When Jacques Derrida died I was called
by a reporter who wanted to know what would succeed high theory and the triumvirate of
race, gender, and class as the center of intellectual energy in the academy. I answered like
a shot: religion.").
142 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Bringing the Messiah through Law: A Case Study, in
RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE LAW: NoMos XXX 201 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1988).
14' Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (overturning use of compelling state
interest test to measure constitutionality of generally applicable laws that interfere with religious
practices).
'" See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding Chapter 2 of Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(upholding Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act).
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that more narrowly constricted the aid government could give to religious schools. 45
The Court also approved education vouchers that can be used at religious schools,1
4 6
thus probably ushering in a new era of indirect government aid to religion. When the
Court dismissed the challenge to the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
because of a lack of standing by the plaintiff, 147 the Court sidestepped an opportunity
to clarify whether this new judicial willingness to allow Government-religion
institutional interaction also will apply to symbolic religious expression cases. The
Court's split in the Ten Commandments cases 148 certainly does not reinvigorate Estab-
lishment Clause limits on what government can do. Given all this, the Court has at
least contributed to the weakening of the secular consensus in recent years.
Although the matter is not yet free from doubt, since the secular consensus still
has important political and cultural support, the fundamental reason that the secular
consensus is collapsing is that it did not "take" in a democratic sense. The idea of
democratic "taking" is how Richard John Neuhaus described the national reaction to
DredScott. 49 He writes of Dred Scott: "That decision did not 'take' democratically;
it did not resolve but only exacerbated the issue it intended to settle."'50 Justice John
M. Harlan describes a more general, but similar, sort of democratic control over
judicial decision-making in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman.'
In this organic sense, the secular consensus was unable to convince the American
people that the role of religion in public life should be severely restricted. We can see
in the fallout of the 2004 Presidential election that, at least for now, whoever controls
the religious high ground in American public life will dominate politically.
What is the meaning of this democratic rejection of the secular consensus? Was
it merely a political failure to be- remedied by better candidates or more effective
public relations? Or, are the American people simply superstitious and easily captured
by religious imagery from the dark ages? Or, is -the meaning of this event more
complex? Perhaps there is a religious element embedded in American democracy that
the secular consensus overlooked.
141 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 797, overruled Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203, overruled Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and partially overruled School District ofGrandRapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
146 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
"47 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
148 Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (upholding a display on the
Texas Capitol grounds), with McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005)
(striking down displays in Kentucky courthouses). Each case was decided by a 5-4 vote.
149 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
150 NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 26.
'5' See 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see generally Ledewitz,
supra note 68.
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C. Religious Elements in American Constitutional Democracy
I am only lightly touching here a field that has received serious recent scholarly
attention - the shared grounds of democracy and religion. 52 I am suggesting that,
given the religious themes clearly present in our political life, the instability of the
secular consensus may have been inevitable. Our major political commitments, even
if they can be derived outside any religion, were not so derived originally, but came
to us from the Jewish and Christian traditions. The religious origins of these themes
do not disappear simply because religion and democracy diverged. Even just a few
examples of such themes make the point.
1. All Human Beings Are Created Equal
This concept, stated in the Declaration of Independence as a self-evident truth,'53
is not self-evident at all. Indeed, in the period prior to the Civil War, Senator John
C. Calhoun denied that this'assertion was true, 54 as did other supporters of slavery.'
The equality principle is clearly foundational to democracy, which treats each
citizen as formally equal in political life. The equality principle is now, albeit belatedly,
written into the constitutional text. 56 Constitutional democracy is impossible without
this principle.
152 This body ofwork ranges from arguments in the approaches to the relationship between
democracy and religion. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR
REASON (2000) (arguing for a necessary, but limited, separation and noting that citizens in a
liberal democracy must rely, at least in part, on secular rationale when considering coercive
legislation); FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE: JUSTICE AND THE REALITY OF
GOD (2000) (suggesting a necessary relationship between democracy and religion); Paul F.
Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1814 (1994) (noting that certain forms
of purported secular liberalism represent religious arguments); Marci A. Hamilton, Direct
Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411 (2004) (suggesting
a range of theologically limited democratic forms); Paul E. Salamanca, The Liberal Polity
and Illiberalism in Religious Traditions, 4 BARRY L. REv. 97 (2003) (supporting limited
interaction); Sullivan, supra note 85 (suggesting a sort ofban on public religious commitments
in liberal democracy).
... THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal. ... ").
1'4 Calhoun stated that there was "not a word of truth" in the Declaration's claim that all
men are created equal. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1 st Sess. app. at 872 (1848).
' David Thelen, Reception of the Declaration of Independence, in THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT 191, 207 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002).
156 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The equality principle has its roots in the Old Testament creation story: "So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female
he created them." '57 All humans are created in the image of God; thus all humans are,
in principle, equal.
58
1 am not suggesting that belief in the equality of humankind requires belief in the
Bible. Certainly this principle can be justified in other ways. But Western democracy
did learn this principle from the Bible. Equality is as religious a principle as "God
created the heavens and the earth."' 59 Insofar as it is a principle necessary for democ-
racy, a strict separation between democracy and religion is bound to be unstable.
2. The Sinful Nature of Humankind
The Framers' familiarity with the biblical understanding of human sinfulness60
is the bedrock of the constitutional commitment to checks and balances. Daniel
Dreisbach summarizes this relationship as follows: "The framers, convinced of man's
fallen nature (and of the concept of original sin), eschewed pure majority rule; en-
shrined individual liberties; and devised a system of civil government committed to
the diffusion and separation of powers, checks and balances, and limited, enumerated,
and strictly delegated powers only."'161
Perhaps the fullest statement of the Framers' view of the link between the
constitutional system and the nature of man is contained in Federalist No. 51:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should
be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govem men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary. In framing a govern-
ment which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
'5 Genesis 1:27. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations to the Bible in this article are to
the Revised Standard version.
158 Despite the traditional rendering in male dominant language, the Bible does not
presume that the male is the image of God, rather than the female. The last part of the verse,
stating "male and female he created them," was interpreted by some of the rabbis to mean
that the original human form was hermaphroditic. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, An Essay on
Liberalism and Public Theology, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 229, 259-60 (1999-2000).
"9 Genesis 1:1.
160 See Genesis 6:5 ("The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth,
and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.").
161 Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion
in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 927, 994 (1996).
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control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.'62
As Madison's reference in Federalist No. 51 to mankind's "experience" shows,
the Framers did not look to the Bible alone or even in detail for a framework of
government. The Framers had other models, including of course, their political
history on this continent. Nevertheless, the starting point of the Constitution - its
political anthropology so to speak - is biblical.63
The view that humans are prone to corruption is as accepted in this culture as is
the commitment that all are created equal. The agreement on these principles en-
compasses both the religious and the secular. In the instance of equality, one might
say that our fundamental law teaches, indeed requires, this commitment. In the case
of sinfulness, however, how does one explain this general agreement? Why should
we feel that checks and balances are a necessary limitation on government power?
Is this so obvious just from the experience of living? Or does this understanding of
the nature of human beings come specifically from revelation?
I think Americans as a whole have learned about human nature either from the
Bible directly or from our societal atmosphere, which itself derives from the Bible.
Since democracy must operate from some sort of anthropological understanding,"6
this biblical borrowing suggests that our democracy remains tied to a religious
understanding.
3. "The World Was Made for Man"'65
The foundation not only for American constitutional law, but also for our entire
political/economic/social system, is that the world was made for man. This is why,
when we have a debate about whether we should drill for oil in the Arctic National
162 THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
163 Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 190 (Viking Press 1970) (1963) (noting that
even though the substance of the American Constitution has Roman origins, the model of
authority is "Hebrew in origin and represented by the divine Commandments of the Dec-
alogue").
'64 Cf NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 53.
Democratic discourse, as Reinhold Niebuhr tirelessly insisted, depends
not so much upon our agreement about righteousness as upon our
agreement about sin - our own sin, and thus our own fallibility, as
well as the sin and fallibility of others. Democratic discourse requires
that no party fashion itself as the moral majority in order to imply that
others belong to an immoral minority.
Id.
165 DANIEL QUINN, ISHMAEL 63 (1992).
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Wildlife Refuge, we ask whether our economic need for oil outweighs our aesthetic
concerns about keeping the wilderness pure for our grandchildren to see and enjoy.
We do not ask about the rights of nature.
We do talk about protecting "the environment," but for most of us that does not
mean that the natural world has, in principle, an independent claim not to be used as
a resource for humans. Protecting the environment really means keeping environmen-
tal harms from affecting humans, either physically or psychologically. There are some
deep environmentalists for whom the natural world is not a resource for humans, but
they are a small minority of the American people. Deep environmentalists do not have
much democratic influence."6
Like equality and human sinfulness, our culture learned this lesson originally
from the Bible. In Genesis, God says to the male and the female, 6 7 "Be fruitful, and
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea
and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth."' 68
The important implication of the religious source of our relationship to the envi-
ronment is that secularism now also knows that the world was made for man, even
though secular thought presumably lacks any understanding of why it thinks so. If the
creator of the world did not give the world to us as our resource, because there is no
creator, then it would just be tyranny on the part of humans to take the world and use
' The current sad truth is stated by Jay Michaelson, in the context of materialism and
global warming:
[A]n environmentalist's distaste for the materialistic ideals that under-
gird the root causes of climate change does not make attempting to
thwart those ideals either practical or morally justified. Conspicuous
consumption is deeply entrenched in American self-conceptions, and
in conceptions of Americans by people in the developing world who
want to be like them.
I suggest it is both unwise and counter-democratic to tell billions
of consumers that "We Know Better," and set about changing deep
structures without regard to the life-defining goals of the consumers
themselves. Such action is unwise because it pins the biosphere's integ-
rity on the hope of overcoming something deeply ingrained in Western
culture. And it is counter-democratic because, until the members ofthat
culture change its constitutive forces, overcoming them in the name of
a paternalistic deep environmentalism thwarts their clearly expressed
preferences.
Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 73, 132-33 (1998) (emphasis in original).
'67 Not Adam and Eve. Adam and Eve are the characters of the creation story of Genesis
2. The creation story in Genesis 1 appears to be a separate and different account of creation.
168 Genesis 1:28.
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it without according to the world any independent status.169 We go on doing this, but
we lack any secular justification.
In Daniel Quinn's book, Ishmael, the gorilla teacher tries to help the basically
secular student see the power and depth of the cultural assumption that the world was
made for man and to see as well how this originally religious understanding has now
become a cultural one. 7 ' It is difficult for the student to see this assumption as an
assumption, because the assumption that the world is made for man is so well-
accepted as to appear self-evident:
"Look, the world wasn't made for jellyfish, was it?"
"No."
"Of course not. The world was made for man."
"That's right."
"Everyone in your culture knows that don't they?Even atheists
who swear there is no god know the world was made for man."
"Think of the consequences of taking that as your premise:
If the world was made for you, then what?"
"Okay, I see what you mean. I think. If the world was made
for us, then it belongs to us and we can do what we damn well
please with it."' 71
According to Daniel Quinn, humans have been doing what they want with the
world for 10,000 years, with consequences we now are beginning to fear. The student
sees very well that atheists know this too, even though they do not believe in God.
4. The United States as Light to the World
James Gordon explains the religious sense of American exceptionalism that
motivated Justice John M. Harlan, the elder, in Harlan's nineteenth century constitu-
tionalism:
169 Only a few legal voices have called for independent standing for the natural world. See
generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOwARD LEGAL
RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1974). Fittingly, in a collection of the writings of Justice
Douglas, Justice Douglas's dissent in Sierra Club v. Norton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), is presented
under the heading "Standing for the Natural World." NATURE'S JUSTICE 293 (James O'Fallon
ed., 2000). Justice Douglas wrote: "Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's
ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects
to sue for their own preservation." Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741-42.
170 See generally QUINN, supra note 165.
' Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).
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Civic religion involved the belief that Providence had chosen the
United States to be a Christian example to the world, and it
promoted confidence in, and love of, all things American. If the
United States was not yet perfect, it was working toward perfec-
tion under the guidance of Providence. Through the United
States, God's plan for humankind was unfolding. In short, Harlan
still believed with his Calvinist forebears that America was a city
on a hill, intended to be a light to the world.172
By using the term "civic religion," Gordon nicely bridges the gap between
Christianity per se, that is, the use of Christian imagery in a national context, and the
more secular use of religious terms that comes later in American political discourse.
Of course, the original biblical people who, like the Americans, were to be a
blessing to the world are the Jewish people, as promised by God to Abram
(Abraham): "I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your
name great, so that you will be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and him
who curses you I will curse; and by you all the families of the earth shall bless
themselves."'7 3 Professor Gordon is describing a later interpretation, although still
a Christian one in his view, in which the American system is the same sort of gift
from God to the people of the world. 74
By the time we get to President George W. Bush's Second Inaugural Address,
the imagery has changed a little, but the message is similar: "So it is the policy of the
United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in
our world" and "[a]dvancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation." '75
It is not unusual for American presidents to describe American policy as inspired
by God. 176 In the case of President Bush's language, God is an absent presence, per-
haps directing affairs, perhaps not, 177 but clearly there is something beyond ourselves
172 James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in Late
Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317, 342-43 (2001).
"' Genesis 12:2-3.
174 Gordon, supra note 172, at 342-43.
175 Press Release, Office ofthe Press Secretary, President Swom-In to Second Term (Jan.
20,2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/0 1/20050120-1 .html
[hereinafter Inaugural Address] (providing a transcript of President George W. Bush's
Second Inaugural Address).
176 See generally Michael M. Maddigan, Comment, The Establishment Clause, Civil
Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293,322 (1993) ("Public acknowledgment
of the existence of God has been part of American civil religion from the beginning. Every
President has mentioned God in his inaugural address, although none has used sectarian
references.").
17' President Bush's stated theology is a little surprising. He does not claim that God is
on our side:
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and our own wishes that is present. The American belief in the American mission,
just as our belief in equality, constitutional government, and human use of the world,
cannot be understood without regard to religion and religious meaning.
When I look back at Robert Bellah's well-known chapter nine in Beyond
Belief,178 where he applied Rousseau's term "civil religion" to American public po-
litical rhetoric, it is surprising just how genuinely and traditionally religious Bellah's
understanding of American civil religion is.' 79 Bellah did not regard references to
God on public occasions as secular, or cynical, or meaningless.180 Bellah argued that
these references - he uses President Kennedy's inaugural address as his model for
then-current civil religion 8' - are understood to mean that though our political
system is based on majority rule, "[t]he will of the people is not itself the criterion of
right and wrong. There is a higher criterion in terms of which this will can be judged;
it is possible that the people may be wrong."'
' 82
This description of American civil religion is religious by almost any under-
standing.183 Bellah acknowledges this and worries about it, asking whether America
could have an agnostic President.' 4 He is asking whether the language of our civil
We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of
freedom. Not because history runs on the wheels of inevitability; it is
human choices that move events. Not because we consider ourselves
a chosen nation; God moves and chooses as He wills. We have con-
fidence because freedom is the permanent hope of mankind, the hunger
in dark places, the longing of the soul. When our Founders declared a
new order of the ages; when soldiers died in wave upon wave for a
union based on liberty; when citizens marched in peaceful outrage
under the banner "Freedom Now" - they were acting on an ancient
hope that is meant to be fulfilled. History has an ebb and flow of
justice, but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and the
Author of Liberty.
Inaugural Address, supra note 175.
President Bush sounds like President Lincoln in his Second Inaugural Address. Both
assert that we do not know God's choices. The difference is that Lincoln would be suggesting
that, though we could not understand it, God might be on the side of the Islamic radicals
opposing our policies.
178 ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADIONAL
WORLD 168 (1970).
179 This is precisely where some later commentators differed from Bellah, arguing that
American civil religion is secular in content, however religious its trappings might seem. See
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
2083, 2098 n.71 (1996).
180 BELLAH, supra note 178.
181 The chapter was first delivered by Bellah as a talk in 1966. Id. at 168.
182 Id. at 171.
183 Cf Ledewitz, supra note 68, at 457-60 (comparing Justice Harlan's and the Bible's
understanding that the people may be wrong).
8 BELLAH, supra note 178, at 183.
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religion is not too religious for such an event. Bellah's asking that question back in
1966 suggests that the whole idea of the naked public square, and the concomitant
assumptions of the secular consensus, were never solidly embedded in American
political life.
The above examples of the religious foundations of important themes in American
public life, which easily could be multiplied, suggest why no secular consensus could
have endured in America. The secular consensus aimed at beginning anew without
the domination of religious modes of understanding. To be secular means to have
starting points independent of religious language and worldview. If, instead, our
democracy always depended on principles borrowed from religion, so that one could
not say with confidence whether these principles are religious or secular in orientation,
then the secular consensus had already failed. The subsequent loss of popular support
for secularism, though noticeable as the political collapse of the secular consensus,
was not that significant. There never really was a secular consensus in America in
the first place.
But is this recognition just something unique about America? Americans regard
European public life as genuinely secular, so it cannot be that the political is in-
herently religious in some obvious way.'85 Nevertheless, the American experience
suggests that there is something deep about political life that at least lends itself to
religious expression. We have to take seriously the possibility that political life cannot
be secular in any fundamental sense.
D. Religion and Deep Political Life
Up to this point, I have assumed that there is an intelligible distinction between
religious and political life. From that perspective, the mixing of religious and po-
litical life in America manifests something particular about this society rather than
anything general about the relationship of religion and politics. If religion and politics
can be distinguished, then America's failure to attain secular democracy, if we have
failed, would only say something about America. Even if America had not practiced
secular democracy, in principle, secular democracy could still exist.
But this assumption concerning the distinction between religion and politics is
at least questionable. The distinction between the political and the religious maybe am-
biguous. Claude Lefort suggests that religious and political life might be competitors,
or even partners, in the same social space: "[B]oth the political and the religious bring
philosophical thought face-to-face with the symbolic, not in the sense in which the
social sciences understand that term, but in the sense that, through their internal
articulations, both the political and the religious govern access to the world." '186
1 Some are of the view that the American mix of religion and politics is now invading
Europe. See Cristina Odone, Culture Wars, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 25, 2004, at 10.
186 CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND PoLIICAL THEORY 222 (David Macey trans.,
1988).
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In what Fred Dallmayr calls the "depth dimension of political life,"', 7 Lefort
describes the philosophical/political task as the disclosure of truth:
What philosophical thought strives to preserve is the experience
of a difference which goes beyond differences of opinion .... the
experience of a difference which is not at the disposal of human
beings, whose advent does not take place within human history,
and which cannot be abolished therein; the experience of a dif-
ference which relates human beings to their humanity, and which
means that their humanity cannot be self-contained, that it cannot
set its own limits, and that it cannot absorb its origins and ends
into those limits. Every religion states in its own way that human
society can only open on to itself by being held in an opening it
did not create. Philosophy says the same thing, but religion said
it first, albeit in terms which philosophy cannot accept."' 8
What is unique about democracy as a type of political system has nothing to do
with secularism. In democracy, the sovereign power of political life has no concrete,
corporate manifestation. "The People," although not a nullity, is not a specifiable
entity. The People are not "there" like a king.8 9 This is an important distinction
about democracy, but it says nothing about the relationship of politics and religion.
Every democracy might be thought "religious" in Lefort's sense.
If the political is understood in these terms, it is inherently religious, or perhaps
I should say that political and religious understandings are encountering the same
reality. When President Bush asserted in his Second Inaugural Address that history
"has a visible direction,"'' 0 he offended no secular sensibility. Marxists, for example,
believe the same thing.' 9 ' Nevertheless, such an assertion is not secular. It is an echo
of what Walter Brueggemann considered the core biblical understanding of God.'92
"The Old Testament insists that there is a moral shape to the public process that curbs
the raw exercise of power. It equally insists that there is a hidden cunning in the
187 FRED DALLMAYR, THE OTHER HEIDEGGER 90 (1993) (discussing LEFORT, supra note
186, at 222-23).
188 LEFORT, supra note 186, at 222-23 (emphasis in original). For Lefort, the difference
between .political philosophy and theology is the non-acceptance by philosophy of the
specifically Christian revelation that "Jesus is the Son of God." Id at 223.
189 DALLMAYR, supra note 187, at 91-94.
9o Inaugural Address, supra note 175.
19' Secularists, however, would object to how this direction is set. For President Bush, the
visible direction of history is "set by liberty and the Author of Liberty." Id. My point is that
the understanding that history has a direction is itself religious, regardless of how one
imagines this takes place.
192 WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: TESTIMONY, DISPuTE,
ADVOCACY 113 (1997).
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historical process that is capable of surprise and that prevents the absolutizing of any
program or power."' 93
If we see things this way - understanding that history has a moral shape - what
would a truly secular democracy look like? The political arguments that Americans
think of as secular as opposed to religious might look very different. They might
look, from this vantage point, like internal, "religious" disputes over the right under-
standing of the moral shape ofhistory. The believer might say, for example, that God
forbids abortion and gay marriage. The non-believer would reject the word "God,"
of course, but more fundamentally would deny that the moral shape of history is
against abortion and gay marriage. The non-believer would also reject, in principle,
the claims by ministers, rabbis, and priests to have some special and reliable access
to the moral shape of history. But the non-believer, in America at least, usually does
not reject the claim that history has a moral shape. If that understanding is religious,
then our political arguments appear to be religious disputes rather than disputes
between religion and secularism.
I do not mean to arrogantly impose the word "religious" on persons who self-
identify as atheists, humanists, or agnostics. There are important differences between
loving and obeying God, on the one hand, and rejecting such comportments as
meaningless, on the other. Believers and non-believers are not interchangeable. But,
as far as American political life is concerned, those real differences between believers
and non-believers are not at issue. No one in America is suggesting that the role of
political office holders is actually to lead American worship of God. " In our actual
disputes, there may be little difference between religious and political assumptions.
Despite the close connection between politics and religion, Lefort does describe
a kind of secular political orientation that he regards as an exception to this connec-
tion.' 95 Lefort says that "liberal thbught encourages us to" regard belief in thepeople
as "a sign of pure illusion .... a fiction," and regards "only individuals and coalitions
of interests and opinions as real."'' 96 In other words, there is in this understanding no
common good. Lefort says that this "liberal thought," with its radical absence of
193 Id.
' The closest any Justice has come to such an assertion is the dissent by Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, in McCreary County v. ACLU of
Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), which upheld government religious expression, including
presumably statements by political leaders, on the basis of "the interest of the overwhelming
majority of religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as apeople,
and with respect to our national endeavors." Id. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). This does come close to envisioning the inauguration of a President, for example,
as a worship service. I do not think, however, that Justice Scalia meant exactly that.
Invocation of God at ceremonial occasions, no matter how sincere, is not truly worship.
195 LEFORT, supra note 186, at 232.
196 id.
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community, "den[ies] the very notion of society."'1 97 All forms of politics are reduced
to an instrumental grab for advantage. All shared meaning disappears.
Lefort may be accurately describing the thinking of some political theorists. But
such radical individualism need not detain us. For if the separation of church and
state requires this kind of liberal thought and thus ends up undermining political life
itself, that would be a critique of secularism, not secularism's goal. Americans who
argue for limits on religion in public life are not aiming at pure individualism. They
are aiming at a healthy political life. They do not intend to abolish the political.
Indeed, by restricting religion, secularists aim to make room for political life. Secu-
larists do not have the option of an apolitical, radical individualism.
Even secular political thought, if it is really in touch with political life, sees a
connection between the political and the religious. John Rawls, for example, recog-
nized that religious and other comprehensive frameworks form the root of political
orientation.'98 Disagreement occurs over whether religious views may come forward
independently into politics. 99
If there is any validity to the suggestion that religion and politics are closely
related, the contested fault line between them will become visible where insistence
upon distinction is greatest. That place in our political system is constitutional law
and, in particular, the relationship of church and state as prescribed by the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.00 If religion and politics
are as closely related as I am suggesting, thejob of separating them, which the secular
consensus assigned to the Supreme Court, was an unsolvable, inseparable dilemma.
The separation of religion and politics failed because it had to fail.
E. The Separation of Church and State, and the Secular Consensus, in Principle
People have different ideas about the desirability of a separation between church
and state. So, Justice Scalia reportedly asserted that the Jews were safer in the United
States than in Europe during World War II because of the stricter separation of
197 Id. Or, as Margaret Thatcher once said, "There is no such thing as society, there are
individual men and women." Mavis Maclean, From Advocacy to Management in Divorce,
A Women's Issue?, 2 CARDOzO WOMEN'S L.J. 53, 58 (1995).
198 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 784-85
(1997) ("[T]he roots of democratic citizens' allegiance to their political conceptions lie in
their respective comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious.").
9 Rawls adds, however, that such comprehensive doctrines may only come into political
debate when reasons given for public action are given that are "not reasons given solely by
comprehensive doctrines." Id. at 784.
200 U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....").
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church and state in Europe."°' Commentator Thom Hartman responded that Hitler in
fact used the blending of church and state to accomplish his goals.20 2
Whatever our view of separation, however, we assume that such separation is
possible in principle. Depending on just what is being separated, that assumption is
not necessarily reliable. The separation of church and state in constitutional principle
suffers from the same conceptual problem as does the attempt to separate religion and
politics discussed above.
We can see the conceptual problem in examining the author of the most extreme
formulation of the separation of church and state in our constitutional tradition:
Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of the "wall of separation between Church and State."2 3
This metaphor has become an important concept in constitutional understanding.
Ironically, this metaphor was first used by the Supreme Court to describe the reach
of the Establishment Clause in a case upholding, rather than striking down, govern-
ment aid to religious schools."0 4
There is a great deal of controversy today concerning whether Jefferson should
be considered in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, since he was not in
2'0 See Scalia Escalates Attacks on Church-State Separation at New York Conference, 58
CHURCH & ST. 16 (2005) ("'Did it turn out that, by reason of the separation of church and
state, the Jews were safer in Europe than they were in the United States of America? ... I
don't think so."' (quoting Justice Scalia)). This statement was supposedly made by Justice
Scalia at a conference on religious freedom at Shearith Israel Synagogue in November, 2004.
Id. I do not know that Justice Scalia actually said this, but it does sound like him, and I do
not remember any official denial from his office over what was a fairly widespread report
at the time.
202 Id.
203 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge and Others, A Committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 303 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only,
and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act ofthe
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
Church and State.
Id,
204 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State."'). The Court later held, "The First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here." Id. at 18. Jefferson's wall metaphor
had been cited earlier in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), but the issue in
Reynolds, and the point for which Jefferson was quoted, was the interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause rather than the Establishment Clause. Id.
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any sense a framer either of the original constitutional text or of the First Amend-
ment,205 and his views on the subject of church-state relations were not widely
shared.20 6 In addition, the criticism has been made that whatever "separation" was
contemplated by the First Amendment owes as much or more to Roger Williams's
belief that the wall of separation was needed to protect the churches against corruption
than to any fear of churches dominating the State.207
Whether Jefferson's understanding accurately reflects the original intention and
meaning of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, or indeed whether Jefferson's
understanding of church and state can be easily stated, are not our concern here.20 8
We are considering whether something like secular democracy is possible. The im-
portant aspect of Jefferson's metaphor for us is that the wall of separation, whatever
it is taken to mean, is between church and state, not between religion and state, nor
between God and state.Y°
I am not referring here to the question whether religion is needed to instruct the
people in morality and is therefore necessary to a healthy republic.210 Rather, I am
referring to the meaning of the God of history. Consider Jefferson's famous words
on the future of slavery contained in the Jefferson memorial - words every American
schoolchild might once have known: "Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect
that God is just, that his justice cannot sleep forever. Commerce between master and
205 See B.L. RAYNER, LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213, 265 (1834).
206 It has been noted that Jefferson does not deserve the degree of attention he has received
in interpretation of the religion clauses. See generally David Reiss, Jefferson and Madison
as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REv. 94
(2002); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Understanding of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1449-50 (1990). Indeed, some have con-
tended that Jefferson's view was non-representational. See Michael C. Dorf, Interpretative
Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles Black Might Have Thought About
Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 846 (2004)
(noting that Madison and Jefferson "were probably at the extreme end ofsecularist sentiment
of the day"). This had been Chief Justice Rehnquist's view. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Jefferson was in France at the time
Congress passed the First Amendment and concluding that "[h]e would seem to any detached
observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning ofthe Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.").
207 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965); see also
TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (1998).
208 See, e.g., A. JAMES REICHLEY, FAITH IN PoLITcs 92 (2002) ("During the course of his
life, Jefferson's personal religious beliefs underwent considerable change.").
209 See generally CARTER, supra note 64, at 106-23.
210 There is dispute about whether Jefferson viewed religion as important in this way.
Compare HALL, supra note 207, at 131, with REICHLEY, supra note 208, at 93-94.
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slave is despotism. Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that
these people are to be free."'
Why would Jefferson tremble about the consequences of the injustice of slavery?
Because, as Jefferson saw it, when liberty, which is the gift of God, is violated by a
nation, the result is the wrath of God:
And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the
people that these liberties are of the gift of God? That they are
not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my
country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot
sleep for ever: that considering numbers, nature and natural means
only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situ-
ation, is among possible events: that it may become probable by
supematural interference! The Almighty has no attribute which
can take side with us in such a contest.21 2
This is a statement of the moral shape of history. Obviously, however one
describes the shape of history - whether as God, or destiny, or fate - it would be
ridiculous to speak of a separation of this from the state. The position of the United
States in 1787, in Jefferson's view, was much like that of the Pharaoh in relation to
the slaves in the book of Exodus.213 These people were destined to be free and public
policy to the contrary threatened civil catastrophe.
In the end, it does not matter that the believer says that God demands freedom
and that the non-believer says that justice demands freedom. Both the believer and
the non-believer expect consequences of the direst kind from the perpetration of
national injustice. Neither the politician nor the citizen can be indifferent to justice/
God's will.
Was the end of slavery an accident? A mere contingency? Can we imagine
humankind going back to slavery? If reality is such that the choices that men and
women make are constrained, and if, in the end, certain outcomes necessarily occur
in history, and if those outcomes are morally irresistible, then secularism is
impossible. If it can be said that freedom is written in the book of fate, then the Bible
21 Jefferson - Quotations on the Jefferson Memorial, available at http://www.monticello.
org/reports/quotes/memorial.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) (quoting the inscriptions on
the Memorial and quoting original passages from which the quotations were derived).
212 Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVIII, reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 203, at 214.
213 See BELLAH, supra note 178, at 188 n.5 (quoting 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 467-68 (1950)).
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is to that extent a reliable guide. Who in this culture sincerely denies that reality is
like this?"'
This is not a matter of overall human progress. Humans invent new injustices all
the time. But when they do so, these new injustices are then subject to the judgment
of history. We can call this judgment, as Jefferson does, the wrath of God. We can
call it whatever we like. The point is, it is real. As Jefferson, the author of the met-
aphor, knew, the wall of separation has no possible application here.
This insight says little or nothing about the precise relationship of church and
state or religion and state. There might be prayer in the public schools, or not. There
might be government aid to private schools, or not. Money might carry the message
"In God We Trust," or not. That is all the subject of constitutional doctrine. These
details are not essential to Jefferson's point about the wrath of God. All nations are
subject to that wrath, depending on their conduct.
F. The Separation of Church and State and the Secular Consensus in Doctrine
Up to this point, we have considered the comprehensive shape of the secular
consensus. I have suggested that there is no overall way to distinguish religion and
politics. Nevertheless, it certainly is possible to assign different roles in public life
to political and religious organizations and themes. This division of roles is the well-
known subject of constitutional separation in the United States. In constitutional
doctrine, a strict separation is possible between religious language and life and po-
litical language and life. As we shall see, the secular consensus is collapsing here as
well, in the details of constitutional doctrine, and is likely to continue to do so.
Constitutional disputes about establishment of religion can be grouped in roughly
four modes: government aid to religious institutions, public invocation of God and
religious themes, teaching religion in the public schools, and the role of religious
organizations in public life. In all of these fields, constitutional doctrine already has
blurred the line of separation or is a vote or so away from doing so. Given the po-
litical realities adverted to above, the additional justices needed to restrict the pro-
hibitions of the Establishment Clause are very likely to be appointed to the Court.215
Thus, religious democracy will probably lead to more expression of religion in all
these fields. On the other hand, there is the apparent anomaly of Employment Division
v. Smith,216 which narrowed the protection of the Free Exercise Clause for religious
214 This understanding is also a basis for reinterpreting the supposed secularism of most
"secular" voters. See infra Part IV (discussing this theme).
215 On July 1, 2005, Justice O'Connor announced her retirement from the United States
Supreme Court. Judge Samuel Alito has been nominated to replace her. On September 3,
2005, Chief Justice Rehnquist died. He has been replaced as Chief Justice by Judge John
Roberts, Jr. Considering the health and age of other justices, these are likely to be the first
of several such changes.
216 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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practice. Smith appears to be a high achievement of the secular consensus, though
that interpretation is not the only one possible.
The general position of the secular consensus in terms of constitutional doctrine
would be, on these issues, that there should not be government aid to religious insti-
tutions, that neither God nor religion should be invoked on public occasions, that
public schools should not teach or encourage religious practice, and that private re-
ligious groups and people should not be permitted to influence public policy in accor-
dance with religious belief. In terms of free exercise of religion, the secular consensus
might agree with the holding in the Smith case that government interference with
religious practice is constitutional unless the government action is aimed at religion.217
Even a short summary of these areas suggests that the secular consensus fading.
1 Aid to Religious Institutions
The most significant recent aid-to-religious institutions case is Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,218 which upheld the Cleveland school voucher program219 in a 5-4
vote.22 The relevant aspect of the program was that it provided tuition aid to students
who attended participating private or public schools of their parents' choosing.22 '
The Cleveland voucher program provided a clear example of substantial, indirect
aid to religious schools.222 Only private schools actually participated in the program.
223
Of these private schools, forty-six out of fifty-six had a religious affiliation.224 Even
more dramatically, 96 percent of the 3,700 students receiving tuition assistance were
enrolled in religiously affiliated schools.
225
Justice Souter's dissent convincingly demonstrated that the Cleveland voucher
program was a boon to the Catholic school system, which overwhelmingly was the
recipient of these public funds.226 A cap of $2,500 on the amount of tuition that could
be charged to low-income students "ha[d] the effect of curtailing the participation of
217 See id. at 885 ("Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.").
2i' 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
219 The program was not technically limited to Cleveland, but applied to any Ohio school
district that operated under federal court order. Cleveland was the only such school district.
Id. at 644-45.
220 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomasjoined. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
21, The program also provided assistance for tutoring for students remaining in the
Cleveland public school system. Id. at 645.
222 See id. at 655.
223 Id. at 647.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 704-07 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 14:555596
UP AGAINST THE WALL OF SEPARATION
nonreligious schools., 227 The result of the cap was that the Cleveland voucher system
was "paying for practically the full amount of tuition for thousands of qualifying
students" at private religious schools, thus "systematically underwriting religious
practice and indoctrination. 228
The scale of the aid in the Cleveland system was unprecedented in constitutional
doctrine, but for the Court majority, the amount of aid was irrelevant. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion upheld the Cleveland program because it was neutral:
The money in the program went to religious schools only insofar as that is where
parents sent their children.229 As the government did not prevent participation in the
voucher program by non-religious schools, the actual religious outcome of parental
choice was constitutionally irrelevant.23
Although the majority in Zelman strongly emphasized parental choice, the
majority's emphasis on neutrality and its disinterest in the amount of public money
that religious schools received suggests a broader rationale in the future. Substantial
government provision of services and materials to all private schools, including re-
ligiously affiliated schools, would seem likely to be the next acceptable step.232
It might be asserted that the narrow vote in Zelman shows that the Court could
change course. That is possible but unlikely. As Justice Souter noted in his dissent,
the Court has been moving unmistakably in the direction ofjudging governmental aid
to religious schools more leniently under the Establishment Clause since 1968.233
Given the result of the 2004 election and the prospect of personnel changes on the
Court, that trend is more likely to accelerate than to reverse.
Justice Thomas's concurrence deserves special mention, for it proposes a more
significant change in Establishment Clause doctrine. Justice Thomas argued in
Zelman, ' and he has argued since,235 that the Establishment Clause should not be
incorporated, that is, should not be applied to the states.
The arguments in favor of Justice Thomas's position are complex, and the po-
sition is not unpersuasive, but it is not likely to be the trajectory of Establishment
227 Id. at 705.
228 Id. at 710, 711.
229 Cf id. at 658-59.
230 Id. at 659 ("The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not
turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are
run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.").
231 Id. at 658-59.
232 Actually, it was also the prior step, since the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000), which upheld governmental supply of "'services, materials, and equip-
ment' to private schools, including religious schools, anticipated Zelman. Id at 861 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1)).
233 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688-89 (Souter. J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 678-79 (Thomas, J., concurring).
235 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2330-31 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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Clause interpretation. In the first place, only Justice Thomas takes this position on
the Court. Second, Justice Thomas's position leads to the conclusion that the states
are actually free to reestablish state churches, as long as they do not use tax money
or in any other way practice "actual legal coercion. 2 36 This is not a position other
justices are likely to adopt.
Nor does Justice Thomas's position resolve the central issues under the Estab-
lishment Clause. The Court will eventually have to decide, for example, whether the
words "under God" amount to a federal establishment of religion. If they do not, is
the reason simply that no one is forced by federal law to say the Pledge of Alle-
giance? Or, is the reason that the Pledge is not an establishment of religion the fact
that "under God" does not have the religious force of the words, for example, "under
Jesus Christ"? We will return to this subject below. For now, it is enough to note
that Justice Thomas's position does not resolve such questions. He is able to sidestep
them because states are free to establish religion.
2. Public Invocation of God and Religion
While the doctrine of the Establishment Clause in the area of public invocation
of God and religion is incoherent, the results are fairly clear. The results demonstrate
that, increasingly, government is free to acknowledge religion, and even to utilize
religion, in government expression. Indeed, it could be argued that, increasingly, gov-
ernment is not free to not do so.
The Court has rather routinely accepted public religious - often specifically
Christian or Judeo-Christian - symbols, themes, and language, by claiming that
these religious usages have, through historical legitimation or rote repetition, lost
their specifically religious meaning. Thus, in Marsh v. Chambers,237 the Court upheld
the practice of legislative prayer for reasons of history. In Lynch v. Donnelly,238 the
Court upheld the display of a creche as part of a publicly sponsored Christmas dis-
play, with Justice O'Connor's swing concurrence noting the many non-religious,
Santa-like aspects of the display.39 It was in her well-known Lynch concurrence that
Justice O'Connor wrote of the non-religious use of religious language - to show
"confidence in the future" and to "solemniz[e] public occasions. ' '240
236 Id. at 2331.
237 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
238 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
239 Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240 Id. at 693.
These features combine to make the government's display of the
creche in this particular physical setting no more an endorsement of
religion than such governmental "acknowledgments" of religion as
legislative prayers of the type approved in Marsh v. Chambers, govern-
ment declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of "In
God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions with "God save
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The Court's acceptance of religious imagery and its redefinition of this imagery
as non-religious was both reaffirmed and undermined in County of Allegheny v.
American CivilLiberties Union,24' which disallowed a manger scene in the Allegheny
County courthouse but permitted a Menorah and a Christmas tree outside a nearby
public building. The manger scene was just too clearly religious.242
Is certain religious language really not religious? In Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow, 243 Justice O'Connor described her acceptance of these official
references to "God" as justified either by what she called "ceremonial deism" or by
"an extremely long and unambiguous history."2" But, as Justice Thomas noted in Elk
Grove, "[iut is difficult to see how [the pledge] does not entail an affirmation that God
exists."245 Upholding the Pledge of Allegiance with the words "under God" in it,
the United States and this honorable court." Those government acknowl-
edgments of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our
culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions,
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition
of what is worthy of appreciation in society. For that reason, and be-
cause of their history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood
as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs.
Id. at 692-93 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan expressed similar sentiments in Lynch:
[T]hese references are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular
purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to
meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could not be
fully served in our culture if government were limited to purely non-
religious phrases. The practices by which the government has long ac-
knowledged religion are therefore probably necessary to serve certain
secular functions, and that necessity, coupled with their long history,
gives those practices an essentially secular meaning.
Id. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In County ofAllegheny v. American CivilLiberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice
Kennedy criticized this notion of secular solemnization through religious language, though
he did not mean that such language is prohibited by the Establishment Clause:
I fail to see why prayer is the only way to convey these messages;
appeals to patriotism, moments of silence, and any number of other
approaches would be as effective, were the only purposes at issue the
ones described by the Lynch concurrence. Nor is it clear to me why
"encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in
society" can be characterized as a purely secular purpose, if it can be
achieved only through religious prayer. No doubt prayer is "worthy of
appreciation," but that is most assuredly not because it is secular.
Id. at 673. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
242 Id. at 598 ("[N]othing in the context of the display detracts from the creche's religious
message.").
243 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
244 Id. at 2324 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
245 Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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which the late Chief Justice Rehnquist stated he was ready to do, which Justices
O'Connor and Thomas have stated they are ready to do, and which Justices Kennedy
and Scalia probably are ready to do, allows the government to proclaim that we are
a nation under God.
The Ten Commandments cases split on the public display of the Commandments,
demonstrating the basic divisions in the Court. In Van Orden v. Perry,246 the Court
permitted a six-foot tall display on the state capitol grounds in Texas, along with nu-
merous other historical markers and monuments. In McCreary County v. American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,247 the Court struck down the display of the Com-
mandments on the walls of two courthouses. 248 Essentially, the lineup in the two
cases was the same, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas voting to uphold displays in both cases, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,249
Souter, and Ginsburg voting to prohibit displays in both cases. Justice Breyer pro-
vided the swing vote, upholding the Texas display as predominantly secular,250
whereas the legislative history in Kentucky demonstrated a "governmental effort
substantially to promote religion."25' The upshot of the two cases seems to be that
government is free to include religious symbols in displays that emphasize their
historical significance and include other non-religious symbols. Under this standard,
there is very little limit on what a determined and clever government can do. What-
ever this case law means, it does not reflect the secular consensus.
Even more uniformly pro-religion have been Court decisions requiring non-
discrimination against private religious expression. From time to time, lawsuits are
brought against school districts for allegedly not allowing schoolchildren to read from
Bibles during show-and-tell or during free time.25 2 Such cases and situations naturally
246 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
247 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
248 In 1980, the Court struck down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in each public classroom in the State. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
249 Justice O'Connor's position was surprising. Justice O'Connor indicated in Elk Grove
that she would vote to uphold religious language based on either "ceremonial deism" or a
long and unambiguous acceptance. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. Her con-
currence in McCreary did not distinguish the Ten Commandments from the "under God"
language in the Pledge.
250 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871.
25 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (distinguishing the display in Van Orden from the displays
in McCreary).
252 See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia's Sermonette, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 863, 881 (1997).
There are literally scores of similar cases... : students being hauled to
the principal's office for praying in the cafeteria or publicly stating a
belief in God, student Bible study groups being refused permission to
meet on the school lawn or an empty classroom during lunch hour or
before or after school, religious groups being excluded from privileges
solely on account of their religious identity.
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become political fodder on the Internet.253 The secular consensus would like to ban
even private religious references from public school.
The Court, however, has been clear in a number of cases since 1990 that where
private speech is permitted in a public school, or in a university, or on public prop-
erty, religious speech may not be discriminated against and that such non-discrimina-
tion does not violate the Establishment Clause.254 This protection of private religious
speech probably will have more effect in nurturing a religious tone in public life than
anything government does. The private attachment of the citizenry to religion will
ensure that religion becomes a dominant theme in much of the public square.
3. Teaching Religion in the Public Schools
The central question for the future of religion and state in religious democracy
is whether government may encourage religion. The highest accomplishment of the
secular consensus was that public schools could neither offer official prayers255 nor
conduct classroom reading of the Bible.256 Engel and Schempp established the es-
sential principle of the secular consensus - that government could not encourage the
citizenry, or at least not schoolchildren, to be religious - to believe in God as re-
vealed in the Bible or to pray to God. At least government could not do so directly. 25
7
Id. A recent such case was filed against the Marple-Newtown School District in Pennsylvania,
by the Rutherford Institute on behalf of a parent who was barred from reading a passage from
the Bible to an elementary school class. See Press Release, Rutherford Inst., Rutherford
Institute Responds to Marple-Newtown Superintendent's Remarks About Lawsuit over
Bible-Reading Mother (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.rutherford.org/articlesdb/
press release.asp?articleid=555.
253 See Bible Reading Banned, at http://forums.crosswalk.com/bible-reading~banned/m_
124428/tm.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) (discussing the Marple-Newtown case).
254 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that the exclusion
of a private Christian club for children from school classrooms after school violates free
speech and the failure to exclude would not violate Establishment Clause); Capital Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding that the decision to allow
a Ku Klux Klan Latin cross on public property, where unattended displays are generally
allowed, does not violate the Establishment Clause); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding the refusal to subsidize religious speech where
non-religious student speech is routinely subsidized violates free speech); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Morishes Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (providing that while the school's
refusal to allow a church group access to school property after school, where other groups
were permitted, violates free speech, permitting such access does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding as not violative of the
Establishment Clause the federal Equal Access Act, which requires equal meeting access for
a student Bible study club).
255 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
256 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
257 When the Court, per Justice Douglas, upheld release time for religious instruction in
Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Justice Douglas's opinion did appear to allow
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
This is the sense of government neutrality toward religion that the Establishment
Clause was said to require. In the words of Justice Black, government may not pass
a law that "aid[s] one religion, aid[s] all religions, or prefer[s] one religion over
another., 258 This core secular principle later became embedded in the first part of the
Lemon test - that government action must have a "secular legislative purpose" in
order to satisfy the Establishment Clause.259
The difference between religious democracy and the secular consensus concerns
most clearly this question of government encouraging religion. The Court has never
repudiated the principle from Engel and Schempp that the government may not see
it as the State's job to encourage schoolchildren or anyone else to be religious. Al-
though the government may accommodate religion, by making Christmas a national
holiday, for example, the government may not encourage religious belief. In the
words of Justice Jackson, America must be "free for irreligion." 2 °
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist began his challenge to the secular consensus on
this central point in 1985, as an associate justice in Wallace v. Jaffree,26' which struck
down an Alabama statute that essentially added the words "or voluntary prayer" to
an existing period of silence in public schools "for meditation. 262 The Court, in an
opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, struck down this additional wording under the
purpose prong of the Lemon test because "the State intended to characterize prayer
as a favored practice," '263 which it surely did. Wallace is a perfect example of the
secular consensus in action.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued that government could constitutionally treat
prayer as a favored activity: "It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted
the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today to learn
that the Constitution . . . prohibits the Alabama Legislature from 'endorsing'
prayer.
264
government to "encourage[] religious instruction." Id. at 314. But in context, this appeared
to mean only that government could accommodate efforts of parents to arrange religious
instruction for their children and that government did not have to feign disinterest in that
endeavor.
28 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). It is not clear that Justice Black meant
that government could not teach or encourage religion. He wrote that government could not
"influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will." Id. The opinion
did not state that government could not influence a person to go to church, only that it could
not do so against his will - a principle of noncoercion rather than neutrality toward religion.
259 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
26 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
261 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
262 Id. at 40.
263 Id. at 60.
264 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The current Court lineup is unlikely to abandon the principle that government
may not favor religion over irreligion. In Mitchell v. Helms,265 Justice Souter, joined
by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, repeated the principle that the Establishment
Clause prohibits "any government act favoring religion. 266 Although Justice Breyer
did not join the Souter dissent in Mitchell, Justice Breyer's dissent in Zelman ap-
provingly cited Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Schempp to the effect that "gov-
ernment efforts to impose religious influence on 'young impressionable [school]
children"' violates the Establishment Clause.267 In 1994, in Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,268 Justice O'Connorjoined the portion
of the majority opinion that referred to "a principle at the heart of the Establishment
Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to
irreligion."269 The principle of government nonpreference for religion was strongly
reaffirmed in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,270 in which Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in an
opinion by Justice Stevens, to strike down a school district policy of student election
to decide whether and what invocation to deliver at varsity football games. 27' The
majority opinion revitalized the "unconstitutional purpose" prong of the Lemon test
and held that the district "policy was implemented with the purpose of endorsing
school prayer.,
272
265 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
266 Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
267 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 719 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26' 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
269 Id. at 703.
270 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 315. Even assuming that Chief Justice Roberts and any replacement for Justice
O'Connor take Establishment Clause positions close to that of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,
it would seem there would still be five votes on the Court to prohibit direct government en-
couragement of religion.
Meanwhile, prior to the Ten Commandments cases, only Justice Thomas had indicated
potential agreement with Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument that the Establishment Clause
does not prohibit the government from favoring religion over irreligion. In Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), Justice Thomas indicated
general agreement with the view that the Establishment Clause requires government neutrality
among religious views rather than between religion and irreligion:
Legal commentators have disagreed about the historical lesson to
take from the Assessment Controversy. For some, the experience in
Virginia is consistent with the view that the Framers saw the Establish-
ment Clause simply as a prohibition on governmental preferences for
some religious faiths over others.... Other commentators have rejected
this view, concluding that the Establishment Clause forbids not only
government preferences for some religious sects over others, but also
government preferences for religion over irreligion.
I find much to commend the former view.
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The Ten Commandments cases, although not involving public schools, sharpened
and clarified the Court's division on the principle of government neutrality in fa-
voring religion over non-religion. In McCreary, Justice Souter's five-justice majority
reaffirmed that "[t]he touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the 'First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion."'273 Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,274 not only disputed the neutrality principle in
general, but specified that when government does favor religion, "the Establishment
Clause permits... disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just
as it permits the disregard of devout atheists." '275 Accordingly, these three Justices
endorsed government encouragement of traditional monotheism.276
Despite Santa Fe and the Ten Commandments cases, it seems to me that the view
of Justice Scalia's dissent is likely to prevail in the long run. I say this in part simply
because of the recent changes in personnel on the Court. In addition, the current
doctrine actually leaves religious minorities more at the mercy of religious majority
practice than would a frank acknowledgement of government endorsement of, and
preference for, religion.
Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
In retrospect, even before his dissent in McCreary, it is obvious that Justice Scalia had
been saying that government is free to promote and encourage religion. It was not quite clear,
however, because Justice Scalia did not confront the issue in quite those terms. In his dissent
in Edwards v. Aguillard, Justice Scalia's agreement with the chiefjustice was primarily that
any attempt to discover legislative motive would be incoherent and illegitimate. 482 U.S.
578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Scalia's
main thrust was the nature of unconstitutional coercion. 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed
by threat of penalty - a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us
who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.").
What was behind Justice Scalia's thinking, though, and what came to the fore in his
dissent in McCreary, is that "[r]eligious men and women of almost all denominations have
felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just
as individuals." Id. at 645. Cf McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-64
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia added in Lee that the Establishment Clause
allows the government to "accommodate" this religious necessity. 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). But "accommodate" is not the right word. Given the collective nature ofwhat
Justice Scalia is describing, government must organize and lead such public prayer. This is
the issue that Justice Scalia began to face in McCreary, and it is the key future issue for
religious democracy.
273 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)
(opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)).
274 Justice Kennedy did not join this portion of the dissent. Id. at 2748 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
275 Id, at 2753.
276 See id. ("Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between the
acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.").
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Ever since Lee v. Weisman invalidated the attempt by a school district to give
guidelines for high school graduation invocation prayers that would reflect a kind of
nonsectarian, "civic religion," '277 the practice has emerged for students who are
selected to speak for other than religious reasons, to pray to God at their high school
graduation ceremonies.278 I attended a public high school graduation in 2004 in
which at least five graduating seniors thanked Jesus Christ for His help and inspi-
ration. Such invocations represent private student speech and are protected by the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.279
The Court continued down the road of distinguishing private and public speech
in Santa Fe. All a school district needs to do to avoid invalidation is to authorize the
student body president to speak before football games and to give this student no
guidelines at all as to what should be said. The student eventually will figure out that
a prayer is expected. Once established, future elections for student body president
will ensure that the majority religion is the one expressed. The Court has not elim-
inated religion in public high schools. It has only eliminated adult leadership.
Nor is it possible to undo this tendency by looking to a school district's moti-
vation in allowing a student to speak before a football game or at graduation. The
possible motivations that the Court has regarded as secular, including solemnizing
events, are so indistinguishable from religion that as long as a district does not use the
term "prayer, ' 280 the policy of student speech will be upheld. Justice Stevens at-
tempted to prevent just such future subterfuges in Santa Fe by pointing out that
"invocation[s]" and "solemnizing" sound like prayer.2 ' But a school district can
certainly authorize the student body president to welcome players and families from
the other school, thus avoiding any religious purpose.
277 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
There may be some support, as an empirical observation,. . .that there
has emerged in this country a civic religion, one which is tolerated
when sectarian exercises are not. If common ground can be defined
which permits once conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction
that there is an ethic and a morality which transcend human invention,
the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies
might be advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow
the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither
does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
278 This likelihood has long been recognized. See Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and
Religious Expression at High School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic
Society, 5 NEXUS 61, 65-76 (2000); John C. Eastman, We are a Religious People, Whose
Institutions Pre-suppose a Supreme Being, 5 NEXUS 13, 20-22 (2000).
270 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) ("[N]othing in the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily
praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.").
280 As the district foolishly did in Santa Fe. Id. at 310.
281 Id. at 309.
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The insurmountable problem in these cases is precisely the one recognized by the
Court in Santa Fe - the community wanted public prayer. "We recognize the im-
portant role that public worship plays in many communities, as well as the sincere
desire to include public prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those
occasions' significance." '282 Where that social desire is strong and well-organized, the
Court's decisions will be a mere paper barrier. Unfortunately, those communities are
precisely the situations in which school district involvement, which the Court has
proscribed, would help protect minority religious interests.
The odd aspect to current doctrine is that the same "civic religion" language that
cannot be delivered at high school graduations and football games is likely to be
upheld in the Pledge of Allegiance. It can be said that one is prayer and the other is
not, but this distinction is not very convincing. If the nation can be said, constitution-
ally, to be "under God," it cannot hurt to say so at a football game.
I think the Court will end up just where Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated and
where Justices Scalia and Thomas have suggested - that government may permit
and encourage a kind of generic religious expression and belief, even monotheism
dependent on a Creator.283 I do not think we will maintain the distinction that permits
government officials to do this around adults but not around students.
The change in doctrine that I anticipate will not necessarily change the outcomes
of the core Establishment Clause cases. It may not prove possible for government to
conduct prayer or Bible reading in public schools in a way that does not violate the
Court's continuing concern with government preference for a particular religion and
with government coercion of religious belief. But those legitimate concerns can be
served without requiring government neutrality about religion itself.
4. Free Exercise of Religion
The failure of the Court to accord much protection to the free exercise of religion
permits a different understanding of the Court's reinterpretation of the reach of the
Establishment Clause. I have been suggesting that the Court is moving away from
the secular consensus in the Establishment Clause cases. But the Free Exercise cases,
which grant wide latitude to the government's interference with religious practice,
even to the point of discrimination against religion, require consideration of alternative
explanations. Perhaps the Court simply wishes to accord the government greater
discretion in its actions. Or, perhaps the Court in the Establishment Clause cases is
282 Id. at 307.
283 Cf Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301,2326 (2004) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (describing the pledge as "a simple reference to a generic 'God'). Presumably,
though Justice O'Connor did not say so, the Ten Commandments did not represent for her
just such a simple reference, which is why she voted against the displays in both Van Orden
and McCreary.
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protecting majoritarian religion, rather than recognizing a broad place for faith in
America.
The important recent case law in the free exercise area consists of four cases.
Employment Division v. Smith284 set forth a new understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause, and this understanding was applied in Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City ofHialeah2 5 and Locke v. Davey.286 Congress unsuccessfully attempted to over-
turn Smith in City of Boerne v. Flores.287
Smith changed the prevailing constitutional test in free exercise cases when
generally applicable government policies substantially burden religious practice.
Prior to Smith, such cases were governed by strict scrutiny - the compelling state
interest test.288 Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith concluded that generally
applicable laws would not be subject to such exacting scrutiny but would apparently
be given the normally deferential review applied to arbitrary government conduct.289
Government action that was "aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs" would receive a different level of review.29°
The surprising aspect of the Smith opinion is its recognition - and seeming
approval -that the Court had applied strict scrutiny against generally applicable law
in "hybrid" cases, in which not only freedom of religious practice but also freedom
of speech or of the press was involved. 29' Thus, Smith created a hierarchy of rights,
in which Free Exercise was accorded less protection than other First Amendment
rights.
The two cases applying Smith manifested different degrees of deference to the
legislature. In Lukumi Babalu Aye, every justice agreed that the City's ban on ritual
animal sacrifice violated the Free Exercise Clause.292 On the other hand, in Davey,
where discrimination against the free exercise of religion was express, 293 only Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented from Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority holding that
there was no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.294
284 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
285 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
286 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
287 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
288 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83.
289 There was actually no explanation in the Smith opinion about the test to be applied
short of strict scrutiny.
290 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
594 (1940)).
291 Id. at 881.
292 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520 (1993).
293 Pursuant to the state constitution, Washington excluded the pursuit of a devotional
theology degree from the state's scholarship program. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718
(2004).
294 Id. at 726.
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Boerne rejected the attempt by Congress essentially to reverse Smith by passing
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.295 Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Breyer, challenged the historical understanding behind Smith,296 which was
defended by Justices Scalia and Stevens.297 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
rested primarily on the role of the Court as arbiter of the Constitution.298
These free exercise cases confound the Establishment Clause conclusions
reached above. For example, Justice Stevens, perhaps the staunchest secularist on the
Court today, strongly supported Smith.299 Yet Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion in Smith, does not readily find establishment of religion but rather allows
substantial government support for religion. More surprisingly, the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who had been foremost on the Court in protecting religion (in the sense
of allowing government preference of religion over irreligion) wrote the majority
opinion in Davey, which allowed a facial discrimination against religion to stand. On
the other hand, Justice Thomas, who is perhaps closest to the late chief justice on
Establishment Clause issues, was one of only two dissenters in Davey.
Without pretending to understand how the justices view the relationship of free
exercise and establishment,"9 it should be noted that the clauses work differently.
Limiting the reach of the Establishment Clause will presumably lead to more ex-
pression of majoritarian religion, since that is the religious practice government is
always more likely to encourage and support. Weakening the Free Exercise Clause,
on the other hand, will tend to harm minority religious interests, although that was not
evident in Davey itself.
In any event, since Smith allows as much or as little accommodation of religion
as democratic political life wishes to grant, the case stands as no serious support for
the secular consensus.3"' None of these cases inhibit the development of religious
democracy.
295 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)).
296 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
298 See Ledewitz, supra note 68, at 440-46 (discussing the democratic aspects ofthe case).
299 Justice Stevens alone, for example, found that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause
as a "governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion." Boerne, 521 U.S. at
537.
" In Davey, it may have been the desire to allow government to "play in the joints"
between what the Establishment Clause permits and what the Free Exercise Clause forbids
that led Chief Justice Rehnquist to uphold the Washington exemption. Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
301 Justice Scalia noted in Smith that several states grant peyote exemptions. Emp. Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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5. Religious Involvement in Government
Recently there was a flurry of comment about Texas Governor Rick Perry's plan
to sign a parental consent abortion bill at a private Christian academy and to discuss
a proposed state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage there as well.30 2
Governor Perry was quoted as saying of his choice of location that "[a] church is an
appropriate place to come together and celebrate a victory for the values of the people
of Texas."30 3 The story also reported that the choice of location "is being praised by
conservative Republicans as a major victory.""
A similar media event erupted over a comment by Democratic National Com-
mittee Chairman Howard Dean characterizing the Republican Party as "pretty much
a white, Christian party. ,305 Dean meant this as a criticism.
These comments and situations reflect the viewpoint of the secular consensus -
and, of course, the opposite reaction by critics of the secular consensus" - that the
mix of religion and political life is unhealthy not just when government involves
itself in religion, but also when private religious persons and institutions involve their
religious views in public life.
The secular consensus regards such intrusions as inherently worse than the ex-
pression of the same views by non-religious voices. For example, Andrew Greeley
criticized the impeachment of President Clinton as instigated by a cabal of religious
groups:
The most dangerous intrusion of religion into American politics
in the last hundred years was the effort of a largely southern,
largely Evangelical, largely Calvinist cabal to cancel the election
of an American presidency by a gross intrusion into the private
life of that president.... The attempt to bum Bill Clinton did not
need a John Winthrop to light the fire.3"7
Why does Greeley think that religious motivation is important in this context?
What difference does it make where a political position comes from? Some people
302 See Bill-Signing at Religious School Is at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 34.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See Shailagh Murray, Dean's Words Draw Democratic Rebukes, WASH. POST, June
9, 2005, at A6.
306 The predictable response to Dean's comment in my local newspaper was an invitation
to join the GOP: "[W]ho does that leave for the Democrats? Atheists. And Islamic fanatics."
Letters to the Editor, Join Us, The GOP, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 23, 2005, at B6.
307 Andrew Greeley, The Puritans and American Politics, in ONE ELECTORATE UNDER
GOD?: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 74, at 106.
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wanted President Clinton impeached simply because he acted immorally. Others
wanted him impeached because he lied under oath. And some, as Greeley says,
wanted him impeached because President Clinton violated God's moral law.3"' But
some people simply wanted to cancel the election and put a Republican in the White
House. Surely that motivation was worse than a religious one. Basically, what dif-
ference does the origin of the opposition to President Clinton make?
Greeley uses the word "dangerous," and that is clearly the feeling of the secular
consensus. 309 It is one thing to be ruled by those with whom one disagrees. It is appar-
ently far worse to be ruled by religiously motivated people with whom one disagrees.
The problem is not constitutional, of course. Obviously, private speech by re-
ligiously motivated people cannot seriously be thought to violate the Constitution.
Such speech, aside from partisan endorsement of candidates by tax exempt institu-
tions, is protected by the Constitution.10
If a secular citizen is ruled by religious opponents, the citizen may feel that there
is little chance of persuading them of the citizen's point of view. The citizen and the
religious opponents may not even share a common language to discuss a political
issue.
But this distinction between religious and nonreligious motivations is meaning-
less. Many people have strong opinions about political issues. Having a strong
opinion, even an implacable one, is not related to religious reasoning. Try persuading
a member of the ACLU that free speech is overrated or the CEO of a coal company
that we should have carbon taxes to fight global warming. Religiously motivated
opinions are no harder and no easier to change than any other.311 Anyway, how could
strength of conviction disqualify religious voters from democratic participation?
Of course the idea that God prefers one politician to another or even one party
platform to another is theologically suspect. But presumably the secular consensus
is not genuinely concerned about that, except as such a view might be a convenient
political weapon.
Some of the secular criticism of political activity by religious voters is simply
hypocritical. Secularists did not bemoan the opposition by Catholic Bishops to the
abolition of welfare.312
308 Id. at 106-07.
309 Id. at 106.
310 Bd. ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990) (opinion ofO'Connor, J.) ("[T]here
is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses protect.") (emphases in original); see also supra note 279 and
accompanying text (discussing Santa Fe and the private speech of students).
3" This is the reason that Rawls does not distinguish religious comprehensive views from
nonreligious comprehensive views. See supra note 199.
312 The fight between the Bishops against the abolition of welfare in Wisconsin was a
particularly dramatic example. See JeffMayers, Catholics Urged to Reach Out to Poor, Wis.
ST. J., Sept. 11, 1997, at lB.
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We can see here in miniature the fundamental problem of secular democracy.
Secular democracy requires that religious believers not participate in politics as
believers. This is not because the believers will not be persuasive to other voters.
Secular democracy is exclusionary in principle. For this reason alone it would not
really be possible for a political system to be both democratic and secular, at least
not in a culture as religious as ours. In addition, secular democracy cannot address
the deepest issues of the meaning of political life. Finally, secular democracy cannot
achieve stable constitutional doctrine. We do not have secular democracy, nor could
we.
What happened in the election of 2004 was, then, to be expected. The influence
of religiously motivated voters in the United States came of age with the 2004
election. These voters today dominate American politics. Certainly this situation is
subject to change with the next election. But any change is unlikely to put the secular
consensus back into the cultural dominance it once seemed to have achieved.
This is what I mean by the existence in America of religious democracy - a
practical fallout from a conceptual void. We now turn from the outdated and largely
impotent secular consensus, to the vibrant specter of religious democracy itself. The
phenomenon of religious democracy in America is new. We now ask what it means
and what its implications are.
III. Is RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE?
It would be a mistake to imagine that only secular democracy has conceptual
problems. Religious democracy has its own set of difficulties. There really is a
question whether religious democracy is possible. Amy Chua, for example, in her
book World on Fire,3 13 argues that democracy in a free-market globalizing context
unleashes powerful ethnic and other hatreds, including resentment against the United
States and Israel, which are expressed in religious terms. Fareed Zakaria sounds
similar themes about democracy in any country with internal religious differences:
"Compromise seems impossible; one can bargain on material issues such as housing,
hospitals, and handouts, but how does one split the difference on a national
religion?"3 4 Zakaria attributes this religious threat to democracy to the Abrahamic
tradition in particular: "Religion, at least the religion of the Abrahamic traditions
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), stresses moral absolutes. But politics is all about
compromise. The result has been a ruthless, winner-take-all attitude toward political
life. '315 Writing about Islam, Lee Travis writes: "The core issue is whether a religious
313 AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 7 (2003).
314 FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FuTuRE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD 114 (2003).
315 Id. at 142.
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democracy is possible."3 6 He asks, "Are rules governing personal and social be-
havior based on divine revelation and interpreted by the state compatible with the grass-
roots participatory ideal of a Western democratic state?"3 7 Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer
puts the basic question in the provocative title of his book, Is Religion Killing Us? 318
Within the United States, religious divisions are not typically ethnic in origin.
Instead, the issues tend to involve a kind of religious orientation - called the
religious right or some such title - versus a more liberal religious outlook and/or a
secular attitude. Nevertheless, in America as well, religious democracy is felt to have
the potential for intense political division. Martha Minow writes, "[I]freligions offer
rich resources for envisioning a better world and motivating people to strive for it,
they also generate divisions, hatreds, and barriers to communication and a sense of
commonality., 319 Justice Breyer states in his dissent in Zelman that an important
aspect of the separation of church and state required by the Establishment Clause is
to "protect[] the Nation's social fabric from religious conflict."32
Certainly religion does stir up such feelings. In May 2005, I received the fol-
lowing e-mail from a national grass roots political group:
The Bush government seeks to impose a narrow, intolerant, and
political form of Christian fundamentalism as government policy.
No longer on the margins of power, this extremist movement
aims to strip women of their reproductive rights, to stoke hatred
of gays and lesbians, and to drive a wedge between spiritual
experience and scientific truth. We will not surrender to extrem-
ists our right to think.32" '
Before concluding that religious democracy is inherently unstable or otherwise
unworkable, it must be specified what sort of religious democracy is meant. There
are many different possibilities for the evolution of American religious democracy.
In this section, I will outline some of these possibilities. I leave the question of the
sustainability of religious democracy open. Whether religious democracy is possible
316 Lee A. Travis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 498 (2002).
317 Id.
318 JACK NELSON-PALLMEYER, Is RELIGION KILLING US?: VIOLENCE IN THE BIBLE AND
THE QURAN (2003).
311 Martha Minow, Governing Religion, in ONE ELECTORATE UNDER GOD?: A DIALOGUE
ON RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 74, at 144, 148.
320 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
321 Email from Not In Our Name, nion@cloud9.net, to Bruce Ledewitz, Professor ofLaw,
Duquesne University School of Law, ledewitz@duq.edu (May 24,2005) (on file with author)
(quoting New Not in Our Name Statement of Conscience (Jan. 18, 2005), available at
http ://www.notinoumame.net/soc-jan05.htm).
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will depend on the kind of religion we have. Many citizens in America vote based,
in part at least, on religious considerations. Some government policies are changing
because of those votes. By itself, this phenomenon need be nothing more than democ-
racy in action. It need not spell the end of democracy.
A. The Different Faces of Religious Democracy in America Today
The nature of religious democracy can be analyzed in terms of four kinds of
interactions between religion and political life. Religious democracy can be a sym-
bolic expression, a policy prescription, a cultural critique, or a theological commit-
ment. Of course, religious democracy can be all or a mix of these things as well. I
distinguish these categories only to clarify matters.
1. Religious Democracy and Symbolic Expression
In part, the change that religious democracy has brought to America is to alter
the tone of the public square. The point that Richard John Neuhaus was making in
1984322 was that the language of belief was absent from the public square.3 23 That
certainly has now changed. Even if the believers still wish to say that their per-
spective is discriminated against, their protests sound hollow given their electoral
successes.
It is in the context of language in the public square that one hears the objection
to religion as a conversation stopper.3 24 It is suggested that allowing religious lan-
guage in political debate threatens democracy because political debate becomes
impossible. These are matters of subjective belief, of taste.
But our current political experience demonstrates that this is simply not the case.
In our most contentious political/legal issue - abortion - there are clearly strong
religious views, probably on both sides, but certainly expressed as such in the pro-
life position. But rarely does anyone argue in the public square that abortion should
be outlawed only because God says so. Pro-life religious voters and leaders argue
as well that abortion kills a human being. The belief in a soul may make it easier
to believe that a fetus is fully human, but many Americans believe that the fetus
should be protected as human without a specific commitment to the concept of a soul.
322 See generally NEUHAUS, supra note 63.
323 See generally id.
324 See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, in PHILOSOPHY AND
SOCIAL HOPE 171 (1999) ("The main reason that religion needs to be privatized is that, in
political discussion with those outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation-
stopper."); see also ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS
ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993) (offering an analysis of this issue and a response).
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Gay marriage seems to me a better example of a source of contentious religious
debate. Many people oppose gay marriage basically because the Bible condemns
homosexuality.325 Nevertheless, much more political opposition to gay marriage
could be called simply social conservatism. Many people just do not like the idea
of homosexuality. That attitude is as divisive, undebatable, and uncompromising
as religious opposition is said to be, yet, obviously, nothing can be done about such
"reasons" for voting against gay marriage.
Religious democracy does not change the nature of political debate. It is true
that political debates now invoke the name of God without hesitation and that
national leaders do the same on ceremonial occasions, perhaps more often than ever
before. All this makes the believer more comfortable in the public square and the
non-believer presumably less so. But there is nothing here that threatens democracy.
Whatever political leaders may mean by references to God, they do not mean that
the non-believer is outside the political community in any practical sense. Such
language does not and is not meant to substitute for ordinary politics. Indeed, the
language of God may be invoked to gain ordinary political support.326
Of more concern are symbolic proposals to declare in some way that America
is a religious nation. Edward Foley referred to efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to
amend the Preamble of the Constitution to include the words "devoutly recognizing
the authority and law of Jesus Christ the Savior and King of Nations" after "We the
People of the United States." '327 Was not the insertion of "under God" in the Pledge
of Allegiance in 1953 precisely this kind of aggressive religious identity claim?
Since the election, the religious coalition that helped re-elect President Bush has
neither pressed to have Jesus Christ recognized as a national symbol nor to have
America declared a Christian nation. Part of the reason for that is that Jews are an
important part - or potential part - of that coalition. For another, times have
changed,328 and even in religious democracy, religious pluralism is a favored American
commitment. The serious push has been for public recognition of the less divisive
term, "God," rather than any more sectarian term.
325 For the relevant texts, see infra note 540.
326 Noah Feldman, A Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, § 6 (Magazine),
at 28, 32 (arguing that "[f]aith is not a conversation stopper.").
327 Foley, supra note 88, at 1195; see also Gaines M. Foster, A Christian Nation: Signs
ofa Covenant, in BONDS OFAFFECTION: AMERICANS DEFINE THEIR PATRIOTISM 120, 120-38
(John Bodnar ed., 1996).
328 See Stephen B. Presser, Some Thoughts on our Present Discontents and Duties: The
Cardinal, Oliver WendellHolmes, Jr., the Unborn, the Senate, and Us, 1 AVE MARIAL. REV.
113, 120 (2003).
It was not unusual even a hundred years ago for Justices of the United
States Supreme Court, to declare that ours was a 'Christian Nation' but
just a scant few years ago a Governor ofMississippi reiterated that mantra
and he was roundly excoriated and condemned by the nation's press.
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Whether the word "God" is sectarian is, of course, contested. The Ninth Circuit
opinion in Elk Grove was correct as a matter of logic that the term "God" is not a
generic term that can be plugged into any religion.329 Indeed, Justice O'Connor
referred to a Buddhist amicus brief making just that point about Buddhism not em-
bracing any form of monotheism, though she still viewed the Pledge of Allegiance
as not endorsing religion.33°
The question of public and symbolic religious expression is going to become a
more pressing constitutional issue under a religious democracy. I stated above that
a view of the Establishment Clause as permitting government encouragement of
religion is likely to ultimately carry the Court as a part of the development of
religious democracy. But this victory is not without a price. Once it is accepted that
government may truly encourage, indeed practice, religion, two issues arise - the
question of the non-believer and that of the minority believer.
I will take up the issue of the non-believer below in Part IV. In my view, for
most Americans, the concept of God is not ultimately an insurmountable issue. The
religious/political problem in American political life is based on a lack of theol-
ogical sophistication and a hostility to religious hierarchy. Simply put, many secu-
larists are actually believers who do not want clergy to tell them what to do. Such
voters may come to see that they are not really threatened by public acknowledge-
ment of God.
Much more difficult is the question of the minority believer in religious dem-
ocracy. Justice Scalia finally began to address this issue in his dissent in McCreary.
If the Ten Commandments are permissible because "the overwhelming majority of
religious believers" must be "able to give God thanks and supplication as a
people,''331 what about the seven million non-monotheist believers and what about
publicly acknowledging Jesus Christ? In other words, when government is
permitted to go beyond "a simple reference to a generic 'God,' ' 332 where will we
go?
329 See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other
grounds by Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
A profession that we are a nation "under God" is identical, for Estab-
lishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a nation "under
Jesus," a nation "under Vishnu," a nation "under Zeus," or a nation
"under no god," because none of these professions can be neutral with
respect to religion.
Id.
330 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
331 McCreary Countyv. ACLU ofKy., 125 S. Ct. 2722,2756 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
332 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia's response is that "[o]ur national tradition has resolved that
conflict." '333 By tradition, the non-monotheist believer is out of luck. Genuine mono-
theism is permitted. But, also by tradition, the majority is not permitted to publicly
pray to Jesus Christ.1
4
Of course this is no response at all. If the non-monotheist is out of luck today,
there is no reason why the non-Christian should not be out of luck tomorrow. That
is the problem with using tradition as the sole basis of judicial interpretation of the
Constitution.
I wish that Justice Scalia had contested Justice Stevens's implication that our
religions are fundamentally divided on the use of the word God.335 Granted that the
Ten Commandments are a Judeo-Christian expression, their unique place in
American tradition can be resolved by referring to their place in our legal history,
as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in his plurality opinion in Van Orden.336 But we are
now moving into a new era of Establishment Clause considerations. The issue for
the future of religious democracy is public expression of thanks and supplication.
Here, Justice Scalia is much too cavalier. It is not true that the "other" religions are
outside Establishment Clause protection. Rather, all of our religions share a core
comportment toward reality that can be the basis of political community and,
according to Huston Smith, can be expressed through the language of God:
Making due allowance not only for differences in terminol-
ogy but for differences in nuances, in East Asia we find Confu-
cianism's shang ti, the supreme ancestor, and beyond him Tien,
or Heaven. In Taoism, there is the tao that can be spoken, and
the Tao that transcends speech.
In South Asia, Hinduism presents us with sanguna brahman
- God with attributes or qualities, among which sat, chit, and
amanda (infinite being, awareness, and bliss) are primary- and
Nirguna Brahman, the neti, neti (not this, not this) of the
Brahman who is beyond all qualities. Buddhism presents a
special case because of its ambiguous stance toward God, but
though the personal God is absent in early Buddhism, it could
... McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
... I assume this is the point of Justice Scalia's invocation of George Washington's Letter
to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, and Scalia's pointed comment that
the examples he cites from our tradition "invoke[] God, but not Jesus Christ," all in response
to Justice Stevens's charge that "followers of Judaism and Islam" are excluded from Justice
Scalia's Establishment Clause protections. Id. at 2755 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Van
Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2886 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
... See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2881 & n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 2863 (majority opinion) ("But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious
leader.").
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not be excluded indefinitely and came pouring in through the
Mahayana. .. . The transpersonal God is, of course, solidly en-
sconced in Buddhism's sunyata - emptiness - and Nirvana.337
I do not mean to suggest that our religions are all one and that it really does not
matter whether I say the Sh'ma or worship Jesus Christ. Nor am I claiming that all
or most believers would agree with Huston Smith. Simplistic comparative religious
claims can be an insult to all serious believers.
But we are not dealing with religion by itself. We are dealing here with political
community and its capacity for transcendent expression. The Court should not so
readily assume that any believer is excluded by religious expression at that level.
All religion that I know of expresses gratitude and practices prayer. It is at least not
clear that any serious believer is harmed or excluded when general expressions of
thanks and supplication are offered publicly out of other religious traditions. This
is why I think America will be able to find public, transcendent expressions that do
not divide religious believers.
One additional potential political problem with religious democracy is, that a
fellow religionist may receive votes because of the religious link - as a sort of
identity politics - rather than because of the policies that the candidate will carry
out. Some critics believe that President Bush received some votes from religious
voters despite his policies, simply because he has identified himself as a religious
Christian. I stated above that I thought this criticism quite mistaken.33 To religious
voters for whom abortion and gay marriage posed a serious concern, President Bush
presented a clear political alternative to Senator John Kerry. This is not anti-
democratic; it is democracy.
Insofar as religious symbolism is concerned, religious democracy is not anti-
democratic, or at least not insurmountably so. But, of course, symbolism is not the
major point of religious democracy. Religious democracy seeks to impose changes
in public policy.
2. Religious Democracy and Public Policy
We are asking here not about religious orientation toward particular public
policies but about religion and public policy itself. Is there something undemocratic
about seeking public policy changes for religious reasons?
In the realm of public policy, there are two kinds of issues concerning which
religious voters want change. The first issue is the receipt of public resources by
religious organizations, specifically vouchers for education. The second is a series
"I HUSTON SMITH, WHY RELIGION MATTERS: THE FATE OF THE HuMAN SPIRIT IN AN AGE
OF DISBELIEF 222-23 (2001).
338 See supra text accompanying note 42.
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of social controversies, especially abortion and gay rights and the related view by
religious voters that the powers of judges to make policy should be curbed.
In the first instance - receipt of public money - there does seem something
improper about religious voters supporting candidates who pledge, as President
Bush did in the 2000 campaign, to funnel public money to religious institutions in
the form of "faith-based initiatives."33 9 Voting to line one's own pocket must surely
undermine democracy.
But this just goes to show that democracy itself can be unseemly because voters
vote this way all the time. In recent years, the Court has undermined the spoils sys-
tem.34 Prior to these cases, a major reason to support a candidate or a party was the
hope that the voter, or the voter's group, would receive government jobs. Some
voters still vote based on their own economic interests. Self-interest is not undem-
ocratic. Nor do these matters always involve mere self-interest. No doubt many of
these voters believe both that these policies are in their own best interest and also
that they are in the common interest.
But of course the major policy changes that religious voters are seeking are bans
on abortion and gay marriage. Do these proposed public policy initiatives threaten
to undermine democracy?
There is a degree of disingenuousness in accusing religious democracy of anti-
democratic tendencies over these issues. Both abortion and gay marriage arose as
tendentious public policy matters as a result not primarily of democratic legislative
action but of judicial action. Abortion was more or less removed from regular elec-
toral politics because of Roe v. Wade.14 ' Gay marriage first achieved political visi-
bility in the Hawaii Supreme Court342 and then in the courts of Vermont 43 and
... See Richard Dujardin, No Longer a Risk Presidential Candidates Bush, Gore Speak
Openly ofReligion in this Election, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 28,2000, at 6. In hindsight,
it may turn out that the religious/political breakthrough occurred in the 2000 election cam-
paign. For example, both candidates supported faith-based initiatives, and both often invoked
religion. "If it seems that you've been hearing a lot more about God and politics from the
presidential candidates this year, you may be right." Id.
340 See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding it unconstitutional to dismiss a non-
policymaking employee on ground of nonmembership in political party); Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980) (applying Elrodto the dismissal of assistant public defender); Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (extending Elrod and Branti to hiring decisions).
341 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
342 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban
subject to strict scrutiny under the state constitution). In response, the Hawaii state legislature
agreed to put a proposed marriage amendment to Hawaii's constitution onto the ballot, declar-
ing that the legislature had the power to reserve marriage to heterosexual couples. See David
Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning andFate, 22 HAwAll
L. REv. 19, 20 (2000) (discussing Haw. Legis. H.B. 117 (1997)). The amendment passed with
a 69 percent vote. See id
... Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that state constitution guarantees
same-sex partners the rights and benefits of married couples).
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Massachusetts. 34 It may be true that it is difficult to argue religious premises in a
democratic policy dispute and that this difficulty represents a problem inherent in
religious democracy, but it is even harder to argue judicial decisions in a democratic
policy dispute. In the gay marriage context, it is not religious democracy that is anti-
democratic, but judicial policy-making.
Even the tendency of opponents of gay marriage to seek state constitutional
amendments banning such marriages, 341 which is an unfortunate and anti-democratic
course of action, cannot be understood except as a reaction to potential, feared court
decisions, which would take the issue out of the hands of voters. Such state consti-
tutional amendments are undemocratic, but they are fending off even more undem-
ocratic judicial action. No movement to pass such amendments made political head-
way before these judicial decisions.346
Aside from the question of the proper role of judges, is there a democratic
problem with religious voters seeking to impose their will by banning abortion and by
banning gay marriage? Of course, by putting the matter this way, I am assuming that
there are no countervailing constitutional rights at stake, which, in the case of abortion,
is obviously not currently the law. Naturally, no American government can .legiti-
mately violate constitutional rights. But, whether abortion and gay marriage involve
constitutional rights is itself a contested question. In any event, it is not a fair criticism
of religious democracy that the policy changes it seeks threaten constitutional rights.
That is a circular objection.
Assuming that the policy changes sought by religious democracy do not violate
constitutional rights, is religious motivation and argument in the policy realm a threat
to democracy? Justice Stevens has argued, for example, that the desire to protect
fetal life is simply a religious belief- a theological position.347 Such a belief, in
'" Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the ban
on same-sex marriage violates state constitution).
341 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
346 1 am not criticizing proponents of gay marriage for seeking in the courts the relief to
which they feel entitled, although it was a poor strategy. I am responding to the assertion that
religious reaction is undemocratic.
341 See Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice WHITE is also surely wrong in suggesting that the govern-
mental interest in protecting fetal life is equally compelling during the
entire period from the moment of conception until the moment of birth.
Again, I recognize that a powerful theological argument can be made for
that position, but I believe our jurisdiction is limited to the evaluation
of secular state interests.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am persuaded that the absence of
any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that
conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.").
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his view, is entitled to no judicial support.348 Perhaps it should follow that such a
view, therefore, is not appropriately expressed in our democracy. One could say the
same things about opposition to gay marriage.
Let us assume for argument's sake that the pro-life and anti-gay movements are
purely religious. Is it fundamentally undemocratic for citizens to demand govern-
ment action based on the citizens' understanding of revelation? This is the question
Lee Travis asks about the enforcement of Shari'a in Islamic countries.349
But the anti-democratic problem in Travis's instance of religious domination
lies either in the assumed denial of human rights to some citizens - women for
instance - or in the fact that religious courts will interpret religious requirements
in a way that removes law-making from the democratic process. If a government, for
example, decides to cut off the hands of thieves as punishment for theft because that
is what Islamic jurisprudence requires,35° one could object either because the pun-
ishment is a violation of universal norms protecting human dignity or because the
decision was not being made democratically. But if we conclude that no human right
is violated by this punishment and that the majority in the particular country favors
this punishment, what precisely is the democratic objection when the majority
sentiment is grounded in religion?
To put this matter another way, some might say that American support for the
death penalty is based on religion because the Bible teaches an eye for an eye.5
Imposing the death penalty might then be criticized as a religious and therefore
undemocratic action.
But, what if the population turns against the death penalty because the Bible also
says, "You shall not kill"? 352 What if the death penalty is then abolished? Would
that repeal also be undemocratic?
Many decisions in public life are based on substantive moral judgments. There
are many issues, from prostitution to drug use, for which the harm principle of John
Stuart Mill3 53 might not be thought to justify government prohibition. Therefore,
perhaps these prohibitions are not "liberal." Yet such prohibitions are common in
American democracy.
348 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778.
149 See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
350 1 am not suggesting that this is actually the case in Islamic jurisprudence. See Cindy
Ellen Hill, A Vermont Lawyer in Pakistan, 23-AUG VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 37 (1997).
35! Exodus 21:24.
352 Exodus 20:13.
311 See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND FEDERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN
STUART MILL 68 (1974); see also Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1483, 1487 (2005) (reviewing STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACr THEORY (2004))
("Famously formulated by John Stuart Mill, the harm principle states that in a liberal society,
the machinery of the state can be legitimately used to prevent harm to others but should not
be used to enforce moral obligations whose violation do not result in harm.").
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The imposition of majoritarian morality by recourse to government coercion is
a serious problem in political theory, but it is not a problem uniquely associated with
religious arguments. The believer might say that prostitution violates God's law
while the non-believer might say that prostitution is immoral. Both positions raise
comparable issues in terms of democracy and public argument. Neither position is
inherently undemocratic, or both are. 54
As a practical matter, the compatibility of democracy and religious policy
making has been demonstrated by America's recent political experience. As one
example, the Lawrence.5 decision striking down criminal sanctions for voluntary
homosexual sexual conduct was certainly opposed by many religious voters. Never-
theless, that case did not become a rallying point in the 2004 campaign. 56 Nor has
there been any substantial political support since the election for the reimposition
of criminal sanctions against homosexual conduct. This is so despite the fact that
such conduct violates the precepts of traditional religion in America.
What the Lawrence episode suggests is that religious democracy does not
abolish the give-and-take of political life. Nor does it seek, at least in America, to
impose all the tenets of religious belief and practice on unwilling citizens through
the use of government sanctions.
Not only have religious voters sought changes in policy that non-religious
Americans might also favor, they have done so without relying solely on religious
rhetoric. In most situations in which religious democracy in America has sought to
change government policy, secular justifications have not only been offered but
have been sincerely held, in addition to genuine religious feelings. This is obviously
so in the case of abortion and probably so even in the case of gay marriage.
Nor have religious voters been unwilling to debate issues of morality in the
public square. I admit that it is frustrating to debate gay marriage with people who
point to the Bible as justification for prohibiting it. But I find it much more frus-
trating to debate the Iraqi invasion with people who simply point to the events of
9/11 - events in which Iraq did not participate - as justification for the invasion
of Iraq. In practice, religion has not been an instance of undemocratic policy-
making in America.
This short excursion at least raises a question concerning any supposed anti-
democratic tendencies in religious voters seeking to change government policy. The
... Cf. Smith, supra note 101, at 1284 (complaining, it seems, that not only religion, but
any "'comprehensive conception of truth and the human good as a whole"' is excluded from
public reason by theorists like John Rawls and Stephen Macedo (quoting Stephen Macedo,
In Defense ofLiberal Public Reason: Are Slavery andAbortion Hard Cases?, in NATURAL
LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 11, 18 (Robert R. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000))).
... Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
356 The onlypolitical significance of Lawrence was as a means of drumming up opposition
to gay marriage. See Esther Kaplan, Onward Christian Soldiers, NATION, July 5, 2004, at 33.
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next question is whether the deeper goals of religious democracy might undermine
democratic life.
3. Religious Democracy and Culture
Religious democracy is not just a matter of who wins elections or what policies
are followed. Some religious voting is a protest against larger trends in the culture
- trends that are difficult for people to find ways to oppose. These religious protest
votes may ultimately prove ineffectual because the cultural trends at issue are
unstoppable. The question for this article is not effectiveness but whether these
religious protest votes tend to undermine democracy.
The sort of cultural trends I am referring to go beyond the so-called culture
wars. For one thing, trends in culture are broader than policy issues. For example,
the legality of gay marriage is a policy issue. But the social acceptance of gay
relationships is a cultural trend. For another, many cultural trends have no specific
policy issue referent. For example, many people find makeover shows on television
to be destructive of human flourishing. Such shows teach us that we are not accept-
able as we are and that our value as people is directly related to unrealistic physical
norms.357 These shows are said to harm young women in particular.358 But there is
no policy proposal to deal with these shows that is being offered and debated today.
Finally, cultural trends may have many and overlapping policy consequences without
being reducible to a single issue. The materialism of American culture, for example,
has unfortunate economic and environmental consequences, but there is no one issue
in political life that seeks to address this.
Undoubtedly, some of the votes supporting President Bush in the 2004 election
represented a feeling by voters that unhealthy cultural trends are harming America.359
357 See, e.g., Darren Devlyn & Cheryl Critchley, Plasty Scene, HERALD SUN (Melbourne),
June 30,2004, available at 2004 WLNR 8945739 ("[Australian] Health Minister [Bronwyn]
Pike has labelled [sic] makeover shows grotesque, saying they play on people's low self-
esteem by prompting them to mutilate themselves for public entertainment.").
358 Cf id.
... This was a consistent Bush campaign theme:
Bush "is extending the political debate over values," citing evidence
that "strong families and communities are developing responsibility and
character in the nation's children." In his weekly radio address, Bush
touted a [sic] the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Sta-
tistics report that showed "drug use and violent crime among teenagers
have decreased dramatically, while children raised in households with
married parents are less likely to live in poverty." Using language "rem-
iniscent of his recent campaign speeches," Bush said "the culture of
America is changing from one that said, 'if it feels good, do it; and if
you've got a problem, blame somebody else[.]"'
Bush: Econ Message Off Base - Or Is It?, HoTLmE, July 19, 2004, available at LEXIS
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These voters might not have thought that a re-elected President Bush could actually
do anything about such cultural trends. Nevertheless, they might have felt that it
was worth voting for President Bush simply as a protest. Does such voting, to the
extent it was happening, threaten democracy?
Thomas Nagel suggested that it is a violation of Rawlsian political justice for
a political community, based on commitment to a particular "contested idea of the
ends of life," to attempt to move its members "in that direction by coercion,
education, the exclusion of other options, and control of the cultural environment."36
The pattern of religious voting as cultural protest could be viewed as a violation of
this sense of liberal politics. Many religious voters would no doubt like to control
the cultural environment in order to change the feel and tone of the country.
But Nagel called the principle Rawls is rejecting "perfectionism."36' That does
not seem to be an accurate description of the generalized feeling that American
culture is becoming coarse and that society is therefore diminished in various ways
that are difficult to specify. The feeling by some voters that without basic civility
social life is impossible cannot be an improper basis for political action. The
deterioration of American social life can occur from a kind of looseness in morality
- more foul language in public, more petty crime, more available pornography, and
so forth. But these are not really alternative conceptions of the good life. And to
the extent that they are, courts have always had to protect such deviancy from
majoritarian prohibition. Religious democracy may object to all these trends in a
very particular way, but many non-religious voters also object to these trends, and
for comparable reasons. There is no religious threat to democracy here.
4. Religion and Comprehensive Worldviews
Rawls objected to the participation in democracy by holders of religious, compre-
hensive doctrines to the extent that acceptance by religious communities of equal
rights in democracy is a "mere modus vivendi." '362 Rawls argued that to participate
in democratic life legitimately, religious groups must accept equal rights for non-
believers in principle and not simply as a strategy to employ until the religious group
has enough political power to dominate the political system, at which time it would
hope to impose its conception of the good upon the unwilling minority.363 Religious
democracy can, of course, be accused of just this sort of political opportunism.
News Library, The Hotline File.
360 Thomas Nagel, Rawls andLiberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANiON TO RAWLS 62,
73 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
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On the other hand, the Abrahamic religions do have a strand of theoretical toler-
ation of what is considered wrongful conduct. Islam states that there is to be no com-
pulsion in religious matters.3" In similar fashion, Jesus rejected Satan's offer of sec-
ular power.365 Therefore, religious democracy may not be, or at least may not always
be, practicing opportunism and subterfuge. Religious democracy may accept in prin-
ciple majority rule and minority rights as the proper foundation of democratic life.
But, aside from the toleration practiced by religion, it is questionable whether
liberal political life itself avoids imposition of just this kind of comprehensive view
or dogma. The most contested political issues in our society are inevitably based on
fundamental morality. Abortion certainly is irresolvably a moral issue. There is no
neutral way to decide whether a fetus is a member of the political community or
not.
36 6
In the case of gay marriage, one can say "Live and Let Live" only if it is already
established that the acceptance of gay marriage will not harm society. But that is a
question rather than an answer.
We can conclude here only that religious democracy in its various guises need
not necessarily pose a threat to democratic life. But we have not looked at the pos-
sible theologies of religious democracy in America. The question whether religious
democracy is possible depends on the answer to the question - how is America
conceptualized in religious democracy?
361 See M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Human Rights and Sharia 'h Justice in Nigeria, 9 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. ANN. SURV. INT'L & CoMP. L. 135, 135 (2003).
In effect, even Mohammed himself recognized and granted freedom of
religion to all the citizens of Medina. This practice of the prophet was
supported by the Holy Qur'an, which states thus 'Lakun Dinikun, Wali
Y Adinii', meaning, for you, your religion, and for me, my religion. By
implication, Prophet Mohammed accepted that there is no compulsion
in religion.
Id. (citation omitted).
365 See Matthew 4:8-10.
Again, the devil took him to a very high mountain, and showed him all
the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them; and he said to him,
"All these I will give to you, if you will fall down and worship me."
Then Jesus said to him, "Begone, Satan...
Id.
" Responding to Rawls's insistence that opposition to abortion is, in principle, reliance
on an "unreasonable" comprehensive doctrine (in Rawls's special sense), Michael McConnell
responded, "Why respect for unborn life rests on a comprehensive doctrine while respect for
the equality of women does not is something ofa mystery." Michael W. McConnell, Religion
and the Search for a Principled Middle Ground on Abortion, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1893, 1893
(1994).
[Vol. 14:555
UP AGAINST THE WALL OF SEPARATION
B. America in Religious Democracy
Religious voters face the question in every election, "Who are these other voters
and what can be expected from them?" As shorthand, I will call any believers "the
community of faith," and specifically Christian believers "the Church." Everyone
else I will call "the world." The relationship of religion and democracy then turns
on how America is regarded by the community of faith. Is America to be treated as
the community of faith or as the world or as some combination of both?
Two ways of looking at this question are avoided here. First, my concern
cannot be the theological harm that may beset the Church from the mixing of church
and state - the danger of "Constantinianism. '367 This cannot be my concern for
two reasons. First, only believers can address a theological harm. So, we, who are
not members of the community of faith - not members of the Church - cannot
know whether this latest form of Constantinianism is to be avoided or not. Certainly
I do not wish to preach to the Church about its mission.368
Second, the concern that "secular" and political uses of religious symbols will
be harmful to the Church sounds insincere when spoken by someone outside the
community. So, for example, when Justice Brennan points to the "insult[]" that
commercial use of a creche in a Christmas display causes to believers,369 the believer
may legitimately ask whether Justice Brennan can possibly be the right person to
protect the theological integrity of the Church.37 I wish to avoid the appearance of
duplicity.
The second basis of analysis that is avoided here is an unrealistic requirement
that voters ignore their religion completely when voting. Thomas Nagel asked
whether the insistence by John Rawls on certain limits in liberal political discourse
is not psychologically impossible for the believer.37' Without resolving whether that
is the case, it is certainly psychologically impossible for the believer to vote as if he
or she were not a believer. This is especially true in the case of the Abrahamic
religions, in which all societies are subject to God's judgment. The Old Testament
is very clear, for example, that the sin of Ninevah promised destruction for that
pagan city.37 2 The believer cannot be indifferent to the conduct of his or her society.
367 See Rex J. Ahdar, A Christian State?, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 453, 464 (1998-99).
368 This is why the same concern about Constantinianism voiced by Stanley Hauerwas is
a very different matter. See Stanley Hauerwas, A Christian Critique of Christian America,
in RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXX 110, 121 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1988).
369 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 711-12 & n.19 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
370 Obviously, I am referring here to Justice Brennan's public and perceived role, not his
own religious life.
"' See Nagel, supra note 360, at 77 ("To base political values on something less than our
most comprehensive transcendental values can seem both morally wrong and psychologically
incoherent.").
372 See Jonah 1:2 (describing the fate of a people whom the Hebrews despised); see also
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Not only are all citizens members of the human family, but everyone will suffer
from God's wrath. This is precisely the perspective of Abraham Lincoln in his
Second Inaugural Address, in which God was portrayed as working out the divine
purpose through the American Civil War.3 73 In Lincoln's understanding, there is no
political actor who is not a part of the divine plan. The notion of a purely secular
political life is alien to Lincoln in this address. That does not mean that clerics
should have political power. But it does mean that God's will must always be taken
into account, since it is dispositive. There is, therefore, for Lincoln, no fundamental,
non-religious political decision.374
These two approaches - that religion cannot enter political life for theological
reasons and that voters should ignore religion in all cases - are the extremes. There
is room between them for clarification of the attitude of religious democracy toward
America.
1. America as the Community of Faith - as the Church - as Israel
One model for religious democracy is to treat political life as if America were
the Church and therefore subject to biblical and other religious injunctions. In this
way of thinking, America would be a Christian nation or one nation uniquely under
God.
Treating America as the Church is different from asserting that all nations are
under God because all people are subject to God's will. That is a different kind of
religious political thinking, one that does not treat America as if it were the Church.
When religious voters try to banish wrongdoing from America, they may be
acting as if there were no difference between what believers in the community of
faith are obligated to do and what citizens in America must do. They may be treating
America as identical to the community of faith. In this perspective, America is in a
special relationship with God.
In principle, in this special relationship, America might be especially blessed or
especially cursed. But in practice, America has been regarded as especially good by
most of the religious voters who make up the new Republican Party coalition.
America has been regarded as the shining city on a hill.375
Jean C. McGowan, Jonah, in 1 THE JEROMEBIBLICALCOMMENTARY 633, 633-37 (Raymond
E. Brown et al. eds., 1968).
13 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in INAUGURALADDRESSES
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE
BUSH 1989, at 142, 143 (1989) ("The Almighty has his own purposes.").
17' This was also the point about secular democracy raised in Part II of this article.
17' This is perhaps a theologically suspect formulation. See Richard D. Parker, Homeland:
An Essay on Patriotism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 407,418 n.30 (2002) ("Ronald Reagan
persisted in calling John Winthrop's 'city on a hill' a 'shining city on a hill."').
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When America is viewed as in a special relationship with God, sin in America
cannot simply be tolerated as something one would expect from pagan non-
believers. If America is the Church, sin must be prohibited by government just as
sin is prohibited within the community of faith - within the Church. For instance,
gay marriage cannot just be something that gays do in America that has nothing
really to do with the Church. In this way of thinking, there is no conceptual space
for the sin of non-believers.
It generally follows in this perspective that America has an obligation to the
world, much as the Church has the obligation in the New Testament to convert the
world376 and much as Israel was to be a blessing to the nations.377 President Bush's
desire to bring freedom and democracy to the world fits very well into this way of
thinking.378
It does not necessarily follow that America has the same obligation as does the
Church to actually spread Christianity. But some religious voters plainly do think
that America should spread Christianity, and they act accordingly. This attitude
complicates the American effort in Iraq.379 American opposition to the presence of
Islam in any new Iraqi constitution also fueled the suspicion in the Islamic world
that, rather than simply fighting terrorism, America was engaged in a new competi-
tion between Christianity and Islam.38 President Bush's references to our presence
in Iraq, and the war against terrorism generally, as a "crusade" contributes to this
31perception.
The perspective that America has a special, religious obligation to the world -
that this is America's destiny - can lead to imperial projects. Such a view implies,
376 See Matthew 28:19 (describing the resurrected Christ as saying to the disciples, "Go
therefore and make disciples of all nations .... ).
177 See, e.g., Genesis 12:3 (noting that through Abraham, "all the families of the earth will
be blessed").
378 See generally LARRY SCHWEIKART & MICHAEL ALLEN, A PATRIOT'S HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: FROM COLUMBUS'S GREAT DISCOVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2004)
(defending the view that the United States has a global mission to spread American values
around the world).
179 The June 30, 2003 issue of Time Magazine posed this question on its cover: "Should
Christians Convert Muslims?" The story emphasized the tensions that conversion was causing
in Iraq. See David Van Biema, Missionaries Under Cover, TIME, June 30, 2003, at 36.
380 See infra notes 480-99 and accompanying text.
381 See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences
of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a
Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 670 n.308 (2005) ("The
prevalent American perception is encapsulated in President Bush's characterization of the
'war on terror' as a 'Crusade,' a historical analogy with horrifying connotations to the Arab
world.") (citing Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President upon Arrival (Sept. 16, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/ 09/20010916-2.html).
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as Amitai Etzioni writes, "that the United States has been ordained by a power
greater than that of any person or a combination thereof, to undertake a mission.
The notion that the United States has been sent by God to do whatever it chooses to
do is dangerous." '382
At one extreme of this understanding of America's role in the world is the
conflation of the Gospel with the political/economic/legal system that is championed
by the United States as the ultimate and last word in human governance.383 This
conflation implies thatjudicial review, market economics, and representative democ-
racy are the way that God intends for people to live for all time and that we are at
the end of history.384 The "end of history," or eschatology, is a Judeo-Christian con-
cept now put into the service of an expansionist American foreign policy. 385
At its extreme domestic end, the view of America as the Church tends to abolish
any distinction between religion and politics and fuses government and the Church.
In law, this tendency identifies government officials with biblical roles, as Michael
Perry does when he identifies judges with the prophets of the Old Testament. 386
Secular law in such understanding ought always to embody natural right and revealed
truth.
382 Posting of the Communitarian Network, comnet@gwu.edu, to commlaw@hermes.
gwu.edu (Oct. 29, 2004) (on file with author) (providing excerpts adapted from AMiTAI
ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMuNITY: A NEW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(2004)).
383 See Rumu Sarkar, Critical Essay: Theoretical Foundations in Development Law: A
Reconciliation of Opposites?, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 367, 368 (2005).
Modernization theory is based on the assumption that development is
the inevitable, evolutionary result of a gradual progression led by the
nation-state that results in the creation (and ascendancy) of Western-
styled economic, political, and cultural institutions. These institutions
rest on three pillars: a free market capitalist system, liberal democratic
institutions, and the Rule of Law.
Id (footnote omitted).
38 The phrase "end of history" was popularized by Francis Fukuyama. See FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
385 See G. Edward White, The Arrival ofHistory in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L.
REv. 485,502 (2002) ("Millennialist doctrines portrayed the course of history as taking place
across a distinctive time continuum, one in which eventually God's truth would be revealed,
sin would disappear, the fall of man would be redeemed, and the 'end of history' would be
achieved in a millennial state of grace.").
386 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTrruTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 98-99
(1982) ("[J]udicial review represents the institutionalization of prophecy. The function of
noninterpretivist review in human rights cases is prophetic: it is to call the American people
- actually the government, the representatives of the people - to provisional judgment.").
Robert Cover has also been said to view the American judiciary in this light. See generally
Ronald R. Garet, Judges as Prophets: A Coverian Interpretation, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 385
(1999).
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Richard John Neuhaus, who is critical of this tendency, tried to draw a dis-
tinction between a "theonomous culture" and a "theocracy., 387 A theonomous culture
is one that "acknowledges accountability to transcendent truth ... one in which
religious and cultural aspirations toward the transcendent are given public expres-
sion."3 8 Neuhaus believes the United States should be theonomous. 39 A theocracy,
on the other hand, is "a false theonomy" "in which an institution, namely religion,
claims to embody and authoritatively articulate absolute truth., 390 According to
Neuhaus, "Theocracy is... an act of historical closure, and therefore a form of
idolatry.
391
As I stated above, the theological objections to the mixing of church and state
are beyond my scope. But, of course, Neuhaus was articulating democratic
objections to theocracy at the same time as theological ones. Obviously there is no
room for democracy in theocracy.
The tendency to identify America with the community of faith has been, for
obvious reasons, traditionally a tendency of Christians only. Non-Christians did not
see America as representing their community of faith.
Surprisingly, this relationship between non-Christian believers and America has
recently been changing. As religious democracy has become more established in
the United States, there has been a tendency to view all religions and all believers as
united in a struggle against secularism. This surprising change is why the term "Judeo-
Christian" now so readily comes to the lips of politicians and religious leaders.392 If the
tradition is Judeo-Christian, then Jews can view America as part of the community
of faith.
This expansion of the community of faith manifested itself doctrinally, in consti-
tutional law, in the Allegheny creche case 393 where a menorah was included in the
"holiday" displays at issue in that case. Justice Blackmun's lead opinion contained
a rather full discussion of the menorah and of the Jewish holiday of Chanukah 394 and
noted the participation of Chabad, an orthodox Jewish group, in the erection of the
menorah at issue.395 Since the Allegheny case, there has been more support in the
387 NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 188.
38 Id. at 173, 188.
389 Id. at 188.
390 id.
391 Id.
392 See, e.g., Op-Ed, A reasonable verdict on Ten Commandments, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), July 5, 2005, at B6 (describing the plaques from the McCreary case as being put up
by County officials to "promote Judeo-Christian religious beliefs"); Op-Ed, The Coming
"Holy" War, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 5, 2005, at 17 (stating that "[plolitically savvy
crusaders insert 'Judeo'" in the phrase "Judeo-Christian").
393 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
394 Id. at 582-87.
'9' Id. at 587 & n.35.
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Jewish community for religious communal expression. Some American Jews now
identify with religious democracy in the United States despite its overwhelmingly
Christian associations.396
This change does not seem to have affected American Muslims yet because of
the special circumstances of American involvement in the Middle East and the war
on terror in general. But eventually, there is likely to be in the United States a larger
forging of links among believers of all kinds. Religious democracy will then begin
to see America as representing religious faith in general rather than as representing
basically the Church.
The tendency of religious voters to see America as the Church is associated with
the conservative spectrum of politics today. But the identification of America with
the community of faith is not necessarily only a conservative tendency. The mainline
Protestant churches and the Conference of American Bishops pushing liberal do-
mestic economic policies sometimes seem to be acting from the identical identifica-
tion of America with the Church.397
Another example of a left-wing conflation of gospel and politics is Jim Wallis's
book, God's Politics,398 which is, on the surface, precisely a progressive call to Amer-
ica to be faithful to the Gospel's understanding of social life. A final judgment on
Wallis's view is difficult to make, however, because the book can also be understood
as an appeal to the evangelical community itself to take a more nuanced approach
when it is in the world influencing government policy. Wallis could then be taking
the situation as it already exists rather than as normative. The Church is already in
the world with some control, and Wallis might be reacting to that.
Finally, the identification of America with the community of faith is not only a
function of specifically or traditionally religious orientations. The Humanist Manifesto
of 1933399 clearly saw itself as addressing America as a whole and converting it to
396 See Stephen Bloch, Cumulative Voting and the Religious Right: In the Best Interests
ofDemocracy?, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 1,21 n.77 (1998) (quoting a University ofVirginia survey
as explaining, "'We do want to acknowledge an entity called the Religious Right, which is
larger than the Christian Right. Besides Christians, the Religious Right would certainly
include both politically conservative traditional Catholics and Orthodox Jews."').
'9' See, e.g., Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All - Pastoral Letter
on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (1986), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 572,607 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon
eds., 1997) ("The way society responds to the needs of the poor through its public policies
is the litmus test of its justice or injustice."); see also Gustav Niebuhr, Christians Groups
Urge a Vast, Coordinated Attack on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A18; Call to
Renewal: Covenant to Overcome Poverty, available at http://www.calltorenewal.com/about_
us/covenant.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) (describing "the Covenant to Overcome Poverty"
issued by the National Council of Churches and other religious leaders).
398 See WALLIS, supra note 138.
... Humanist Manifesto I, available at http://www.anericanhumanist.org/about/ manifesto 1.
html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). See STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY: RELIGIOUS
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a new religious or quasi-religious understanding of reality.4"0 John Dewey did'not
see any more reason for a separation of politics from first principles than does any
member of the religious right today.40" All the same kinds of messianism and intol-
erance can arise from the identification of America with a secularized "religion. '
This has been a short survey of one possible way of looking at the place of
America in the thinking of religious democracy. The threat to democracy from this
perspective is straightforward. Acting from the point of view that America is the
community of faith, the Church may attempt to take society over, as if everyone
were already a member, imposing obligations and responsibilities on everyone that
are only appropriate for those who really are members of the Church. Religious
democracy may lead the Church to attempt this kind of takeover.
But there is another possible kind of religious democracy, one in which the com-
munity of faith is a minority and does not represent the entire community. Under this
view, America is understood as the world - potentially an alienating and alienated
presence.
2. America as the World
The main difference between America as the world and America as the Church
is the acknowledgment that, at least for the time being, America and the community
of faith are separate. The community of faith is a minority in the larger society.4 3
The standards of conduct for believers are separate and different from those for
members of the society as a whole. There is no attempt to treat non-believers as
identical with believers. Once this perspective is accepted, the community of faith
FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC HUMANISM 449-51 (1991) (providing an account ofJohn Dewey's
involvement in the Manifesto).
4' The original author of the Manifesto, Roy Wood Sellars, argued in Religion Coming
ofAge (1928) that "religious humanism" would be the next step in humanity's religious evo-
lution. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 399, at 450.
401' This is how Steven Rockefeller interpreted Dewey's integration of the religious and
the political: "Dewey found that as his moral faith in unifying social ideals matured, his
personal adjustment in relation to his world deepened and his life gained in religious quality."
Id at 475.
402 Fukuyama's "end of history," for example is as irresistible as God's will ever was. See
FUKUYAMA, supra note 384.
403 Dr. Kaled Abou El Fadl provided an impressive statement of how this understanding
robs even majority rule of the pretense of divine authority. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam
and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 4, 71 (2003).
[D]emocracy is an appropriate system for Islam because it denies the
State the pretense of divinity. Moral educators have a serious role to
play because they must be vigilant in urging society to approximate
God, but not even the will of the majority can come to embody the full
majesty of God.
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
must decide what its relationship should be with the rest of society, that is with the
world.
Non-Christian religions usually adopt this perspective automatically. After all,
no Muslim or Jew can believe that America is literally a part of the Islamic or
Jewish world. America is obviously the world to the non-Christian. As suggested
above,"X this may be changing, but for the moment Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Bud-
dhists, and others see themselves as minorities and must decide what their relation-
ship is with the rest of America, as must those Christians who do not see America
as the Church.
There are four basic orientations which the community of faith that sees itself
as separate can take with regard to America. The community can serve as influence,
witness, converter, or non-participant. The community can take all or some of these
orientations at different times. Religious democracy is compatible with some of these
orientations, but not with all of them.
Probably the most common attitude for the separate community of faith to take
with regard to America is to attempt to influence America in what the community
views as a positive direction. M.A. Muqtedar Khan wrote, for example, that "the
mission of Islam and Muslims in the West can be to become the moral conscience
of free societies." 40 5 Many religious voters probably are of this view. They may not
think of America as the community of faith itself, but they are willing to join with
other voters - religious or not - to improve life in the United States.
Religious voting of this kind can contribute to and eventually merge into a kind
of religious democracy. Whether that occurs, and it seems to have done so in the
United States, depends mostly on the percentage of religious voters in the electorate.
When a lot of particular communities of faith all vote in a certain direction, electoral
politics will be affected. The current change in American political life, which I have
called religious democracy, is somewhere between this kind of change and the ten-
dency of believers, described above, to merge America with the community of faith.
The difference between this sort of coordinated religious voting and voting as
a religious bloc that views America as the community of faith itself is that when
different religious groups vote in the same direction, their political power is diffused.
They never lose the sense that, although they may be in a coalition, they are still a
minority. So, Khan was quick to add that "religious minorities in America are be-
coming extremely nervous about the relations between the Christian Right and the
Republican establishment." Thus, constitutional separation of church and state
' See supra text accompanying note 396.
405 M.A. Muqtedar Khan, The Myth of Secularism, in ONE ELECTORATE UNDER GOD?: A
DIALOGUE ON RELIGION & AMERICAN PoLmcs, supra note 74, at 134, 138.
406 Id. at 136.
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may be a high priority for these religious communities even when religious voting
is, in general, effective at changing the direction of government policy.4 °7
The other models of interrelationship between the community of faith and the
larger society - the world - presuppose a less optimistic outlook. These are not
consistent with the religious democracy that America has become.
In the second model, that of witness, the community of faith observes and
proclaims the breakdown of the larger society. This may be what some religious
groups did in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s before despair and outrage
led to a more organized and participatory political response.4"' In this model, the
community of faith sees the breakdown of the life of the larger society and attests
to that breakdown as the inevitable consequence of the refusal of the larger society
to embrace its truth.
In the third model, that of conversion, the faith community is not involved with
the concerns of the larger society. The community instead concentrates on the task
of conversion.' Saint Paul takes something of this view in his letters in the New
Testament. Paul is not terribly interested in how the Roman Empire is doing. He
does not attempt to influence it, as in the first model. Nor does he take much notice
of its cruelty and violence, as in the second model. He goes about his task of bring-
ing the good news to everyone.4"0
There is a temptation to regard the conversion model of interaction as non-
political or personal, but that frame of reference is false with regard to Paul in par-
ticular and Christianity in general. Christ is not an apolitical event for Paul. Christ
simply does not fit into any available political category in the Roman world. The
same may be true for some Christians today. On the other hand, there probably are
communities of faith in which conversion does replace political life, by meditation or
mysticism or in some other way. In any event, this third model is not consistent
with religious democracy.
Finally, there is the model of the community of faith in withdrawal from the
larger society. This stance of non-participation is further removed from the affairs
of society than is even the model of conversion. The community of faith that is not
participating may be very passive and self-contained.
407 Given current political conditions and the war against terrorism, Muslim communities
may feel more of a threat today from majority sentiment than do other minority religious
groups.
408 Alternatively, that might have been a conversion. See supra text accompanying note
392.
409 This was the view reported in a sermon by Jerry Falwell in 1965, criticizing ministers
who were actively involved in the Civil Rights movement: "Preachers are not called to be
politicians, but to be soul winners." NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 10.
410 This is why Paul writes in the First Letter to the Corinthians that he has been sent "to
preach the gospel and not with eloquent wisdom," for the crucifixion is not wisdom to the
gentile world of the Roman Empire, but rather is "folly to Gentiles." 1 Corinthians 1:17, 23.
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The stance of non-participation can itself take two different forms. In the pure
form, there might be no participation in the larger society's political life. For ex-
ample, the community of faith might never vote. In a more mixed form, the com-
munity might participate in politics to the extent its own interests are involved. In
America, that might mean ensuring that limits - constitutional or otherwise - on
majority power are kept strongly in place. That could lead to, for example, strong
support for the separation of church and state and for the free exercise of religion.
There are probably no examples of a complete distinction between the view of
America as the church and the view of America as the world. America's current
political situation is a mixture of these two perspectives.
3. America as Both Church and World
There is an odd disconnect in American political life in which certain matters
are thought to pertain to America as the Church and others are said to concern solely
the community of faith itself. The distinctions can appear to be arbitrary.
In the case of some liberal religious voters, for example, large-scale economic
arrangements can be viewed as directly governed, in principle, by the standards of
the Torah and the Gospel. Thus, poverty, business regulation, and the role of the
market are matters of public concern. They are to be addressed through collective
action and are a proper subject of political activity. They are subject to religious
democracy.4 1' To that extent, America may be thought of as the Church.
Yet, in matters pertaining to sexual behavior - birth control, abortion, and gay
marriage - the liberal religious voter may be inclined to echo the words of Governor
Mario Cuomo: "[M]y own religion.., required me to accept the restraints it imposed
in my own life, but it did not require that I seek to impose all of them on all New
Yorkers. ''4 2 At a certain point, the community of faith is conceptualized as separate
from the larger society.
The converse situation more or less occurs in the case of many conservative
religious voters. According to them, matters such as abortion, gay marriage, stem
cell research, and the right to die should be governed by the standards of the Torah
and the Gospel. These matters are to be constrained by public law and are the
proper subject of political action. Here religious democracy is properly at work. In
this realm, America is the community of faith.
411 See Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The
Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1, 34
n.254 (2005) ("Political movements owing to religious inspirations include the Social Gospel
movement, nearly all the peace movements, the demand for freer immigration of refugees,
and the abolition and civil rights movements.").
412 Mario Cuomo, In the American Catholic Tradition of Realism, in ONE ELECTORATE
UNDER GOD? A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION & AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 74, at 14.
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Yet, when it comes to the operation of the market - the economic life of the
larger society - collective action is to be resisted and matters left to private arrange-
ment. Government action in the economic realm is a threat to personal autonomy.
The Church is certainly concerned with poverty, for example, but asserts that the
way to approach poverty is by activity within the community of faith - a food
bank, a clothing drive, and so forth. Here, America is not the Church but is separate
from the community of faith.4t 3 In this understanding, America is the world.
Not surprisingly, these distinctions - America as Church versus America as
world - break down at the hands of authentic theology. The theologian Karl Barth,
in a remarkable talk to Swiss trade unionists in 1911,"' was referring to just such
false distinctions when he explained "the inherent connection between Jesus and
socialism" and cautioned his audience that "the purpose of my lecture . . . has
nothing to do with your attitude toward the church."' 1 5 I cannot summarize Barth
here. But Barth makes it clear that even though the concerns of the trade unionist
- that is, of the socialist - are "in line with the concerns of Jesus,"4 6 the methods
of the trade union movement for social justice will be unable to further them:
"[A]mong us the greatest part is program, whereas for Jesus program and perfor-
mance were one. Therefore, Jesus says to you quite simply that you should carry
out your program, that you should enact what you want... ; then you will be true
socialists.""'7
If I may attempt a translation into the terms used, religious democracy, as I have
been describing it, could never be authentically religious no matter what issues it
pursues in the public square, for the Torah and the Gospel are different from a po-
litical program to be enacted by the government as a result of a process of voting.
While that might sound like the urging of political passivity, Barth understood his
counsel as the deepest political radicalism. In any event, it is neither easy to say
who is the Church nor who is the world.
413 See, e.g., Maura Ryan, On Powell's Theology, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 41, 58 (1996):
I think that we, as Christians, have an obligation at least to try to be the
hands with which Christ feeds and heals people today, and, therefore,
our first response should always be what can we as the Body of Christ
do to solve this problem. If we find that there is nothing that we can do,
then let's go talk to Caesar, and say, "Caesar, you have a problem, and
justice or compassion or even God wants it solved." Maybe God wants
us sometimes to go talk to Caesar, perhaps to keep us humble, perhaps
to evangelize Caesar. But I think we have an obligation first to ask how
we mobilize the Body of Christ to deal with these problems.
414 Karl Barth, Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice (1911), in KARL BARTH
AND RADICAL POLrrIcs 19 (George Hunsinger ed. & trans., 1976).
411 Id. at 22.
416 Id. at 36. But see id, at 36-37 ("But I hope you have also heard the rebuke implied in
this distinction I have made between Jesus and yourselves!").
411 Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
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C. The Policies of Religious Democracy
Religious democracy could prove unsustainable if there are important policy
issues that religious democracy is unable to address. Religious democracy might be
unable to discuss such issues because of its sectarian divisions. Alternatively, re-
ligious democracy might be unable to do so because it cannot consider all political
matters in a reasonable and fair way.
In order to consider these possible objections, I will divide some of the important
issues facing America, especially those with which religious democracy might be
thought especially vulnerable and incapable, into four groups: religion and mo-
dernity, religion and individual liberty, religion and electoral competition, and re-
ligion and international cooperation. As with this entire article, I cannot do justice to
these themes, but at least I can outline the questions that religious democracy raises.
I am dealing here with religious democracy in concept. There are many different
kinds of religion and, therefore, many different kinds of religious democracy. Many
religious voters have attitudes that non-religious voters may find narrow-minded and
intolerant. If religious democracy is possible in principle, the attitudes of believers
simply will become the subject of electoral competition. Those attitudes, however,
are not a legitimate objection to religious democracy itself.
1. Religion and Modernity: Science, Technology, Capitalism, and the Environment
Ever since Galileo's forced recantation, there has been a legitimate concern that
religious authorities are opposed to scientific investigation." 8 The efforts that are
going on right now in the name of religion to undermine the teaching of evolution
418 The astronomer, physicist, and mathematician Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) was con-
demned by the Church's Inquisition in Rome as "vehemently suspected of heresy." Peter
Machamer, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GALILEO 23 (Peter Machamer
ed., 1998). See also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 129, 211 (2003).
[B]ecause Galileo's work was threatening to the Catholic Church and
its teachings, and because ofthe Church's encompassing power, Galileo
was under intense pressure - indeed, was ultimately convicted by the
inquisitors - to "restate" his views on the structure of the universe.
Galileo's recantation was the result, not of scientific observation, but
of religious persecution and the very real threat of a horrible death.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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in American public schools further that concern,419 as does the resistance by believers
to the discovery of the age of Earth in geology.420
If it were the case that religion is inherently obscurantist, there might be reason
to oppose religious democracy. Most of us would at least have to pause if told that
scientific discovery must be subject to Church authority. But this is a pseudo-issue.
The suggestion that there is an inherent tension between religion and science,
as opposed to criticisms by some believers of some aspects of science, is simply
false. The modern, western scientific tradition was created by churchmen. There
was not always Church censorship of even drastically revolutionary thought.421 Nor
do all communities of faith object to most scientific investigation. The Catholic
Church, for example, has come to terms with modern astronomy, biology, and geol-
ogy.422 Karl Barth himself, quite an orthodox Christian voice, teaches that Genesis
should not be thought of as promoting a particular cosmology.
423
419 See generally Kent Greenawalt, Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism,
and Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (2003) (offering a
very carefully stated rejection ofmost versions of intelligent design as non-scientific theories);
see also Diana M. Rosenberg, Monkey Business and Unnatural Selection: Opening the
Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets ofDarwinism, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 611
(2001) (providing a more stringent criticism).
420 Greenawalt, supra note 419, at 327 ("A popular modem view, set out in a 1961 book
called The Genesis Flood, attributes geological evidence to Noah's flood and claims that
physical processes have not been uniform over time.").
421 See Joseph M. Alioto, Antitrust on the Rebound, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 809,
810-11 (1999).
In 1543, a Polish monk, Nicolaus Copernicus, in his book entitled On
the Revolution of the Celestial Bodies, stunned western civilization
with his scientific and mathematical proof that the earth and the other
planets revolve around the sun. The ancient Ptolemaic theory was
suddenly wrong. There was a new perspective.
Id.
422 See Douglas E. Stewart, Jr., Note, Going Back in Time: How the Kansas Board of
Education 's Removal ofEvolutionfrom the State Curriculum Violates the FirstAmendment 's
Establishment Clause, 20 Rev. Litig. 549, 559 n.55 (2001) ("In 1996, Pope John Paul II
issued a statement calling evolution 'more than a hypothesis,' which strengthened the Roman
Catholic Church's acceptance of the 137-year-old theory.").
423 3 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 2, at 6-7 (G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance
eds., H. Knight et. al. trans., 2004).
It is no doubt true that human faith has always expressed itself in a
particular conception, and human witness in a particular presentation,
of the Word of god, and in so doing they have attached themselves to
certain cosmologies .... The fact that this has continually happened
does not mean, however, that the Word of God itself.., contains a
specific cosmology ....
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There may be an essential resistance in Judeo-Christian thinking to certain kinds
of technological applications of science, but that is not opposition to scientific discov-
ery itself. The stem cell debate, for example, does not concern investigation of the
natural world but of the method by which that investigation might go forward.424
It is true that religion as a whole relativizes scientific discovery and subjects it to
other norms, ethical and otherwise. Butjust as all civilized people condemned Nazi
"scientific" experimentation with human subjects,425 we cannot say a priori that
holding science to other norms is opposition to science itself.
The fear that technological civilization is destroying our essential humanity is
a complex matter. But this fear is not confined to religious believers. One of the
most popular statements of this theme is Bill McKibben's book Enough.426
McKibben's book is not religious but secular, or perhaps I should say that the book
transcends the religious/secular divide. Similarly, when Pope John Paul II con-
demned the "culture of death" in the West, he was not raising a purely religious
concern.
427
This is the case as well with the Catholic Church's critical stance toward capital-
ism. 428 The condemnation of materialism in western culture has been a consistent
424 See Arthur C. D'Andrea, Note, Federalizing Bioethics, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1663, 1671
(2005) ("The core disagreement of the stem-cell debate is the moral status of a human
embryo.").
425 See April A. Oliver, Note, Human Experimentation at the Brink ofLife, 9 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 1177, 1184-85 (2001).
The work of Nazi doctors in World War II was among the twentieth cen-
tury's worst atrocities. Ultimately, these doctors were tried at Nuremberg
for the criminal nature of the research they conducted on concentration
camp prisoners. The highly publicized trial of the Nazi medical men,
known as United States v. Brandt, focused on the experiments of twenty-
three German physicians and scientists, including Hitler's personal
doctor ....
... [S]ixteen of the Nazi defendants, including Hitler's doctor,
were found guilty of crimes against humanity. Of these sixteen, seven
were executed for their crimes.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
426 BILL MCKBBEN, ENOUGH: STAYING HuMAN IN AN ENGINEERED AGE 209-13 (2003).
427 See POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER EVANGELIUM VrrAE para. 12 (1995).
428 See Antonio F. Perez, International Antitrust at the Crossroads: The End ofAntitrust
History or the Clash of Competition Policy Civilizations?, 33 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 527,
552 & n.73 (2002).
Perhaps the strongest formulation of the Roman Catholic Church's
position- rejecting not capitalism but rather rejecting treating capital-
ism as an all-encompassing ideology - is found in the Papal encyclical
on the concept of development for the post-colonial era. Pope Paul VI,
after noting the rise of industrial society, observed that "it is unfortunate
that on these new conditions of society a system has been constructed
which considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, compe-
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theme in Church teaching in recent years.429 There are many secular Americans
deeply worried about the penetration of a certain kind of economic thinking into the
moral foundations of this country.430 Such people welcome the Catholic Church's
resistance to the market even if they disagree with the Church on most other matters.
There is an irony here. While the Catholic Church may be associated with oppo-
sition to technology and the market, it is easy to show that religious voters in America
are not really opposed to either. Churchgoers in America are among the vast con-
suming public. Materialism should be a consistent religious concern, particularly
among Jews and Christians, but clearly it is not.43
The Judeo-Christian opposition to materialism also ought to be a basis upon
which to address the modern human threat to the environment. Again, the record
of Judaism and Christianity on this issue is mixed. As discussed above, there is a
certain tendency in biblical religion to regard nature as mere backdrop to man.432
Yet, religion is also one of the potential foundations of the acceptance of limits
to human growth without which no environmental improvement is ultimately likely.
It was the Jewish Sage Maimonides who taught that the beings of this world are not
for the sake of man. 433 The Protestant theologian Karl Barth wrote of nature "in its
otherness, of equal dignity" with man, of the non-human creatures "with their own
dignity and right, and enveloped in the secret of their own relation to their Creator.
4 34
competition as the supreme law ofeconomics, and private ownership of
the means of production as an absolute right that has no limits and
carries no corresponding social obligation."
Id. (quoting Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progessio: On the Development ofPeoples [26 (1967),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 240, 246 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon
eds., 1992)).
429 Id. ("In short, it was not capitalism that the Papacy rejected, but rather the perversion
of capitalism into a 'stifling materialism."').
430 This even has been a source of concern with regard to ethics in the legal profession.
See Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. L.
REv. 217, 219 (2002) ("Many scholars argue that the movement towards law-as-business
instead of law-as-profession has introduced the values of the market-driven economy into
the practice of law, thus replacing its 'moral traditions."').
431 The "What Would Jesus Drive" campaign is a notable exception but still an exception.
See John C. Dembach, Sustainable Versus Unsustainable Propositions, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 449, 464 n.81 (2002).
432 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
41' E-Mail from Hadar Susskind, Washington Representative, Coalition on the Environment
and Jewish Life, to Bruce Ledewitz, Professor of Law, Duquesne University (Mar. 17,2005,
18:58:26 PST) (on file with author) (translating MOSES MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE
PERPLEXED) ("It should not be believed that all the beings exist for the sake of humanity. On
the contrary, all the other beings too have been intended for their own sakes, and not for the
sake of something else.").
"I 3 CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 423, pt. 2, at 4.
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These statements are not isolated or idiosyncratic. The media noted the support
that Pope Benedict XVI received from animal rights groups because of his stand on
the rights of animals.
435
There is no inherent opposition in religious democracy to the health of the
environment. I acknowledge that the opposition of the Catholic Church to artificial
birth control436 is certainly a potential practical impediment to environmental im-
provement, but this is not a conceptual issue. The Church is not pressing for un-
limited human growth. That stance, as the Club of Rome knew well,437 is exclusively
a secular one.
2. Religion and Individual Liberty: Liberalism and the Rights of Women
Can religious democracy respect the rights of individuals, especially the rights
of women? This question should be divided into three viewpoints - the internal
administration of the Church, the establishment and free exercise of religion, and the
practice of other rights in society.
The Church is not internally a liberal democracy. As the recent forced resig-
nation of Reverend Thomas Reese from the magazine America shows,438 the Catholic
Church enforces a form of orthodoxy in its internal speech. Additionally, women
cannot become Catholic priests. Every community of faith practices limits that the
wider society does not.
But such internal restrictions are not generally sought to be applied by the
communities of faith to the larger society. This is an instance of the issue of Church
and world. Religious democracy need not treat America as if it is subject to the
requirements of the internal discipline practiced by communities of faith. Perhaps
there is a tendency by communities of faith to forget the legitimate distinction be-
tween the community of faith and the larger society, but that is usually an error from
the perspective of the community of faith's own beliefs. This is the threat of theoc-
racy.439 That tendency in religious democracy may represent a potential threat to
... See Neighbors Describe Pope as Humble Cat Lover, AMERICA, May 9, 2005, at 4
("Two animal welfare groups, the Humane Society of the United States and People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals, known as PETA, gave Pope Benedict XVI high marks for his
previous comments about the care of animals.").
436 SeeJOHNPAULII,ENCYCLICALLETTER VERTATIS SPLENDOR para. 80 (1993) (describing
the use of contraceptives as "intrinsically evil").
431 See DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, A REPORT FOR THE CLUB
OF RoME's PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND 154 (1972). The report presciently
sets forth many of the elements of the environmental crisis humankind now faces, and
identifies economics and technology as the sources of the threat, rather than religion. Id.
438 See Michael Paulson, Catholic Journals Feel the Chill, TORONTO STAR, May 14,2005,
at M7.
431 Cf. NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 138.
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democratic life, but it is not a mistake that religious democracy must inevitably
commit.
The situation is quite different with regard to the rights of religion itself. There,
religious democracy must plainly insist on religion's uniqueness. Religious
democracy, in principle, is inconsistent with a strictly secularist interpretation of the
Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Religious democracy in any form
sends a message that society favors the practice of religion. Non-believers, if they
are realistic, must see themselves in a minority position. Indeed, after the Presidential
election of 2004, non-believers in America must already suspect that it will be
difficult for the Democratic Party to win a national election without at least defusing
the religious issue and softening the image of the Party as hostile to faith. This is
already a form of political coercion. It is not undemocratic, but it does alter the
relationship of church and state.
Here is a bedrock dispute. If liberal democracy must be secular, as Rawls
maintained in a Theory ofJustice,"4 then religious democracy cannot survive. Over
time, it must become, first, not liberal, and later, not democratic. I do not believe
that Rawls was right, but only history will judge.
The reach of the free exercise of religion should expand under religious dem-
ocracy. The restrictions that the Smith case"' placed on the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be ascribed to the wishes of any American community of faith. Indeed, the
opposition of religious communities to Smith has been practically unanimous." 2
Even politically powerful religious groups have condemned Smith.443 They have
done so even though Smith is much more of a threat to religious minorities than to
more mainstream groups." It is to be hoped that one accomplishment of religious
democracy and one litmus test President Bush will legitimately and openly apply to
any nominee to the Supreme Court will be a commitment to overturn Smith.
In terms of other rights, religious democracy is always likely to oppose a certain
nihilistic and degraded tone in society, as well as the denigration of cherished re-
ligious symbols. Thus religious democracy poses some risk, at least in theory, of ex-
ercising censorship and reimposing sanctions against blasphemy. More practically,
religious democracy in the United States has consistently opposed particular exer-
cises of human autonomy, either because they are said to harm others, as in the case
440 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
44 See Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 645,
650-54 (1998) (describing the enactment process of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and the hostility voiced by an "unprecedented coalition" of religious groups to Smith).
"' See id. at 653 (congressional testimony of Robert Dugan, Jr., representing the National
Association of Evangelicals).
444 See id. at 651.
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of abortion, or because they are said to threaten what it means to be human, as in the
case of the right to die."'
Distinctions among rights can be made. In general, communities of faith in the
United States seem to have accepted the radical freedom of speech that America
practices." 6 Admittedly, believers have objected to public support for works of art
that are felt to be insulting to communities of faith."7 Those objections are likely
to increase under religious democracy. But the test of liberal political life is not the
presence of public subsidies for dissenters, but the absence of jail time.
Religious democracy may be viewed in American political terms as hostile to
the concept of fundamental human rights to be enforced by the courts. That appear-
ance, however, may be misleading. It may be a result of unsophisticated jurispru-
dence by American religious thinkers. This anti-judicial tendency results from oppo-
"4 There has been consistent opposition by religious groups to certain forms ofend-of-life
medical decision-making. See Kim C. Arestad, Note, Vacco v. Quill and the Debate Over
Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is the Right to Die Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?,
15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 511, 545 (1999).
446 Ofcourse these freedoms can favor religious believers themselves. See Avery Cardinal
Dulles, S.J., Catholic Social Teaching andAmerican Legal Practice, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
277, 284 (2002).
Some Americans seem to feel that religion is so divisive a topic that it
ought not to show itself on the public square. People have a right to be
religious, they assert, so long as they keep their piety to themselves and
do not urge their beliefs on others. The Catholic Church, on the con-
trary, insists that people have an inalienable right to bear witness to
what they hold to be true as a matter of religious conviction. In the
name of free speech, people ought not to be muzzled in the classroom
or elsewhere. In this connection, the Church has often declared the
right of private religiously oriented schools to exist and to be supported
by some form of tax relief, so that parents of modest means have a true
choice about the kind of education being given to their children. The
Church also teaches that religiously oriented schools should be allowed
to hire teachers and administrators who support the values ofthe school,
although here certain delicate questions arise about the right of em-
ployees to enj oy privacy concerning their personal beliefs and conduct.
Id. (footnote omitted).
" See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, GoodSociety, and the Prescriptive State,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 355, 368 (2000).
Champions of the civil society strenuously objected when federal agen-
cies such as the National Endowment for the Arts and the National
Endowment for the Humanities sought not to fund projects that offended
some core social values, such as photos that showed Christ on a cross
dipped in urine. A good society would take it for granted that it will
provide public funds only to projects that enhance, or at least do not
undermine, that which it considers virtuous.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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sition to particular judicial decisions, most notably Roe v. Wade."8 This impression
of opposition to judicial review of fundamental rights overlooks the historical reality
that substantive due process protected the rights of Catholic parents to educate their
children in the Church, away from the assimilationist pressures of the public schools." 9
The ascent of religious democracy probably does entail restrictions on certain forms
of autonomous decision-making, but definitely not an across-the-board reduction of
freedom in America.
In terms of the rights of groups, the two groups that may feel threatened by the
success of religious democracy in 2004 are homosexuals and women. In terms of
gay rights, opposition to gay marriage helped fuel Republican victories in 2004.450 In
terms of the rights of women, President Bush will do all he can to overturn Roe v.
Wade.
4 5 1
No doubt the prospects of gay marriage received a setback in the 2004 election.
No doubt, as well, the momentum toward the acceptance of gay rights within the
448 See John H. Robinson, The Compromise of '38 and the Federal Courts Today, 73
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 891, 898-902 (1998) (offering a nuanced discussion of this tendency).
44' See Paula Abrams, The Little Red Schoolhouse: Pierce, State Monopoly of Education
and the Politics of Intolerance, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 63 (2003) ("Pierce [v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)] struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend
public schools. The Oregon ballot initiative was largely the product of anti-Catholic and anti-
immigrant sentiments.").
450 See John G. Culhane & Stacey L. Sobel, The Gay Marriage Backlash and its Spillover
Effects: Lessons From a (Slightly) "Blue State ", 40 TULSA L. REv. 443, 444 (2005).
41' There is not much question about this. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Should Ideology Matter
in Selecting Federal Judges?: Ground Rules for the Debate, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 463,470
(2005).
[S]hortly after President George W. Bush's re-election, a radiojoumalist
asked David Frum, special assistant to President Bush, whether Bush
would select Justices according to an anti-abortion litmus test. Frum
predictably answered no to "litmus test" - a term of negative con-
notations that virtually no one will endorse - but nonetheless went on
to acknowledge that he expects close scrutiny of"judicial philosophy"
and legal views, including views regarding Roe v. Wade:
I think he [Bush] will find there are a lot of Justices who personally
favor abortion who happen to think that Roe v. Wade was a bad case.
And I think what he will be looking at is judicial philosophy. That is,
I think, a somewhat different thing from a litmus test. You want to
know how a judge thinks, you want to know how he approaches the
law.... They will look through the vast corpus of cases that if the
person is on a lower court they've presided over, they'll look at their
writings, they'll look at the way they've litigated things, and say, is this
a person whose philosophy is broadly congruent with ours.
Id. (quoting Fresh Air with Terry Gross (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 3, 2004)).
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Church has been stopped with the current threatened split within the American
Episcopal Church over the issue of the ordination of a gay Bishop.4 2
But, as in the case of rights generally, a distinction can be made between rights
in society and rights in the Church. In principle, communities of faith should not
oppose the rights of homosexuals in society. They should not oppose ordinances
prohibiting discrimination against gays, for example.453 Indeed, communities of
faith should not necessarily oppose secular gay marriage even if scripture condemns
homosexuality. After all, practitioners of gay marriage are, presumably, not members
of these communities of faith. Religious opposition to liberal divorce laws certainly
has diminished.4" The distinction between members and non-members has been
ignored by the communities of faith, but in principle, religious democracy need not
pursue discriminatory policies. I hope this will eventually prove to be the case with
regard to gay marriage in particular, but I admit I am not confident.
Unlike gay rights, it seems that the situation for women will improve overall in
religious democracy compared to the current status of women in American society.
Whether this turns out to be the case will depend on whether the right to an abortion,
which is plainly at risk from religious democracy, is a sine qua non of women's
rights. That is obviously not for me to say, but there are many women in America
who do not view abortion in that way.45
Religion has a mixed record in terms of the rights of women. In the Arab world,
women are clearly not equal citizens, and this status is supported by religious author-
ities.456 In the Netherlands, Ayaan Hirsi Ali wages a struggle to liberate Muslim
452 See Steve Levin, Plan Realigns Anglican Church, PrTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June
16, 2005, at Al.
41' The Catholic Church does not uniformly oppose anti-discrimination provisions that
protect homosexuality. See generally Robert Nugent, The US. Catholic Bishops and Gay
Civil Rights: Four Case Studies, 38 CATH. LAW. 1 (1998).
4"' Diminished, but not disappeared. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN.
L. REv. 1758, 1798 n. 155 (2005) (discussing religious support of covenant of marriage in
Louisiana as more politically feasible than desired goal of tightening state divorce law gener-
ally).
... See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Getting Our Stories Straight: Narrative Autonomy and
Feminist Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 449,455-57 (1997) (discussing feminist differences on
this issue).
456 See John F. Murphy, The Impact of Terrorism on Globalization and Vice- Versa, 36
INT'L LAW. 77, 79 (2002) (discussing the view of Thomas Friedman).
Many Arab-Muslim states today share the same rigid political structure.
Think of it as two islands: one island is occupied by the secular auto-
cratic regimes and the business class around them. On the other island
are the mullahs, imams and religious authorities who dominate Islamic
practice and education, which is still based largely on traditional Koranic
interpretations that are not embracing of modemity, pluralism or the
equality of women. The governing bargain is that the regimes get to stay
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women from a religious tutelage that even liberal society has been unable to
penetrate.457 Religion enforces many such restrictions on women. As Donna
Sullivan writes, "Many gender-specific human rights violations are grounded in
cultural and religious practices.""45
On the other hand, religion can also serve as a protest against secular oppres-
sion. In Turkey, for example, women are donning headscarves despite a ban on the
practice, in protest against the government.459
In America, the condition of the rights of women under the demands of the eco-
nomic market is appalling. American economic life is, in practice if not in law, pure
sexism, in which the desire of women to have children,' let alone the desire of men
and women to care for their children, is relentlessly punished in economic terms."6
It is a fiction that equal rights for women are possible when the market's insatiable
appetite for unlimited work is not curbed by public policy.462 It is a fiction that equal
rights for women are possible when, in practice, men divorce their wives, and, based
on the unequal economic evaluation of the contributions of the two parties, women
and children lose wealth and income thereby and men gain.46 3 Furthermore, these are
in power forever and the mullahs get a monopoly on religious practice
and education forever.
Id. (quoting Thomas L. Friedman, Breaking the Circle, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2001, at A25).
411 See Christopher Caldwell, Daughter of the Enlightenment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 26.
458 Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality andReligious Freedom: Toward a Frameworkfor
Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 795 (1992).
... See Clarke Thomas, Editorial, Where a Head Scarf is No Mere Cloth in the Famously
Secular Turkey, Women's Headwear Has Become a Telling Flashpoint, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, June 15, 2005, at B7.
460 See Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 27 (2004) (discussing the economic
pressure on women having children and the failure of law to address it).
"' Marion Crain, "Where Have all the Cowboys Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning in
Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1909-10 (1999) (exploring impact of market
pressure on the divorce rate).
462 See generally HARRIET B. PRESSER, WORKING IN A 24/7 ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR
AmERicAN FAMIIEs (2003). Kenneth Standard, President of the New York State Bar Asso-
ciation, addressed these issues for lawyers in particular in 2004 and placed the source of the
pressure on the larger economic system:
Much of the malaise I have seen stems from trends in society that are
affecting workplaces in general - the difficult economic climate, the
competitive commercial environment, corporate restructurings resulting
in a smaller number of people shouldering the same amount or even
more of the work, the advancements in technology that enable us to be
connected to laptops, cellphones, E-mail, etc. 24/7, and the heightened
expectations and demands of clients/customers.
Kenneth G. Standard, Balancing Act, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 5, 5 (2004).
46 The statistics are quite consistent concerning this wealth effect. See Jill Elaine Hasday,
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only the economic aspects of the rights of women in America. The constant
advertising barrage of the sexual image of women, for example, is so unhealthy that
the self-esteem of younger women is said constantly to be at risk. ' Religious dem-
ocracy can serve as a way to address and challenge these inequities.
The concern that religious democracy will undermine individual rights is based,
in part, on the consistent religious criticism of the individualism of American so-
ciety.465 That critique is indeed an important part of the religious message in America.
But this religious critique is not destructive of human rights. Indeed, the critique
supports the criticism by the political left against the dominance in America of the
market and the diminution in this society of any notion of social solidarity.466
Hyper-individualism has not proved to be a foundation of liberal democracy, but a
threat to it. The emphasis of religious democracy on community may represent a
change in American political life, but not one for the worse.
3. Religious Democracy and Electoral Competition: Constitution and Democracy
in June 2005, there were widespread allegations that the election in Iran was
rigged."7 These charges raise the question whether religious leaders can ever really
accept democracy and limits on government when the government is controlled by
religious authorities.
Insofar as religious democracy looks to a norm outside democracy for legitimacy,
which of course every religion does, it can be argued that religion cannot participate
fully in democratic life. Many have suggested that Islam cannot recognize democ-
racy as fundamentally legitimate." 8 Rabbi Eliezer in the Talmud famously states,
The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825, 869-70 n.171 (2004).
"4 Cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 420 n.212
(1999) (discussing the effect of advertising on consumer's self satisfaction); see also Cheryl
B. Preston, Consuming Sexism: Pornography Suppression in the Larger Context of Com-
merciallmages, 31 GA. L. REv. 771 (1997) (comparing the effects of commercial advertising
and pornography).
" See, e.g., William Joseph Wagner, Universal Human Rights, the United Nations, and
the Telos of Human Dignity, 3 AvE MARIA L. REv. 197, 215 & n.58 (2005) (arguing that
individualist, rights-based theory undermines social solidarity).
466 See Joachim J. Savelsberg, Cultures of Control in Contemporary Societies, 27 LAw &
SOC. INQuIRY 685, 689 (2002) (describing the "crisis decades" ofdeclining social solidarity).
467 See Michael Slackman, Iran Moderate Says Hard-Liners Rigged Election, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 19, 2005, § 1, at Al.
468 See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The WestHas Won, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 11,2001,
available athttp://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0, 1361,567333,00.html (arguing that
"there does seem to be something about Islam, or at least the fundamentalist versions of
Islam that have been dominant in recent years": that renders Islam particularly resistant to
modernity," by which Fukuyama means democracy and capitalism); Christian Pippan &
Emile Noel Fellow, Book Review, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 213, 215 (2004) (reviewing L. Ali
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"Be not concerned about your voting" when the rabbis vote, in good majoritarian
fashion, on a matter that should be controlled by tradition and reason." 9 It is said
in the United States that there is a serious Christian movement working against the
Constitution on the ground that, in principle, the Bible, rather than any secular
governing framework, must control the system of government.47° Along these lines,
Professor Dow, for example, has objected to religious democracy as inconsistent
with the democratic norm that the people must be able to enact any law they want.471
The people cannot be bound to certain preexisting religious codes or even the will
of God. Religion can never accept that concept.
These concerns seem grossly exaggerated and excessively theoretical in terms
of the American political context. Religious democracy here has proceeded entirely
by majoritarian methods. Indeed, it is the opponents of religious democracy who
have resorted to the courts, in part because of the democratic success of politicians
who appeal to the religious leanings of voters.
The tendency of the Democratic Party to denigrate religion - or to be perceived
as doing so472 - has been the anti-democratic problem in America. Conversely,
religious groups have been content to play the electoral game.
The. surprising ability of religious groups to work together to further the re-
election effort for President Bush in 2004 is the best evidence that religious dem-
ocracy is not inherently unstable. The main members of the religious portion of the
Republican Party coalition - Catholics and Protestants - have certainly opposed
each other politically in the past.473 All of that was subsumed in the 2004 electoral
effort. Even funding for Catholic schools, traditionally a source of opposition from
Khan, A THEORY OF UNIVERSAL DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE END OF HISTORY (2003), and
arguing that existing models of political Islam have "failed to accept meaningful political
competition."). But see El Fadl, supra note 403.
469 4 BABYLONIAN TALUuD, Hagigah 3b, at 11 (I. Epstein trans. & ed., Soncino Press
1938).
470 See generally Kimberly J. Cook, Abortion, Capital Punishment, and the Politics of
"God's" Will, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105 (2000).
471 Dow, supra note 75, at 885 (noting that in a democracy, "[t]here is nothing that the
people are not free to do.").
472 See infra text accompanying notes 520-24.
113 Monroe Freedman suggested, for example, that the adoption of anti-solicitation rules
by the American Bar Association in the early Twentieth Century reflected Protestant bias
against newly immigrated Jews and Catholics. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS 240-41 (1990).
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Protestants, 474 has been supported by the new religious coalition.475 An effort was
even made during the campaign to reach out to Jews by toning down specifically
Christian rhetoric. All of this suggests that religious democracy is neither inherently
divisive nor undemocratic.
The impeachment and attempted removal of President Clinton is an exception
to the general willingness of religious groups to use purely electoral methods to gain
and maintain power.476 The tendency to demonize political opponents, which was
exemplified in regard to Clinton,477 is, admittedly, an undemocratic tendency poten-
tially present in religious democracy. When I believe that my political party espe-
cially serves God, I may end up believing as well that my opponents especially do
not serve God.
This tendency to demonize opponents is another potential threat to democracy
that religious democracy may or may not be able to resist. We do not-know whether
religious democracy can curb such tendencies. If it cannot, religious democracy will
not last.
4. Religious Democracy and Peace Among the Nations
Religious democracy has never been able to quiet international competition
between countries with different religions. Not only do religious differences exacer-
bate international relations, they can spill over into domestic religious unrest. An
example of this tension is the relationship between India and Pakistan. The movement
called political Hinduism embodies opposition to Pakistan internationally and hos-
tility to Indian Muslims domestically.478
144 See C.M.A. McCauliff, Distant Mirror or Preview of our Future: Does Locke v.
Davey Prevent American Use of Creative English Financingfor Religious Schools?, 29 VT.
L. REv. 365, 367 n.4 (2005) (discussing the history of interreligious disputes over funding).
In 1988, the 200th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church adopted a policy statement
opposing vouchers. See Dean M. Kelley, Religious Access to Public Programs and Govern-
ment Funding, 8 BYU J. PUn. L. 417, 434 n.78 (1994).
"7 See Americans Divided over Role of Religion in Politics, New Poll Says, 57 CHURCH
& ST. 17, 17 (2004) ("The American people oppose school vouchers, 45 percent to 39 per-
cent. Support was highest among evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics and lowest
among the unaffiliated, atheists and agnostics.").
476 See Greeley, supra note 307.
477 See Presser, supra note 328, at 122 ("In what recently amounted to a national refer-
endum on morality in politics, the impeachment proceedings against former President Clinton,
we saw to what an extent a good portion of the nation (one side in the cultural war) believed
that personal morality had nothing to do with politics.").
478 See Mohammed Ayoob, Political Islam: Image and Reality, 21 WORLD POL'Y J. 1
(2004); see also Mushirul Hasan, Now Redeem the Promise, INDIAN ExPRESs, July 26,2000,
available at http://www.indianexpress.com/columnists/mush/20000726.html (providing a
critical view of the claims of political Hinduism, or Hindutza).
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There is deep international Muslim suspicion of American foreign policy in-
tentions. A poll was taken in the fall of 2003 testing public opinion in Indonesia
about the United States and in a story reporting the results, Raymond Bonner of The
New York Times wrote: "The majority of Indonesians, who are moderate Muslims,
view the campaign against terrorism as a war on Islam, and the war in Iraq has
fueled those views."479 If Muslims feel that way in Indonesia, then many, if not
most, Muslims likely feel that way around the world.
In America, the exception to the religious harmony present in the 2004 Repub-
lican Party coalition was the American Muslim community. ° The reason that
Muslims were, by and large, not part of this coalition was not attributable to theo-
logical disputes between Christians and Muslims per se. Instead, the problem presum-
ably was American Muslim opposition to American foreign policy under President
Bush, specifically the feeling that the war against terrorism is really directed against
Islam. 4
1
Most Americans, of course, would vehemently deny that the war against terrorism
is a war against Islam. On the political right, the war is said to be for morality, as
William Bennett writes in his book, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on
Terrorism.4 2 On the left, the fight is said to be for democracy, as argued in George
Packer's collection of essays, The Fight Is for Democracy.4 3 Recently, the sides
have begun to merge. Some on the right now say that the war is for democracy, most
notably that the war in Iraq is creating the potential for democracy in the Middle
East.4  Some on the left say the war is for morality, to liberate women from the
4" Raymond Bonner, Islamic Cleric Gets Mixed Verdict in Indonesian Trialfor Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, at Al.
480 The CNN exit poll did not list a category for Islam in the "vote by religion" question,
but listed only Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and for every other voter who identified with a
religion, "Other." 74 percent of this "Other" religious group, which represented 7 percent of
the voters, supported Senator Kerry. This is not clearly a Muslim vote, but it is likely that
Muslim voters make up a substantial portion of this group. See Election 2004, supra note 19;
see also Peter Skerry & Devin Fernandes, Interpreting the Muslim Vote, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 26, 2004, at A27.
481 Skerry and Fernandes suggest that the Muslim community is more divided on these
matters than might be assumed. Skerry & Fernandes, supra note 480.
482 WILLIAM J. BENNETT, WHY WE FIGHT: MORAL CLARITY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
(2003).
483 GEORGE PACKER, THE FIGHT IS FOR DEMOCRACY: WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS IN
AMERICA AND THE WORLD (2003).
484 Thus, Charles Krauthammer in April 2005 referred to the "Arab spring" of movement
toward democracy in the Middle East touched offby changes in Iraq. Charles Krauthammer,
The Arab Spring Continues in Lebanon, Townhall.com, Apr. 1, 2005, at http://www.town
hall.com/opinions/columns/charleskrauthammer/2005/04/01/14980.html.
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patriarchy of traditional societies.485 But there are code words that suggest that
Islam may be the target.4
8 6
Americans believe that we are sincere when our govemment denies that we
oppose Islam. We say to ourselves that America permits free exercise of Islam, like
every other religion. For example, we do not ban headscarves in public schools like
the French do. 87 So, this widespread feeling that we oppose Islam must be mistaken
- a horrible and serious misunderstanding. But the impression of our hostility to
Islam has some basis. For one thing, the Bush Administration, from the beginning
of the war in Iraq, sought to exclude Islam from any new Iraqi constitution. The
original Bush Administration plan, outlined by L. Paul Bremer in the Washington
Post, had been that a new Iraqi constitution would be drafted by an appointed body,
leading to a process of eventual elections and transfer of sovereignty.4 8 This plan
was scrapped because of Iraqi, mostly Shiite, objections. In March 2004, an interim
Iraqi constitution was adopted that was to expire once a government is elected under
a permanent constitution."'
Comments by Bush Administration officials in the fall of 2003 about the role
of Islam under an Iraqi constitution revealed the American hostility to Islam. Time
Magazine reported on the Bush Administration's acceptance of the idea that a per-
manent Iraqi constitution had to be drafted by elected representatives. 49° In the ar-
ticle, Michael Elliott said the change meant that Washington would not "achieve its
larger goals. For the idealists in the Administration, one purpose of the adventure
in Iraq was to create in the Middle East a democratic, pluralistic state with protections
for the rights of minorities and women." 9' The article suggested that the Administra-
tion's hope had been to limit the role of Islam in Iraq but that now the Administra-
tion was ready to give in to Iraqi political realities. Two unnamed officials were
quoted in the article as follows, "'Islam's going to be in [the constitution], no matter
what .... We don't have to make Iraq look like the U.S. If we get [a stable country]
that's more Islamic than we would like, that's O.K." 49
2
485 Recently, support on the left for the war in terms of women's rights has waned, not
because the goal is not worth pursuing, but because Bush's announced goal of liberating
women in the Middle East does not seem to be succeeding. See Maureen Dowd, Reformer
Without Results, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at A11.
486 See, e.g., Fukuyama, supra note 468.
487 See Maximilien Turner, Comment, The Price of a Scarf the Economics of Strict
Secularism, 26 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 321 (2005) (discussing the 2004 French law banning
conspicuous religious apparel from public schools).
488 L. Paul Bremer III, Iraq's Path to Sovereignty, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2003, at A21.
489 See Carolyn Eisenberg, Iraqs Future, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 2004; at A49.
490 Michael Elliott, If at First You Don't Succeed.... TIME, Nov. 24, 2003, at 36.
491 Id.
492 Id.
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Another indication of American hostility to Islam is the issue of conversion. In
the June 30, 2003 issue, Time Magazine ran this question on its cover: "Should
Christians Convert Muslims?""93 The story described efforts of some Christian
groups in Iraq to convert Muslims to Christianity.494 The story also gave the back-
ground of Christian missions around the world, including Afghanistan, in which the
same issue of conversion has come up."95 Mainstream Christian aid groups do not
engage in conversion, but newer groups do.496
This willingness to try to convert Muslims to Christianity reveals the attitude by
Christians that there is no salvation outside the Church. This may be a sincere and
understandable attitude for Christians to take, but for practitioners of other religions,
it certainly would suggest hostility to those religions, including Islam.
This impression was reinforced when General William Boykin, our deputy under
secretary of defense for intelligence, was quoted concerning a fire fight against a
Muslim warlord he had fought in Somalia: "I knew... that my God was bigger than
his. I knew that my God was a real god, and his was an idol."497 In May 2004, there
were reports linking Boykin to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, which reinforced the point
about hostility to Islam.498 The editor of the Middle East Report, Chris Toensing,
said at the time of Boykin's possible involvement, "This will be taken as proof that
what happened at Abu Ghraib (prison) is evidence of a broader culture of dehumanis-
ing Arabs and Muslims, based on the American understanding of the innate superi-
ority of Christendom." 99
Is this disharmony and international competition an inherent aspect of relig-
ious democracy? Must religious democracy in America mean "Christianity on the
march?"500 Will religious democracy promote international tension and even war?
These are serious questions. Unlike religious democracy at home, we do not
have a model of peaceful international cooperation in the face of religious differ-
ences. On this issue, since the Christian/Muslim tension is already so high, we can
only hope that religious peace is possible.
49' TIME, June 30, 2003, at Cover.
4 David Van Biema, Missionaries Under Cover, TIME, June 30, 2005, at 36.
495 id.
496 Id.
491 See Bob Herbert, The Latest Overreach from the Pentagon, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
28, 2004, at 9 (quoting General Boykin).
498 See Susan Taylor Martin, Religious Remarks Hound General, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 17, 2004, at 1A.
499 'Holy War'general linkedto Iraq Prison Scandal, ABC News Online, May 12, 2004,
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s 106865.htm.
500 Robert Kuttner, What Would Jefferson Do? An Essay on Faith, Reason, Terror, and
Democracy, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 2004, at 31, 36.
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IV. THE RELIGIOUS VOID IN AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE
This article has looked at secular democracy and religious democracy. It
appears that secular democracy is in decline and is perhaps conceptually weak, while
religious democracy is in ascendancy and perhaps can contribute to a healthier
political life in America.
Yet despite such optimism, religious democracy is opposed and even loathed by
millions of Americans.5 'O In addition to that, religious democracy has served to
cement the Republican Party in power, even though the policies pursued by that
party have not been what one might expect of a Christian-oriented political organi-
zation. 2 What accounts for the hostility to religious democracy? What accounts
for the politically conservative orientation of religious democracy? There is indeed
a political problem in America. But the problem is not religious democracy itself.
The problem is that many voters are cut off from the possibility of participation in
religion in the political realm. That reality has had very negative political conse-
quences. It has led to smugness in believers, who imagine their political coalition
is righteous, and unbecoming disdain of religion by non-believers, who imagine only
fools could believe all that stuff. 3 I wish to suggest in this section how this political
situation might be changed.
What follows is a proposal for American political life. But my proposal is not
new to American law. As early as 1961, in Torcasco v. Watkins,5 4 the Supreme
Court described "religions in this country which do not teach what would generally
be considered a belief in the existence of God."50 5 Later, in UnitedStates v. Seeger, 6
the Court granted conscientious objector status based on a belief that "occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God., 507 If voters looked at religion in similar terms today, we would not be able
to speak of "religious voters" and "secular voters." We would conclude instead that
most Americans are quite religious and that neither party enjoys a monopoly, or
even a competitive advantage, over the issue of religion.0
501 See Hedges, supra note 6, at 55 (providing a flavor of the intense opposition of liberals
to the religious right).
502 Obviously, this is a matter of judgment. Just for starters though, Jesus praised the
peacemakers. See Matthew 5:9. Conversely, President Bush has felt obliged to wage con-
tinuous war since 9/11.
503 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986) (suggesting that
many believers may be scientifically illiterate).
5- 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
501 Id. at 495 n. 11.
506 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
507 Id. at 166.
508 There are voices today that argue similarly for a "spiritual left" or a "politics of
meaning." See Michael Lerner, After the Fall: Why America Needs a Spiritual Left, TIKKUN,
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A. The Imbalance in American Religious Democracy
Religion in America today is, in political terms, largely the possession of the
Republican Party.509 With the exception of ethnic groups that traditionally vote Dem-
ocratic - like Jews and African Americans - voters who identify as practicing
religion are likely to vote Republican.
This reality has two political consequences. First, given the simple numbers, a
pro-God political party in America is going to have continued political success over
a perceived anti-God political party. That by itself is not a problem for democracy.
It is not a flaw of religious democracy that it favors one political party anymore than
voting rights for women is questionable because women tend to vote for the Dem-
ocratic Party in larger numbers than do men.10
The second consequence of Republican Party support by religious voters is that
no broad, politically progressive coalition can be maintained in America today.
Such a coalition cannot be sustained by self-identified secular voters. Not only are
there not enough of them, but the concerns of poverty and peace are inherently
religious themes."' Secularism has proven to be too thin a political diet to nourish
such fundamental concerns. This is disastrous for progressive political causes.52
I am not demeaning the progressive religious political efforts going on in
America today. Every religious tradition in America has its progressive political
side. A number of Catholics are in fact radically left-wing. Thomas Merton's life
and writings513 and Cardinal Joseph Bernardin's "seamless garment" understanding
Jan./Feb. 2005, at 34. The differences in what I am proposing here from that idea are, first,
the difference between history on the one hand and Tikkun's psychology on the other and,
second, the related difference between the trans-human and Tikkun's humanism. Tikkun must
assure the skeptical Left that the magazine is not proposing that "people on the Left should
all become religious or spiritual," whereas that is just what I would like to see. Id.
509 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
510 The CNN exit poll in the 2004 Presidential election showed a significant gender gap
between the candidates. Among men, President Bush won, 55 percent to 44 percent for
Senator Kerry. But among women, President Bush lost, 48 percent to 51 percent. See CNN.com
Election 2004-U.S. President [hereinafter 2004 Presidential Election Results], athttp://www.
cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/ results/president (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
511 Historically progressive American political causes were always supported by religious
voters. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Faith Full- When the Religious Right was Left, NEw REPUBLIC,
Feb. 28, 2005, at 12 ("How strange it is that American liberalism, nourished by faith and
inspired by the scriptures from the days of abolitionism, is now defined - by its enemies but
occasionally by its friends - as implacably hostile to religion.").
512 So that there is no mistake, this is no theoretical, nor universal, concern. I am referring
to political causes such as environmental protection, national health insurance, progressive
taxation, public support for the poor and working poor, all of which I support.
"' See David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day's Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14
HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 57, 62 n. 14 (1996) (listing Merton's major works).
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of "life issues"' 14 have greatly enriched political dialogue in this country. Nor are
Catholics alone in their radicalism. Jim Wallis exemplifies progressive politics in
the evangelical community. The National Council of Churches has always cham-
pioned the rights of workers and other progressive causes.5, 5 Rabbi Michael Lerner,
editor of Tikkun Magazine, courageously promotes a program of peace and recon-
ciliation in America and the Middle East."1 6 Examples of what could be called "left
wing" religion abound in America."I'
All these efforts, however, have yielded only very modest political results.51 8
One reason for this is institutional. In American politics, a cause generally needs a
political party to support and promote it. Usually this means one of the two major
parties. Progressive religion has not received a hearing in recent years in the
Democratic Party.519 This has meant in practice that it has not gotten much of a
hearing in a political sense at all. So the political problem would seem to be the
resistance of the Democratic Party to religion.
514 See Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305,
306 (2004) (describing Cardinal Bernardin's approach to life issues in the 1980s).
55 See Eric Schlosser, Migrant Farm Workers' Rights Are Withering on the Vine, CAP.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at 9A (describing the National Council of Church's support for a labor
boycott); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establish-
ment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 314 (2001) (describing mainline churches as "liberal").
516 See generally TIKKtN ... To HEAL, REPAIR AND TRANSFORM THE WORLD: AN
ANTHOLOGY (Michael Lemer ed., 1992).
517 One such Christian umbrella organization is the Christian Alliance for Progress, whose
web page contains many examples of the efforts of progressive Christians in the public
square. Christian Alliance for Progress Home Page, http://www.christianalliance.org.
518 See Leonard Pitts, Jr., Where's the Christian Left?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Nov.
11, 2004, at A17.
519 The problem ofexpressing the Christian left politically, which Leonard Pitts addressed,
id, was illustrated a few days later, when a sympathetic reader wrote the following response
to his article:
My guess is that "the Christian left" resides in the Democratic Party.
Unfortunately, the Democratic Party aggressively supports abortion
and stem-cell research requiring the destruction of human embryos.
These, of course, are antithetical to Christianity, and therefore many
Christians have abandoned the Democratic Party. While these Christians
might like to go "left" on economic justice issues, they are compelled
to go "right" on the life issues. Economic justice means nothing if you
haven't made it out of the womb.
Cary Valvo, Letter to the Editor, Dems and Life Issues, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov.
19, 2004, at A18.
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It is commonly said that the Democratic Party is anti-religious.52° Is that really
true? In the June 12, 2005 edition of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Reverend N.
Graham Standish wrote an article arguing that no political party can claim to em-
body God's will.52 1 In the course of the article, Reverend Standish revealed that he
left the Republican Party in 1992 because the political attack style of the Repub-
licans conflicted with his notion of the teachings of the Gospel.5 22 He then added
in a devastating though offhand observation, "For a time, I considered joining the
Democratic Party, but they seemed to have little interest in people of faith ....
Dr. Standish clearly has no anti-Democratic Party axe to grind. If someone like
Dr. Standish received this impression, it can only be that this is the reception people
of faith tend to receive from the Democratic Party. So, when Howard Dean cri-
ticized the Republican Party for being "pretty much a white, Christian party, 5 24 it
did not occur to him, nor to many other Democrats, that he was treating the category
"Christian" as if it were an insult.
Of course, Democrats now know that this impression of religious hostility is a
formula for political disaster. The Party has received a great deal of counsel to open
itself up to religion and to speak the language of values.525
The Democratic Party, however, has been unable to comply with this advice.
Part of the reason for this inability is a clash of political issues. Women's rights
520 The comment by Howard Dean in June 2005 certainly suggested that possibility. See
supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. The perception of the Democratic Party as anti-
religious, however, goes much deeper than an isolated comment. See Howard Fineman &
Tamara Lipper, Dean's Mouth Gives the Democrats Plenty to TalkAbout, NEWSWEEK, June
20, 2005, at 36.
But Dean's real problem may not be his mouth but his mind-set. He
and his aides seemed genuinely mystified at the idea that his character-
ization of the GOP was a political mistake. But by labeling the other
party a bastion of Christianity, he implied that his own was something
else - something determinedly secular - at a time when Dean's
stated aim is to win the hearts of middle-class white Southerners, many
of whom are evangelicals. In a slide-show presentation at the DNC
conference last weekend, polltaker Comell Belcher focused on why
those voters aren't responding to the Democrats' economic message.
One reason, he said, is that too many of them see the Democrats as
"anti-religion" And why was that? No one asked Dean, who wasn't
taking questions from the press.
Id.
521 Rev. Dr. N. Graham Standish, A CountryDivided by Christ, PITrSBURGHPOST-GAZETTE,
June 12, 2005, at J1.
522 Id.
523 Id.
524 Murray, supra note 305.
525 See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Democrats: Expand Language of Morality, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 2004, at A17.
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groups and gay rights groups are important members of the Democratic Party
coalition. Insofar as religious progressives might challenge these positions, it is hard
for the Party to open up to these voters.526 That is the nature and limit of coalition
building. The Republican Party has its own, similar fissures.527
But issue conflict is not the major reason that the Democratic Party fails to
welcome people of faith with open arms. Many religious progressives, after all,
support the right of women to choose and support gay rights as well. The main
problem is something else. The hostility to religion among secularists in the Dem-
ocratic Party is a real and deep phenomenon.
Secularists in America are working hard to divorce politics and government
from their traditional religious foundations. It is no accident, for example, that Alan
Dershowitz's new book is entitled Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the
Origin of Rights.528 That book is part of an overall attempt by progressives to de-
velop fully secular politics. The attempt to do the same with regard to constitutional
law is represented by the book The Godless Constitution.529
There are also attempts to develop a fully secular inner and moral life. The
publisher calls Sam Harris's new book, The End of Faith,5 30 a "truly modem foun-
dation for ethics and spirituality that is both secular and humanistic.""53 All of this
can be attributed to the continuing work of the heirs to the secular consensus I dis-
cussed above.
532
126 This is what the letter writer was explaining in response to Leonard Pitts. See Valvo,
supra note 519. This is also why, despite the embarrassment to the Party, a pro-life
Pennsylvania Democratic Governor was not permitted to address the 1992 Democratic Party
National Convention. See Editorial, A Way to Common Ground on Abortion, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, June 26, 2005, at E4 (describing that event).
527 Republican Party divisions came to the forefront almost immediately after Justice
O'Connor announced her planned retirement. See Jeffrey Rosen, So What's the "Right"
Pick?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 2005, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (dividing the conservative
spectrum from which a judicial nominee might come into the following categories: "Orig-
inalist Conservatives," "Libertarian/Constitution in Exile Conservatives," "Traditionalist Con-
servatives," "Pragmatic Conservatives," and "Deferential Conservatives").
528 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 88. The book also has been listed by the title Rights From
Wrongs: the Origin of Human Rights in the Experiences of Injustice. The clash can be
observed on the Barnes & Noble website. See http://www.barnesandnoble.com (search
"Search Books" for "Rights from Wrongs"; then follow "Rights from Wrongs: The Origins
of Human Rights in the Experiences of Injustice" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
529 See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 94.
530 SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON
(2004).
... The publisher's comment can be found listed with the book at the Barnes & Noble
website. See supra note 528 (providing the website).
532 The effort to derive foundations for political life without religion may, of course, not
succeed. See supra Part III; see also Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A
Nonreligious Ground?, 54 EMoRY L.J. 97 (2005).
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But why is this work continuing in the face of political failure, indeed political
catastrophe? At the risk of oversimplifying, I think that much of the determined
hostility against religion among secular voters lies in the fact that religious training
for many Americans ends at about the grammar school level. 33 Thus, secularists
think of God as fundamentalists portray God. They think of the Bible as a rule
book. They regard religion as oppression. They reject supernaturalism and miracles
and think that this is a rejection of religion.
Most secularists do not know that there are many other ways to understand the
religion of the Bible. They have never heard of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's condemna-
tion of a "positivism of revelation," or of his call for "religionless Christianity. ' 534
They do not know that Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan rejected supernaturalism and the
chosenness of Israel. 35 Ill-trained in and ignorant of religious matters, people call
themselves secular as a well-intentioned, but quite unnecessary, act of self-defense.
The political harm from religious democracy in America is that only a little
more than half of the population participates in it.136 This is just enough to ensure
political power for the Republican Party but not enough to develop authentic re-
ligious democracy. An authentic religious democracy would challenge prevailing
religious assumptions in the public square. America will not have that kind of re-
ligious democracy until those who mistakenly regard themselves as secular are able
to take a new look at religion.
The current religious/political stalemate, which is truly stale, pits those who pray
in public against those who seek to live without prayer. Neither option can contribute
to a healthy political sphere. America faces today a situation not unlike that facing
John Dewey and others in 1933.37 Their response was an attempt to help modem
men and women who were cut off or felt cut off from traditional religious forms to
experience authentic religious life. That response led to the Humanist Manifesto.538
... See SMITH, supra note 337, at 273 ("Your standard criticisms of religion sound so
much like satires of third-grade Sunday school teachings that they make me want to ask
when you last read a theological treatise and what its title was.").
I" DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, LETrERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 153 (Eberhard Bethge ed.,
3d ed. 1967).
131 See Ze'ev W. Falk, Jewish Religious Law in the Modern (and Postmodern) World, 11
J. L. & RELIGION 465,471 (1994-95).
536 The reference here is to the close political divide between the two party coalitions. The
result in the 2004 presidential election was 51 percent for President Bush (62,040,606) versus
48 percent for Senator Kerry (59,028, 109). See 2004 Presidential Election Results, supra
note 510. The religious nature of this divide is presented by figures and notes 19-24 and
accompanying text.
537 See ROCKEFELLER, supra note 399, at 451 ("Believing that the pressing social, psycho-
logical, and moral issues facing America were tangled up with religious issues, Dewey
became further involved in religious discussions in 1933.").
538 Id.
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In hindsight, we can see that their effort failed. But the need has not vanished.
We must be willing to begin again where the drafters of the Humanist Manifesto left
off.
In principle a religious renewal would not require resuscitation of the Biblical
tradition. People could look elsewhere for religious foundations. They could look
to Wicca or indigenous traditions or Buddhism.
In practice, however, a rebirth of religious orientation in America can only be
based on the Bible. The Bible and the Bible's story of God are the foundation of the
American tradition. Rediscovery of religion here has to begin there.
Is this suggestion an unholy use of religion for mere political gain? A rebirth
of religion in America is surely a more serious matter than a hoped-for partisan
change in voting patterns. That criticism is part of the misunderstanding of the re-
ligion of the Bible. The Bible primarily concerns exactly the sort of thing Americans
vote about. The Bible is politics. 39 A political rebirth of biblical religion isjust what
the Bible has in mind.
B. Secularists Who Are Believers
My goal is a simple one. I am aiming to convince secular voters that they are
in fact religious in orientation. Therefore, they have neither need nor justification
for hostility against religious voters and against the Bible generally in political life.
Indeed, the Bible is the best available teaching for political life. Who are these sec-
ular voters whom I claim are religious?
Some would say that, as far as the Bible is concerned, the question of who is a
believer is easy to answer. To be a Jew is to believe in God and to follow the com-
mandments of the Torah. To be a Christian is to believe in Jesus Christ as the Son
of God and to obey God's will as revealed in the Old and New Testaments. For
example, because both the Old Testament and the New Testament condemn homo-
sexuality,54 a believer cannot accept gay marriage.
It is not just fundamentalists who think this way. Even liberal biblical religion
tends to regard the Bible as a sort of answer-in-the-back-of-the-book. When liberal
biblical religion embraces something condemned in the Bible, such as gay rights,
there often is an air of guilt and defensiveness around the effort. 4
... To jump ahead of my argument somewhat, for the biblical world "to be non-political
is to be irrelevant." N.T. WRIGHT, JESUS AND THE VICTORY OF GOD 98 (1996).
540 The relevant Old Testament texts are: Genesis 19:1-29, Leviticus 18:22, and Leviticus
20:13. The relevant New Testament passages are all from the letters of St. Paul: Romans
1:18-32, 1 Corinthians 6:9, and 1 Timothy 1:10.
541 This is the feeling I get reading Michael Perry on the subject of the Bible and
homosexuality. See generally Michael J. Perry, Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex Unions:
an Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 449 (2001).
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It is this way of looking at the Bible - as an objective dogma - that Bonhoeffer
criticized as "positivism of revelation."542 In another letter,543 Bonhoeffer amplified
what he meant by that term:
[It] says in effect, "like it or lump it": virgin birth, Trinity, or
anything else; each is an equally significant and necessary part
of the whole, which must simply be swallowed as a whole or not
at all. That isn't biblical. There are degrees of knowledge and
degrees of significance; that means that a secret discipline must
be restored whereby the mysteries of the Christian faith are pro-
tected against profanation) 44
Bonhoeffer was describing the problem with a believer condemning something
simply because the Bible condemns it - for example, homosexuality. Let us say
you know a homosexual couple. They are loving and kind to each other. They are
living out their sexuality the only way they can. They do not seem to you to be
choosing something but to have been imprinted with something. So you find the
Biblical condemnation of them to be harsh and unjust, indeed incomprehensible.
"That does not matter," says a certain kind of Jew and Christian. The Bible condemns
it. "Like it or lump it."'5 45 It is all one. You cannot be a Christian or a Jew without
buying the whole package as is. Nor is there to be any interpretation by the believer
when the matter is clearly decided by the Bible - sort of like the parol evidence
rule.
546
Secularists are put off by religion of this kind. But that is an overbroad reaction
to what is only one kind of biblical religion. Obviously a person can be a Jew or a
Christian and support gay rights and gay marriage. There are many such believers.
Biblical believers are not stuck with what Bohnoeffer called, critically, "a law of
faith. 547 Dietrich Bonhoeffer was just this kind of Christian.
Naturally, there must be some limit to this approach to the interpretation of the
Bible. Surely one could not be a Jew without believing in God or a Christian without
believing in Christ. In the same letter, Bonhoeffer called "Christ's incarnation" a
542 In a letter to Eberhard Bethge dated April 30, 1944, Bonhoeffer attributed this way of
interpreting and understanding the Bible to Karl Barth. BONHOEFFER, supra note 534, at
278-82. Bonhoeffer's partial criticism of Barth - he also praised him - is way outside my
scope here, but I feel I have to add that I do not see this in Karl Barth.
143 Id. at 285.
'44 Id. at 286 (emphasis in original).
545 Id.
546 See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 561 (1998).
547 BONHOEFFER, supra note 534, at 286.
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"gift for us. 548 He, of course, was not questioning the essential teaching of the
Gospel. That recognition leads to another question - can one be a Biblical believer
without being a Jew or a Christian?
To consider this question, let me take myself as an example of what could be
called the biblically-oriented secularist. This secularist does not believe in God, mean-
ing he does not believe that there is a separate being, a person, not a part of the ob-
servable universe, who has plans and speaks and wills." 9 This places this secularist
outside the Bible, which seems to begin with just the opposite understanding."' 0
We will return later to the question of God, for obviously there are many ways
to think about God. Whether one is a believer in God is not always clear.
What about the other beliefs of this secular voter? He believes that scientific
explanations of reality are in general accurate and full accounts. But scientific
accounts leave out all depth and meaning. This voter does not believe in any con-
tinuation of his existence after death, either in Heaven or resurrection, but he is part
of the eternal stream of life all the same. He does not believe that the world will
ever be radically different from the way it is now. But he feels that it can and will
become a much better place. He believes that the creation of the universe was, if not
an accident, still not part of what could be called a "plan." Yet, what happens in it
is of incomparable importance.
Perhaps a person with these beliefs should not be called a Jew or a Christian.
That must be decided by others - by Jews and Christians. But could such a person
still be a believer in the biblical understanding of faith?
N.T. Wright, in his magisterial, continuing work describing the early Church
and the origins of Christianity,55 maked the point that the Old Testament does not
plainly include doctrines like life after death, resurrection, and end-of-world-salvation,
although there are hints and clues about such things. 52 The Old Testament and
548 Id.
541 Of course, many theologians have taught that God is not a being. See, e.g., Arthur J.
Jacobson & Steven B. Smith, Introduction: Spinoza's Law, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 499
(2003) (discussing the views of Baruch Spinoza).
550 See Genesis 1:3 ("And God said, 'Let.there be light'; and there was light.").
5 N.T. WRIGHT, CHRISTIAN ORIGINS AND THE QUESTION OF GOD, 3 Vols. (1992-2003).
552 Life after death is discussed in Wright's third volume, The Resurrection of the Son of
God. 3 WRIGHT, supra note 551, at 90 ("The minimal sort of 'life' that the shades had in
Sheol, or in the grave, approximated more to sleep than to anything else known by the
living."). Resurrection is also discussed in this volume. See id. at 85 ("[W]ithin the [Jewish]
Bible itself, the hope of resurrection makes rare appearances, so rare that some have
considered them marginal."). End of the world salvation is discussed in Wright's second
volume, Jesus and the Victory of God. See 2 WRIGHT, supra note 551.
It is time... to reject the old idea that Jesus expected the end of the
space-time universe.... Jesus' warnings about imminent judgment
were intended to be taken as denoting (what we would call) socio-
political events, seen as the climactic moment in Israel's history, and,
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particularly the Pentateuch, is concerned with the working out of God's purpose in
history - the Hebrews becoming a people, their enslavement, their liberation, the
inheritance of the land, and the creation of a holy way of life in that land."5 3 There
is no eschatological end of history in this understanding.5 4 The rejection of some
other kind of existence for humankind - the insistence that this life is really all
there is for us - does not exclude one from biblical commitment. So, with the
obvious exception of non-belief in God, nothing in the above list of beliefs
disqualifies this secular voter from considering himself a believer and trying to act
accordingly.
Let me now add more strokes to this portrait of the secular voter. This person
also believes that the good has real weight in history - indeed is sovereign in
history - and that the world has a tilt in the direction of the good. He believes that
this weight is not attributable to the will of human beings. He believes that there is
a difference between right and wrong, between beautiful and ugly, between true and
false, and that these differences are not matters of human judgment but are real and
reliable. He believes that there is significance to the attempt by people to live by
love and compassion and that in some way, the whole universe upholds the righteous
who live this path. He believes that the holy has power over everything demeaning,
narrow and small. He believes that societies that protect the poor and the vulnerable
flourish and that those that do not fail. He believes that slaves are destined to be
free. In short, he believes in the blessing and the curse - and he chooses life for
himself and his people.55
in consequence, as constituting a summons to national repentance. In
this light, Jesus appears as a successor to Jeremiah and his like ....
Id. at 96-97 (emphasis in original).
... See WALTER BRUEGGEMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT: THE CANON
AND CHRISTIAN IMAGINATION 43-100 (2003).
114 Yet, putting it that way is misleading as well. As Walter Brueggemann wrote of the
Old Testament:
The hope of Israel is in three dimensions. First, there continued to be
alive in Israel hope for a politically serious, Davidic (messianic)
recovery .... Second, Israel's vigorous hope moved beyond political
realism in a transcendent direction, issuing in apocalyptic-visionary
expectation of world scope.... Third, in a less differentiated way,
Israel continued to hope that, in Yahweh's own time and way, the
world would be brought right by Yahweh. This latter sort of hope is not
messianic (=Davidic), but neither is it apocalyptic.
BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 192, at 446.
... Cf Deuteronomy 30:19. I use the word "tilt" because I am trying to capture the quality
of inexorability but also of indeterminacy. The Hebrews were slaves in Egypt 400 years
before liberation. Genesis 15:13. The same was true in America. It follows that an individual
human life may or may not experience God's justice. This is the problem of Job. The
Hebrews were well aware of these questions, which inevitably arise when we think of God
as too much like us.
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With that last reference I seem to have smuggled religion back in after all. But
there is no smuggling here. These are the very understandings and commitments
that the Hebrews introduced to the world. This is the Bible. Brueggemann described
the Old Testament understanding of reality as "a moral shape to the public process
.... a hidden cunning in the historical process that is capable of surprise." 556
This litany of belief suggests three conclusions. First, it is not easy to be a non-
believer. There cannot be very many. Most Americans do not accept a purely ma-
terial interpretation of history. Nor do most Americans believe that the world is chaos,
not govemed at all.
Second, although it is also no mean feat to be a believer, it seems to me that
most Americans are. Most Americans believe, for example, that injustice is know-
able and wrong and that there are social and political consequences that attach to its
practice. Most Americans believe that America is to follow the path of justice and
peace and that if we do not, we will suffer as a nation. In other words, most Amer-
icans, even those who call themselves secular, believe that society is judged by -
that just means "subject to" - transcendent norms. Such people are not secular.
They are believers within the biblical tradition.
Third, these beliefs are not matters of "ethics." By ethics, we usually mean what
people should do. But, in contrast, I am describing what we, as a nation, must do
if we are to avoid the curse and receive the blessing. It follows, of course, that we
must get the truth of history right. If homosexuality is wrong, and we permit it, even
encourage it, our nation will be judged. On the other hand, if we behave unjustly
to homosexuals, we also will be judged. The stakes of politics are just as ultimate
as the religious right says. 'It does not follow that they are right in their conclusions.
They have not entertained the possibility of sin in their confidence for one moment.
Ethics are universal and modest. Biblical religion is neither of these things.
Mark Lilla has argued that liberal Protestantism collapsed after the 1950s, leading
to a more "ecstatic, literalist and credulous" Protestantism - a "dumbing down of
American religion" that would have horrified the framers of the Constitution.557 In
typical liberal/secular fashion, his proposed remedy is that "citizens should probably
be more vigilant about policing the public square," not less so,"' as I propose in this
article.
But Lilla acknowledged that liberal biblical religion collapses for a reason.
People "yeam[] for a more dynamic and critical faith, one that would stand in judg-
ment over the modem world.... an authentic experience with the divine .... ""'
This yearning cannot be cured by a half-measure quarantine of the public
square. This hunger for meaning is a deep religious/political happening that must
556 See BRUEGGEMAN, supra note 192, at 113.
... Mark Lilla, Church Meets State, N.Y. TIMEs, May 5, 2005, § 7 (Book Review), at 39.
558 Id.
559 Id.
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be expressed but cannot be expressed through flat, thin, liberal politics. Rawls is not
the answer. Surely that is clear by now. This yearning requires religious democracy
based on openness to the radical message of the Bible.
We see the nature of biblical belief in the story of Abraham5 60 in the book of
Genesis. This story is foundational for Jews and Christians as well as for Muslims
as the story is retold in the Quran. The story of Abraham does not contain most of
the elements that the secularist cannot believe. Abraham is not promised life after
death. He is not promised resurrection. He is not promised salvation at the end of the
world. Instead, he is promised that his descendants will be a blessing to all the peoples
of the world, in what sounds like the same world, but in a far better condition.56'
The point of the story of Abraham is not that there is a God who speaks in
sentences. The point is this: Abraham receives a call.162 He does not know where
or in what particular he is to be great, but he is told that the way to be great is to be
a blessing to the world. The difference between Abraham and us is not that he
receives a call and that we do not. We all know we have received a call, if we are
honest with ourselves. Nor is the point that Abraham is religious and we are secular.
Abraham would no doubt have been regarded as anti-religious by the people of his
time. The point of the Abraham story is that he responds: "So Abram went, as the
Lord had told him... ."' He did not know where he was going.
Religious language in the public square actually represents the beliefs that I
have been describing. Justice O'Connor should not call all this "confidence in the
future. 5 6 Indeed, we might have confidence that we are being judged and found
wanting - that the future will be dark. We may find that global warming, for ex-
ample, is God's judgment for our selfishness and greed and stupidity.
What is being expressed here - in the above paragraphs - is closer to what
Neuhaus called theonomy - accountability to transcendent truth566 - than to con-
fidence in the future. Theonomy is accepted by many who call themselves secular
but are not. The reason we cannot express these ideas without religious language is
that they are religious ideas. That is why Robert Bellah's understanding of American
160 Abraham is known as Abram at the beginning of the story. Genesis 12:1.
561 Genesis 12:1-3.
562 Genesis 12:1 ("'Go from your country and your kindred and your father's house to the
land that I will show you."').
563 Similarly, Christians were regarded as atheists in the first century. See Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross, No Other Gods Before Me: Spheres of Influence in the Relationship
Between Christianity and Islam, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 264 n.262 (2005).
5" Genesis 12:4.
565 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
566 See supra notes 387-90 and accompanying text.
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civil religion was so genuinely religious.567 We really are a religious people. When
we say the name, God, we are saying these things.568
C. The Political Consequences of Belief
The question in American political life is no longer religion or not religion. We
have religion now in the public square. We are a religious democracy. The question
is, what kind of religious democracy are we to be? Are we going to consider as
religion only what is currently denominated such by members of the Republican
Party coalition? That would mean a religious democracy primarily concerned with
abortion and gay rights and relatively unconcerned with issues of peace and economic
justice. How genuine and radical will the religion in the American public square be?
Religious democracy is too new to give answers to these questions. But I would
like to sketch very briefly how radical a challenge authentic religious democracy
could become to the status quo in America. Authentic religious democracy yields a
vantage point for judgment of the modem world. It is not certain that anything else
does.
1. Truth Versus Relativism
Public life in America is now filled with spin. It is easy to imagine that every-
thing is a manipulable matter of opinion. The Bible is an antidote to that kind of
thinking. The Bible insists that there is such a thing as truth. 69
Nihilism, relativism, and skepticism are surprisingly influential in American law.
This is why a conservative can write that Chief Justice Rehnquist
does not, in the least, believe in the principles of the Declaration
of Independence as either myth or as reality. He does not believe
567 See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
568 Justice Breyer's swing concurrence in Van Orden demonstrated that he does not
understand the difference between theonomy and ethics. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct.
2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote approvingly that "[i]n
certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can convey not simply
a religious message but also a secular moral message (about proper standards of social
conduct)." Id. at 2869. But the point ofthe Ten Commandments, and what renders all of their
content religious, is the understanding that there are consequences, that is, punishments, for
their violation. This is why they are not known as the "Ten Suggestions."
569 Deuteronomy 32:4 ("He is the Rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are justice;
a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he."). The Hebrew phrase "Ayl
Emoonah" is not always translated as "a God of Truth." In the Revised Standard Version of
the Bible, the phrase is translated "A God of faithfulness." Deuteronomy 32:4 (Revised
Standard Version). But, of course, God's faithfulness is truth. God keeps faith with his
promises in history.
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that we can say that despotism is intrinsically evil. Nor does he
believe that we can say that free government and the rule of law
are intrinsically good."'0
Justice Scalia shares the same intellectual heritage as does the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Scalia criticizes substantive due process, not on the ground that
it led to the deaths of innocents in abortion, but that it lacks a "guiding principle."57'
Because there is no guiding principle, any court applying substantive due process,
in the end, "will, by God, write it the way the majority wants. 5 72
Justice Scalia does not sense the irony in this formulation. Why wouldn't the
guiding principle of substantive due process, or any other substantive morality, be
"by God," that is, that which is true is that which is in accordance with God's will?
Justice Scalia would respond that there is "no chance of agreement" '73 concerning
God's will. That is so in the present. But it will not necessarily be so as history plays
out. Jefferson said that the slaves were destined to be free.574 It turns out he was
right. There was a guiding principle. Many people just mistook it. And, even though
the South did not agree, that lack of agreement did not change the guiding principle
at all. The eradication of slavery was not subject to human will any more than is the
reality of global warming. Not everything is spin.
I have been criticizing conservatives here, but I could just as well have accused
a liberal like John Hart Ely of the same skeptical world view.575 Ely wrote of sub-
stantive due process: "[O]ur society does not, rightly does not, accept the notion of
a discoverable and objectively valid set of moral principles, at least not a set that
could plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected representatives." '76
Ely's viewpoint is not something a defender of Roe v. Wade577 could possibly
agree with. For such a defender, the right of choice should be a matter of truth, not
just a matter of opinion. Yet, defenders of Roe have not squarely faced this issue.
Nor did Justice Blackmun's original opinion in Roe, which attempted to avoid all
substantive moral judgments through the interpretive strategies of original intent and
textualism."' The fetus was not a person for purposes of due process because fetuses
570 HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A
DISPUTED QuESTION 84 (1994).
"I ANTONIN SCALA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45 (1997).
572 Id. at 47.
171 Id. at 45.
" See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
171 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
576 Id. at 54.
577 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
578 See generally id. at 113-67.
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were not so considered at the time the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
were adopted. 9
Justice Blackmun did not want to decide whether the fetus had a right to life.
The question for him was not whether the fetus really is a person, but only whether
the fetus has been so regarded. 80 Justice Blackmun did not want to conclude that
rights are real. But if there really are such rights, we must decide whether the fetus
is a human being with the rights of a human being. If the fetus is a human being,
abortion is homicide. What happens to a society that lives by homicide?
The Bible does not take a position on abortion. Jewish law, which is based, of
course, on the Old Testament, was not strict about abortion58' and did not consider
it to be homicide.8 2 But the Bible certainly has an understanding of the value of
human life. Human life is precious, much more so than our possessions, including
our bodies.
Left and right in American politics have switched sides over time concerning
the powers of the judiciary.583 Religious democracy is consistent with either a pro-
or anti-substantive due process or fundamental rights position. Whether judges can
be trusted to protect human rights and whether they should be trusted to do so is a
matter of political judgment.5" The fundamental question, though, is whether there
is such a thing as a human right in the first place. Are there ways of life that are better
and worse for people? Are there absolute needs that every human being has a right
to have fulfilled? The commitment that there are such needs and rights can no
... Id. at 157-58.
580 Justice Blackmun even called Texas's view in defending the statute at issue in Roe
"one theory of life." Id. at 162.
5' See Susan E. Looper-Friedman, "Keep YourHands Off MyBody":Abortion Regulation
and the Takings Clause, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 253,268 n.79 (1995) ("[A]ccording to Jewish
law there are circumstances when abortion is not only permitted, but may be required to save
the life or health of the mother or the well-being of her living children.").
582 Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, Jewish Theological and MoralReflections on Genetic Screening:
The Case ofBRCA1, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 73 (1997) ("Judaism does not see abortion as
murder, as Catholicism does, because biblical and rabinnic sources understand the process
of gestation developmentally.").
583 See generally Michael Wells, Rhetoric and Reality in the Law of Federal Courts:
Professor Fallon's Faulty Premise, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 367 (1989) (arguing in the sub-
stantive due process era, business interests favored federal court power and now liberals do).
584 Even if there are such rights, judges might not be the proper actors to defend them. See
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
[T]he point at which life becomes 'worthless,' and the point at which
the means necessary to preserve it become 'extraordinary' or 'inappro-
priate,' are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine
Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people
picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory ....
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longer be taken for granted or surrendered without thought. It is a matter that must
be addressed.
American society has surrendered truth. That is the hidden secret of advertising
gurus and political consultants. Religious democracy could help us find our way again.
2. Human Solidarity Versus the Market
At some point in history, biblical religion in America became supportive of
capitalism. This makes no sense because Jesus was as far from supporting economic
competition as one could be. Not only did Jesus doubt that the rich have a place in
the kingdom of God,585 but He also strongly suggested in several places that attach-
ment to possessions was antithetical to His way of life.586 If Jesus were taken
seriously, our economic system, based as it is on increasing material consumption,
would grind to a halt. As the gorilla teacher says in Ishmael, people assume that
Jesus could not have meant what he said.587 It is a mystery how one can be a capi-
talist and a Christian.
The problem with capitalism from the Bible's perspective is not just greed and
hyperconsumption. The very logic of winners and losers - the heart of capitalist
competition - is the problem. Brueggemann illustrates this point in his interpreta-
tion of Psalm 72.588 The Psalm says of the king:
For he delivers the needy when he calls,
the poor and him who has no helper.
He has pity on the weak and the needy,
585 Mark 10:25 ("It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich
man to enter the kingdom of God.").
586 Matthew 6:19-21.
Do not lay up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust
consume and where thieves break in and steal, but lay up for yourselves
treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes and where
thieves do not break in and steal. For where your treasure is, there will
be your heart also.
Id. See also Mark 10:17-22.
In the book of Mark, the rich man, loved by Jesus and invited to follow him, does not
because it would have entailed giving away his possessions. In words that should haunt any
believer with more possessions than a simple life would justify (which would mean almost
all of us) the story ends: "At that saying his countenance fell, and he went away sorrowful;
for he had great possessions." Mark 10:22.
587 QuINN, supra note 165, at 232 ("Even the most fundamental of the fundamentalists
plug their ears when Jesus starts talking about birds of the air and lilies of the field. They
know damn well he's just yarning, just making pretty speeches.") (referring to Matthew
6:26).
588 BRUEGGEMAN, supra note 192, at 423-24.
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and saves the lives of the needy.
From oppression and violence he redeems their life;
and precious is their blood in his sight." 9
Brueggemann interprets this as follows: "The public good requires that active social
power must be mobilized to enhance the entire community and to resist personal
aggrandizement of some at the expense of others."59
Capitalism requires as its norm the personal aggrandizement of some at the
expense of others. It is true that capitalism promises that, in the end, all will be
benefited from the competition, including the losers. Nevertheless, there still are
losers, so the aggrandizement is still at the expense of others.59' This is not an aspect
of capitalism. This is its heart.
Even worse than the rivalry in the heart of capitalism is the pace of technologi-
cal capitalism. Religious conservatives now argue that the Ten Commandments
should be permitted to be placed on public buildings - the issue in a general sense
in Van Orden592 and McCreary.593 But have these conservatives read the Ten Com-
mandments? Have they seen the conflict with the market that they so praise? One
of the Ten Commandments requires that the sabbath day be set aside from work.594
In contrast, the creed of technological capitalism is 24/7/365.' 9' Americans are
589 Psalm 72:12-14.
590 BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 192, at 424. Brueggemann did not single out these partic-
ular verses, but these verses give a flavor of the thrust of the whole Psalm. Id. at 423-24.
Actually I am giving capitalism too much credit. Capitalism usually leaves much of
the winnings where they fall. See Ezra Rosser, This Land is My Land, This Land is Your
Lands Markets and Institutions for Economic Development on Native American Land, 47
ARIZ. L. REv. 245, 293 (2005).
The Kaldor-Hicks [sic] criterion, also called "potential Pareto improve-
ment," slightly modifies Pareto's original idea by saying that if the
change resulted in "winners" and "losers," and the gain to the "winners"
was enough to pay the "losers" equal to the loss, then the change is
welfare improving. Significantly, this Kalder-Hicks improvement is
said to hold even where the "winners" do not actually pay off the
"losers," so long as the winners could have done so.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
592 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
'94 Exodus 20:9-10 ("Six days shall you labor, and do all your work; but the seventh day
is a sabbath to the LORD your God; in it you shall not do any work....").
... The cheerfulness of this tyranny would be amusing if the matter were not so serious.
Consider a typical announcement from the State Bar of Montana:
It's hard to imagine how we'd get along today without our computers,
but when they misbehave it's too often a real nightmare. We've all
been there. Things happen, and computer problems can cripple produc-
tivity and slow billing to a crawl.
Maybe when manufacturers claim 'Plug and Play' what they mean
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constantly told that we must work harder, better, faster. Now, as Thomas Friedman
warned us in his book, The World is Flat,596 Americans must work even harder
because of the economic challenge represented by China and India. 97
Capitalism in its technological phase is a treadmill. We have been made slaves,
not different essentially from the slaves of Egypt. 98 One of the core teachings of
the Bible is that human beings are not just beasts of burden. Where is the proposed
constitutional amendment to reinstitute rest?599
Whenever criticisms like this are raised, we are told that all of the burdens of the
modem market are inevitable. We are at the end of history. Human choice is beside
the point. All the world will be forced to embrace representative government,judicial
review, and most importantly, technological capitalism. This is precisely Friedman's
point. ° °
is 'Plug and Pray.'
Getting computer help can be frustrating, time-consuming and pro-
hibitively expensive.
The State Bar of Montana has partnered with Dial-a-Tech, an
award-winning Computer Help Desk service we hope you'll find to be
a valuable business tool and terrific family resource. Dial-a-Tech was
originally launched is [sic] the mid-90s as the technical support back-
bone for CompUSA computer superstores nationwide. Dial-a-Tech is
a registered trademark of Telvista Inc.
... How do SBM members get help? Help is available 24/7/365
including holidays via toll-free phone; email; and live chat.
New Benefit Helps State Bar Members Get the Most from Technology, MONT. LAW., Nov.
30, 2004, at 14. I am sure this is a very good benefit. But the implication is, unmistakably,
that lawyers in Montana are, and ought to be, working and billing, "24/7/365, including
holidays." Id.
596 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005).
197 Id. at 260-65.
598 See supra note 555.
'99 There have been such proposals and their biblical resonance has been strongly noted.
Tikkun Magazine, some years ago, for example, was championing just this cause. See, e.g.,
Jeremy Rifkin, Hi-tech Populism in the Information Age, TIKKUN, May/June 1995, at 44.
There used to be blue laws in many states prohibiting work on Sundays (the Christian
Sabbath). See generally Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L.
REv. 675 (2000). They passed away out of popular indifference, difficulty of enforcement,
and judicial invalidation. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Twp., 392 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1978)
(invalidating Sunday Trading Laws under State Constitution). See also Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 881,897 (1983) (observing that Sunday blue laws were commonly unenforced before
they were repealed by legislatures).
600 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 596. It is also Fareed Zakaria's point in reviewing
Friedman's book. Fareed Zakaria, The Wealth of YetMoreNations, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 10. Zakaria quoted Friedman's doubts about whether the emerging
economic power of India can be good for the young people of the United States and adds:
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The Bible rejects such determinism and fatalism.6" As Brueggemann said, the
Bible insists that at the heart of history is the capacity for surprise. 2 Humans are
ultimately not permitted to enslave themselves permanently." 3
3. Teshuvah Versus Imperialism
I do not want to hear another politician say that the American people are good.604
Jesus's words echo in my head: "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God
alone. ,605
The American people are not good. Maybe we are no worse than most, but that
is all that can be said. We are the people of slavery. We are the people who stole
this land. We are the people who expanded into Hawaii, Cuba, and the Philippines.
We are the people who intervened in the Americas and elsewhere. We are the
people who perfected firestorms as a military tactic. We are the only people who
ever used an atomic bomb. These are just some of our crimes. No, we are not good.
Neuhaus wrote that democracy requires a sense of human sin.606 So, as we have
lost the sense of our own sin, we have lost one of the foundations of democratic life.
When you think you are good, you may end up worse than simply not good.
There may be no limit to the evil you can do. You might begin to suspend judgment
on your own actions because you know you are good. How could a good people do
something really evil?
Strangely, the converse is also true. Without a sense of human sin, critics end up
supposing that America is unique - not in this case uniquely good, but uniquely
[Friedman] ends up, wisely, understanding that there's no way to
stop the wave. You cannot switch off these forces except at great cost
to your own economic well-being. Over the last century, those countries
that tried to preserve their systems,jobs, culture or traditions by keeping
the rest ofthe world out all stagnated. Those that opened themselves up
to the world prospered.
Id. at 11. Sorry about your culture and traditions. I'm sure they were lovely.
601 See BRUEGGEMAN, supra note 192, at 113.
602 Id.
603 See id. at 113 n.132.
604 See, e.g., Independence Day, 2004, Office of the White House Press Secretary (July
2, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040702-8.html
(quoting President Bush as saying, "We are a strong, decent, and good-hearted country.");
see also News Conference with Rep. Duncan Hunter, Federal News Service, June 13, 2005,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Federal News Service File (commenting on allegations of
abuse ofprisoners at Guantanamo Bay and stating, "The American people are good people.").
605 Mark 10:18.
606 NEUHAUS, supra note 63, at 53 (citing Reinhold Niebuhr) ("Democratic discourse...
depends... upon our agreement about sin - our own sin, and thus our own fallibility, as
well as the sin and fallibility of others. Democratic discourse requires that no party fashion
itself as the moral majority in order to imply that others belong to an immoral minority.").
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evil. That is just as absurd a starting point as the presumption that the American
people are good. America's adversaries certainly are not good either. As Barth put
it, neither the revolutionary nor the conservative are justified.0 7 Our political life
"cannot be the scene of the conflict between the Kingdom of God and Anti-Christ. 608
The Bible does not share our illusions about ourselves. The Hebrew nation is
not portrayed in the Bible as good. But the Hebrews are portrayed as capable of the
practice of teshuvah.i
Teshuvah means repentance.610 It is quite different from the notion of an apology,
as if we could apologize for the crime of slavery or for lynchings as we apologize
for arriving late to a movie.611 A politics of teshuvah would be open to doubt of our
own motives. It would try to look at ourselves as others in the world see us. It would
not paralyze us any more than teshuvah now paralyzes the religious person. But
teshuvah does render all human action ambiguous in moral terms. That is just what
America needs.
607 KARL BARTH, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS 489 (Edwyn C. Hoskyns trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 6th ed. 1977) (1933) [hereinafter BARTH, THE EPISTLE].
608 Id.
o The people are told to repent. Ezekiel 14:6 ("Therefore say to the house of Israel, Thus
says the Lord GOD: Repent and turn away from your idols; and turn your faces from all your
abominations."). Not only the Hebrews can repent, but so also can pagans, and even God.
Then tidings reached the king of Nin'eveh, and he arose from his
throne, removed his robe, and covered himself with sackcloth, and sat
in ashes. And he made proclamation and published through Nin'eveh,
"By the decree of the king and his nobles: Let neither man nor beast,
herd nor flock should taste anything; let them not feed, or drink water,
but let man and beast be covered with sackcloth, and let them cry
mightily to God; yea, let every one turn from his evil way and from the
violence which is in his hands. Who knows, God may yet repent and
turn from his fierce anger, so that we perish not?" When God saw what
they did, how they turned from their evil way, God repented of the evil
which he had said he would do to them; and he did not do it.
Jonah 3:6-10.
610 See generally Samuel J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look at Repentance, Forgiveness, and
Atonement in Jewish Law andPhilosophy andAmerican Legal Thought, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1677 (2000).
61' The United States Senate offered a formal apology for failing to pass an anti-lynching
bill when federal action was needed, but Congress never has passed an apology for slavery,
despite the efforts of Dayton Representative Tony Hall in the 1990s. See Opinion, Lynching
Wasn't Work of a Few, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 20, 2005, at A8, available at 2005
WLNR 9868411.
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Current religious democracy tends to identify America as the agent of God's will.
That should not surprise us since religion and blasphemy are routinely linked. What
is needed in America is not the banishment of religion but a deeper appreciation of
what religion can mean.
4. Freedom Versus Slavery
Passover is the Jewish holiday that celebrates the liberation of the Hebrew slaves
from Egypt highlighted by a ceremonial meal called the Seder. Jews like to say at
the Seder table that there are many kinds of slavery.6"2 It is a clich&. But, like most
clichds, it is true. What the Bible ultimately promises is freedom from all slavery.
What Jesus proclaims in his first public utterance is "to set at liberty those who are
oppressed."6 ' Freedom is the Bible's major theme.
In an early work, Walter Brueggemann described the new way of life that Moses
brought, in contrast to the Egyptian paradigm. This new prophetic consciousness
mixed religion and politics: "a religion of God's freedom as alternative to the static
imperial religion of order and triumph and a politics of justice and compassion as
alternative to the imperial politics of oppression." 1 4 Freedom as the ground ofjustice.
The secularist does not know any of this. The secular voter thinks of the Bible
as oppressive - that it is filled with rules that must not be broken, some of which
are unjust. The Bible is filled with rules, and some of them are unjust. That is why
the Bible is not to be regarded as a rulebook.
But the secularist who says this about the Bible is, as Jesus said, pointing to the
speck in his brother's eye and overlooking the log in his own.6 5 Perhaps some parts
of the Bible are oppressive, but who is forced to live in accordance with all of its
teachings? On the other hand, what we can be certain about is the oppressive, terribly
oppressive in many ways, nature of this modem world that men and women have
made. The oppression of the modem world is causing enormous suffering. The
Bible is the best starting point for us to understand the oppression to which we are
now subject and, perhaps, defeat it. Or, if we cannot defeat it, at least by using the
Bible's vantage point, we might challenge it.
The Bible is a source of hope. The Bible sees the world as good.61 6 It regards
injustice and suffering as illegitimate - almost inconceivable. The Bible trusts the
universe. It is open to all things.
612 See, e.g., Judy Shanks, Shabbat Shalom, Temple Isaiah, Apr. 14,2005, at http://www.
temple-isaiah.org/clergy/55-5-67.shtml ("We reenact the Exodus precisely to feel, intensely,
the pain of the many kinds of slavery that exist in our world .... ).
613 Luke 4:18 (quoting Jesus as reading from the Prophet Isaiah in Isaiah 61:1-2).
614 WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THE PROPHETIC IMAGINATION 18 (1978).
615 Matthew 7:5 ("You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will
see clearly to take the speck out of your brother's eye.").
616 Genesis 1:31 ("And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very
good.").
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This openness of the Bible - this freedom - may sound strange, since some
religious conservatives want to banish the teaching of evolution. Certainly, it is not
biblical to imagine that God cannot work through evolution, but there is a sense in
which evolution, understood as a complete explanation of all life, must be false.
And the believer is right to say so, for no such reductionist explanation of reality is
possible.617
As Brueggemann said, the Bible promises that no human project can be abso-
lute.6"' So history cannot be at an end. Current political, legal, and economic organi-
zation cannot be the last word. The Bible, not the Constitution or the courts, is our
guarantee of freedom.
D. What About God?
I said earlier that I would return to the question of God. The secular voter does
not believe in God. This would seem an insurmountable barrier to the embrace of
religious democracy that I have been promoting.
Obviously, I am not going to try here to say who or what God is. Karl Barth
stated, simply, that "[e]very theological statement is an inadequate expression of its
object." 19 Negative theology62° and process theology62' are attempts to talk about
God without endorsing the beingness of God. Paul Tillich wrote of "the God above
the God of theism. 62 2 Suffice it to say that the secularist who believes everything
else I have outlined above is not outside religious democracy because he asserts that
God does not exist. Karl Barth, as usual, anticipated such a Jonah-like attempt to
flee from God:
617 Science seems to be catching up to the idea that the sum is, if not greater, at least not ex-
actly the same as its parts added together. See ROBERT B. LAUGHLIN, A DIFFERENT UNIVERSE:
REINVENTING PHYSICS FROM THE BOTTOM DOwN (2005) (recognizing emergent properties,
which appear only as large agglomerations of matter).
618 See supra text accompanying note 192.
619 KARL BARTH, ANSELM: FIDES QuAERENs INTELLECTUM [FAITH IN SEARCH OF UNDER-
STANDING] 29 (Ian W. Robertson trans., Meridian Books 1962) (1958).
620 "Negative theology- also known as the Via Negativa (Latin for "Negative Way") and
Apophatic theology - is a theology that attempts to describe God by negation, to speak of
God in terms of what may not be said about God. In brief, the attempt is to gain and express
knowledge of God by describing what God is not .... rather than by describing what God
is." Wikipedia, Negative Theology, at http ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NegativeTheology (Last
visited Sept. 11, 2005) (emphasis in original).
621 See generally C. ROBERT MESLE AND JOHN B. COBB, JR., PROCESS THEOLOGY: A
BASIC INTRODUCTION (1994).
622 PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957) (referring to another of his books,
THE COURAGE TO BE (1952)).
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If you understand the connection between the person of Jesus and your
socialist convictions, and if you now want to arrange your life so that it
corresponds to this connection, then that does not at all mean you have
to "believe" or accept this, that, and any other thing. . . . And as an
atheist, a materialist, and a Darwinist, one can be a genuine follower and
disciple of Jesus. 6
23
As Jesus said directly, "Not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord,' shall enter the
kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father .... ,624 The Bible helps
us to see what that will is. It does not attempt to convince us that there is someone
doing the willing. Disagreement about that is no excuse for failure to act, nor, more
importantly, is it an excuse to scoff.
There is a book in the Old Testament that illustrates biblical belief for someone
who does not believe in "God." It is the book of Esther, the only book in the Old
Testament that does not contain the word God.625 In the book of Esther, a decree has
been issued by the Persian King, at the behest of the high official Haman, ordering
the deaths of all the Jews in the kingdom.626 Queen Esther, who is a Jew, though
this was not widely known, is requested by her cousin Mordecai to intercede with
the King on behalf of the Jews.627 She is afraid to do so because there is a penalty
of death for an uninvited approach to the King, unless the King accepts the entry.628
Mordecai sends the following response to Esther: "[I]f you keep silence at such a
time as this, relief and deliverance will rise for the Jews from another quarter, but
you and your father's house will perish. And who knows whether you have not
come to the kingdom for such a time as this? '629 Mordecai does not say, "God made
you Queen for this reason." Rather, he asserts, simply, that she is Queen for just this
moment.63° In other words, Esther's life has this certain shape. This is the moment
for the fulfillment of the purpose of her life. This is the fulfillment of her destiny.
All meaning in human life comes from the perception that our lives have a mean-
ingful shape. This is the sense I may have in my vocation, or in my art, or in going
to war to end slavery.
Just as Esther's life has this shape, so history has this shape as a whole. This is
Brueggemann's understanding of the Bible. There is a moral shape in history.63' Who
would want to deny that? Who, in denying that, would want to live out of that denial?
623 BARTH, supra note 414, at 22.
624 Matthew 7:21.
625 See Dreisbach, supra note 161, at 958.
626 See Esther 3:8-11.
627 See Esther 2:10, 4:8-9.
628 See Esther 4:10.
629 Esther 4:14.
630 Id. 4:13.
631 See BRUEGGEMAN, supra note 192, at 113.
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When the scientist asserts that evolution shows there is no design in the uni-
verse,632 he is not speaking of the shape of his own life.633 He is not speaking of the
history of science, and he certainly is not speaking of history itself.634
There is one more point about God in the Bible. The moral process in history
is not indifferent to us. We are invited to participate. We are called. We are called
by something that is more than other people. Esther is called by Mordecai,635 it is true,
but the call goes deeper than that. In answering such a call, we are promised, if not
a happy life, at least a life of significance. Karl Barth said this better than anyone
else: "as that reality by which men know God, lay hold of Him, and cling to Him, as
the Unknown, Hidden God, as the final 'Yes' in the final 'No' of all concrete, observ-
able life., 636 Perhaps we cannot say any more about God than that.
CONCLUSION
America is a religious democracy now. The secular consensus has ended. This
change does not appear to be temporary. The change has centered in the actions of
voters rather than governmental actors. Therefore, even if religious democracy were
something the courts wanted to alter, they would be unable to do so.
Religious democracy, however, is not something we should wish to alter. It
opens a depth of political life that secular politics cannot reach. For that reason,
religious democracy might help America to become a better democracy.
Clearly, there are questions that religious democracy will have to answer. The
most significant one is whether religious democracy can practice true pluralism at
home and abroad. Can religious democracy protect non-believers and dissenting
believers? This is a vital question, but it is not the greatest challenge facing religious
democracy.
American political life is crippled today by a false dualism between religious
voters and secular voters. This divide has led to a narrow expression of religion in
America's public square. The challenge to religious democracy is not ultimately its
relationship to our many religious traditions or even its relationship to secularism.
The greatest challenge to religious democracy will be to bring about religious renewal
in American political life.
632 See DAWKINS, supra note 503.
633 Even though he may say he is. Id. at 6 ("Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually
fulfilled atheist.").
634 See id.
635 Esther 4:8-9, 13-14.
636 BARTH, TH EPISTLE, supra note 607, at 493.
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